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Others disagree, but we argue here that such disagreements are often terminological. We explain why DCOP holds in a Ramseyian operationalist model of credence, but show that it is trivial to extend this model so that DCOP fails. We then discuss a model due to Joyce, and show that Joyce\u2019s rejection of DCOP rests on terminological choices about terms such as \u2018intention\u2019, \u2018prediction\u2019, and \u2018belief\u2019. Once these choices are in view, they reveal underlying agreement between Joyce and the DCOP-favouring tradition that descends from Ramsey. Joyce\u2019s Evidential Autonomy Thesis is effectively DCOP, in different terminological clothing. Both principles rest on the so-called \u2018transparency\u2019 of first-person present-tensed reflection on one\u2019s own mental states.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-018-01926-8","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,9,17]],"date-time":"2018-09-17T13:37:53Z","timestamp":1537191473000},"page":"4365-4386","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["Ramsey and Joyce on deliberation and prediction"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"197","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8865-4647","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Yang","family":"Liu","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9091-760X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Huw","family":"Price","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,9,17]]},"reference":[{"key":"1926_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781139107990","volume-title":"Evidence, decision and causality","author":"A Ahmed","year":"2014","unstructured":"Ahmed, A. 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