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Inferentialists tend to insist that they can avoid these results: there are constraints on what sets of inference rules can legitimately be admitted into a language, the story goes, and the rules governing disruptive expressions like \u2018tonk\u2019 are defective and so inadmissible. I argue, though, that from an inferentialist perspective, there\u2019s no genuine sense in which rules like the \u2018tonk\u2019 rules are defective; in fact, anyone who endorses the relevant sort of inferentialism turns out to be committed to Carnap\u2019s principle of tolerance. I then explain why this, despite appearances, isn\u2019t a problem for inferentialism.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10992-026-09836-8","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,13]],"date-time":"2026-03-13T12:17:43Z","timestamp":1773404263000},"page":"411-435","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Whence Admissibility Constraints? From Inferentialism to Tolerance"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"55","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4603-0569","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Brett","family":"Topey","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,13]]},"reference":[{"key":"9836_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"130","DOI":"10.1093\/analys\/22.6.130","volume":"22","author":"ND Belnap","year":"1962","unstructured":"Belnap, N. D. (1962). 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