{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,9]],"date-time":"2026-02-09T18:32:59Z","timestamp":1770661979365,"version":"3.49.0"},"reference-count":46,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2016,9,9]],"date-time":"2016-09-09T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1473379200000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"funder":[{"name":"Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DE)"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Synthese"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,3]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-016-1207-9","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2016,9,9]],"date-time":"2016-09-09T14:22:28Z","timestamp":1473430948000},"page":"1103-1125","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":10,"title":["The value of minimalist truth"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"195","author":[{"given":"Filippo","family":"Ferrari","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,9,9]]},"reference":[{"key":"1207_CR1","unstructured":"Bader, R. (ms). Conditional intrinsic value. Unpublished manuscript."},{"key":"1207_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"23","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1013165112545","volume":"107","author":"B Bradley","year":"2002","unstructured":"Bradley, B. (2002). Is intrinsic value conditional? Philosophical Studies, 107, 23\u201344.","journal-title":"Philosophical Studies"},{"key":"1207_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"11","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199660025.003.0002","volume-title":"Epistemic norms","author":"B Brogaard","year":"2014","unstructured":"Brogaard, B. (2014). Intellectual flourishing as the fundamental epistemic norm. In C. Littlejhon & J. Turri (Eds.), Epistemic norms (pp. 11\u201332). Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"key":"1207_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Cameron, R. (2009). Intrinsic and extrinsic properties. In R. Le. Poidevin, S. Peter, M. G. Andrew & R. P. Cameron (Eds.), The routledge companion to metaphysics. Routledge.","DOI":"10.4324\/9780203879306-30"},{"key":"1207_CR5","volume-title":"Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality","year":"2012","unstructured":"Correia, F., & Schnieder, B. (Eds.). (2012). Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."},{"key":"1207_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"141","DOI":"10.1093\/aristotelian\/59.1.141","volume":"59","author":"M Dummett","year":"1959","unstructured":"Dummett, M. (1959). Truth. Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, 59, 141\u2013162.","journal-title":"Truth. Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society"},{"issue":"3","key":"1207_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"177","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00367469","volume":"60","author":"M Dunn","year":"1990","unstructured":"Dunn, M. (1990). Relevant predication 2: Intrinsic properties and internal relations. Philosophical Studies, 60(3), 177\u2013206.","journal-title":"Philosophical Studies"},{"issue":"2","key":"1207_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"279","DOI":"10.1080\/00048402.2012.686514","volume":"91","author":"D Edwards","year":"2013","unstructured":"Edwards, D. (2013). Truth as a substantive property. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), 279\u2013294.","journal-title":"Australasian Journal of Philosophy"},{"key":"1207_CR9","first-page":"246","volume-title":"The blackwell companion to naturalism","author":"D Edwards","year":"2015","unstructured":"Edwards, D., Ferrari, F., & Lynch, M. (2015). Truth and naturalism. In K. Clark (Ed.), The blackwell companion to naturalism (pp. 246\u2013261). Oxford: Blackwell."},{"issue":"264","key":"1207_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"516","DOI":"10.1093\/pq\/pqv116","volume":"66","author":"F Ferrari","year":"2016","unstructured":"Ferrari, F. (2016). Disagreement about taste and alethic suberogation. Philosophical Quarterly, 66(264), 516\u2013535.","journal-title":"Philosophical Quarterly"},{"key":"1207_CR11","unstructured":"Ferrari, F. (ms). Normative (Alethic) Pluralism. Unpublished manuscript"},{"key":"1207_CR12","unstructured":"Ferrari, F., & Moruzzi, S. (ms). Deflationary Pluralism. Unpublished manuscript"},{"key":"1207_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1093\/0199242895.001.0001","volume-title":"Truth and the absence of fact","author":"HH Field","year":"2001","unstructured":"Field, H. H. (2001). Truth and the absence of fact. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"key":"1207_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"37","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781139149136.002","volume-title":"Metaphysical grounding","author":"K Fine","year":"2012","unstructured":"Fine, K. (2012). Guide to ground. In F. Correia & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical grounding (pp. 37\u201380). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."},{"key":"1207_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"175","DOI":"10.1515\/9783110292596","volume-title":"Companion to intrinsic properties","author":"R Francescotti","year":"2014","unstructured":"Francescotti, R. (2014). Intrinsic\/extrinsic: A relational account defended. In R. Francescotti (Ed.), Companion to intrinsic properties (pp. 175\u2013198). Berlin: De Gruyter."},{"key":"1207_CR16","first-page":"338","volume":"15","author":"A Gibbard","year":"2005","unstructured":"Gibbard, A. (2005). Truth and correct belief. Philosophical. Issues, 15, 338\u2013350.","journal-title":"Issues"},{"key":"1207_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1093\/0198752237.001.0001","volume-title":"Truth","author":"P Horwich","year":"1998","unstructured":"Horwich, P. (1998). Truth (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.","edition":"2"},{"issue":"2","key":"1207_CR18","first-page":"347","volume":"40","author":"P Horwich","year":"2006","unstructured":"Horwich, P. (2006). The value of truth. No\u00fbs, 40(2), 347\u2013360.","journal-title":"The value of truth. No\u00fbs"},{"key":"1207_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199268900.001.0001","volume-title":"Truth-Meaning-Reality","author":"P Horwich","year":"2010","unstructured":"Horwich, P. (2010). Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"key":"1207_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"17","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199672134.003.0002","volume-title":"The aim of belief","author":"P Horwich","year":"2013","unstructured":"Horwich, P. (2013). Belief-truth norms. In T. Chan (Ed.), The aim of belief (pp. 17\u201331). Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"issue":"2","key":"1207_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"169","DOI":"10.2307\/2184924","volume":"92","author":"C Korsgaard","year":"1983","unstructured":"Korsgaard, C. (1983). Two distinction in goodness. The Philosophical Review, 92(2), 169\u2013195.","journal-title":"The Philosophical Review"},{"issue":"1","key":"1207_CR22","first-page":"199","volume":"32","author":"J Kvanvig","year":"2008","unstructured":"Kvanvig, J. (2008). Pointless truth. Midwest Studies. Philosophy, 32(1), 199\u2013212.","journal-title":"Philosophy"},{"key":"1207_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"157","DOI":"10.1215\/00318108-2006-034","volume":"116","author":"R Langton","year":"2007","unstructured":"Langton, R. (2007). Objective and unconditioned value. Philosophical Review, 116, 157\u2013185.","journal-title":"Philosophical Review"},{"key":"1207_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lemos, N. (2001). Value ... and what follows. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(2), 492\u2013495.","DOI":"10.2307\/3071083"},{"key":"1207_CR25","volume-title":"On the plurality of worlds","author":"D Lewis","year":"1986","unstructured":"Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell."},{"issue":"1","key":"1207_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"19","DOI":"10.7710\/1526-0569.1453","volume":"14","author":"J Litland","year":"2013","unstructured":"Litland, J. (2013). On some counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding. Essays in Philosophy, 14(1), 19\u201332.","journal-title":"Essays in Philosophy"},{"issue":"217","key":"1207_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"497","DOI":"10.1111\/j.0031-8094.2004.00369.x","volume":"54","author":"M Lynch","year":"2004","unstructured":"Lynch, M. (2004). Minimalism and the value of truth. The Philosophical Quarterly, 54(217), 497\u2013517.","journal-title":"The Philosophical Quarterly"},{"key":"1207_CR28","volume-title":"True to life","author":"M Lynch","year":"2005","unstructured":"Lynch, M. (2005). True to life. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press."},{"key":"1207_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199218738.001.0001","volume-title":"Truth as one and many","author":"M Lynch","year":"2009","unstructured":"Lynch, M. (2009a). Truth as one and many. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"key":"1207_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"225","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199231188.003.0011","volume-title":"Epistemic value","author":"M Lynch","year":"2009","unstructured":"Lynch, M. (2009b). The values of truth and the truth of values. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Epistemic value (pp. 225\u2013242). Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"issue":"1","key":"1207_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"76","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1933-1592.2009.00267.x","volume":"79","author":"M Lynch","year":"2009","unstructured":"Lynch, M. (2009c). Truth, value and epistemic expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(1), 76\u201397.","journal-title":"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research"},{"key":"1207_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"302","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0149.2005.0374c.x","volume":"46","author":"M McGrath","year":"2005","unstructured":"McGrath, M. (2005). Lynch on the value of truth. Philosophical Books, 46, 302\u2013310.","journal-title":"Philosophical Books"},{"issue":"2","key":"1207_CR33","first-page":"177","volume":"114","author":"C McHugh","year":"2014","unstructured":"McHugh, C. (2014). Fitting belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114(2), 177.","journal-title":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society"},{"key":"1207_CR34","unstructured":"Moore, G. E. (1922). The conception of intrinsic value. Philosophical studies, 260."},{"key":"1207_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"31","DOI":"10.1023\/B:ETTA.0000019981.46807.4f","volume":"7","author":"J Olson","year":"2004","unstructured":"Olson, J. (2004). Intrinsicalism and conditionalism about final value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 7, 31\u201352.","journal-title":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice"},{"key":"1207_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.5040\/9781472594280","volume-title":"Value theory","author":"F Orsi","year":"2015","unstructured":"Orsi, F. (2015). Value theory. London: Bloomsbury."},{"issue":"1","key":"1207_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"33","DOI":"10.1111\/j.0066-7372.2003.00002.x","volume":"100","author":"W Rabinowicz","year":"2000","unstructured":"Rabinowicz, W., & R\u00f8nnow-Rasmussen, T. (2000). A distinction in value: Intrinsic and for its own sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100(1), 33\u201351.","journal-title":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society"},{"issue":"3","key":"1207_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"517","DOI":"10.1017\/apa.2014.22","volume":"1","author":"G Rodriguez-Pereyra","year":"2015","unstructured":"Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2015). Grounding is not a strict order. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(3), 517\u2013534.","journal-title":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association"},{"key":"1207_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"122","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781139149136.005","volume-title":"Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality","author":"J Schaffer","year":"2012","unstructured":"Schaffer, J. (2012). Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity. In F. Correia & S. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality (pp. 122\u2013138). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."},{"issue":"3","key":"1207_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"227","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00085.x","volume":"8","author":"B Williams","year":"1995","unstructured":"Williams, B. (1995). Truth in ethics. Ratio, 8(3), 227\u2013236.","journal-title":"Ratio"},{"key":"1207_CR41","volume-title":"New waves in truth","author":"C Wrenn","year":"2010","unstructured":"Wrenn, C. (2010). True belief is not instrumentally valuable. In C. D. Wright & J. L. L. Nikolaj (Eds.), New waves in truth. London: Palgrave Macmillan."},{"key":"1207_CR42","volume-title":"Truth","author":"C Wrenn","year":"2015","unstructured":"Wrenn, C. (2015a). Truth. Cambridge: Polity Press."},{"issue":"4","key":"1207_CR43","first-page":"1","volume":"96","author":"CB Wrenn","year":"2015","unstructured":"Wrenn, C. B. (2015b). Truth is not (very) intrinsically valuable. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96(4), 1\u201321.","journal-title":"Pacific Philosophical Quarterly"},{"key":"1207_CR44","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.4159\/9780674045385","volume-title":"Truth and objectivity","author":"C Wright","year":"1992","unstructured":"Wright, C. (1992). Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press."},{"issue":"263","key":"1207_CR45","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"362","DOI":"10.1093\/pq\/pqv085","volume":"66","author":"J Wyatt","year":"2016","unstructured":"Wyatt, J. (2016). The many (yet few) faces of deflationism. Philosophical Quarterly, 66(263), 362\u2013382.","journal-title":"Philosophical Quarterly"},{"key":"1207_CR46","unstructured":"Zimmerman, M. (2015) Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2015 edition). Stanford: Stanford University. http:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/archives\/spr2015\/entries\/value-intrinsic-extrinsic\/ ."}],"container-title":["Synthese"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s11229-016-1207-9\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s11229-016-1207-9.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s11229-016-1207-9.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,8,20]],"date-time":"2023-08-20T01:33:47Z","timestamp":1692495227000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s11229-016-1207-9"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2016,9,9]]},"references-count":46,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,3]]}},"alternative-id":["1207"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s11229-016-1207-9","relation":{},"ISSN":["0039-7857","1573-0964"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0039-7857","type":"print"},{"value":"1573-0964","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2016,9,9]]}}}