{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,7]],"date-time":"2025-10-07T14:29:52Z","timestamp":1759847392833,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":39,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"S20","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,1,22]],"date-time":"2019-01-22T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1548115200000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,1,22]],"date-time":"2019-01-22T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1548115200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100000155","name":"Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100000155","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Synthese"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,8]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-018-02073-w","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,1,24]],"date-time":"2019-01-24T02:50:40Z","timestamp":1548298240000},"page":"4813-4830","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Against logical generalism"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"198","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-7212-1117","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Nicole","family":"Wyatt","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Gillman","family":"Payette","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,1,22]]},"reference":[{"key":"2073_CR1","volume-title":"Logical pluralism","author":"J Beall","year":"2006","unstructured":"Beall, J., & Restall, G. (2006). Logical pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"issue":"3","key":"2073_CR2","first-page":"783","volume":"4","author":"B Brown","year":"2017","unstructured":"Brown, B. (2017). A preservationist perspective on relevance logic. Journal of Applied Logics\u2014IfCoLoG Journal of Logics and their Applications, 4(3), 783\u2013794.","journal-title":"Journal of Applied Logics\u2014IfCoLoG Journal of Logics and their Applications"},{"issue":"4","key":"2073_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"739","DOI":"10.1007\/s10670-016-9841-7","volume":"82","author":"CR Caret","year":"2017","unstructured":"Caret, C. R. (2017). The collapse of logical pluralism has been greatly exaggerated. Erkenntnis, 82(4), 739\u2013760. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s10670-016-9841-7.","journal-title":"Erkenntnis"},{"issue":"1\/2","key":"2073_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"75","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0114.1980.tb00005.x","volume":"61","author":"N Cartwright","year":"1980","unstructured":"Cartwright, N. (1980). Do the laws of physics state the facts? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61(1\/2), 75.","journal-title":"Pacific Philosophical Quarterly"},{"issue":"3\u20134","key":"2073_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1007\/s11787-014-0094-4","volume":"8","author":"RT Cook","year":"2014","unstructured":"Cook, R. T. (2014). There is no paradox of logical validity. Logica Universalis, 8(3\u20134), 1\u201321. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s11787-014-0094-4.","journal-title":"Logica Universalis"},{"key":"2073_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/0199270023.001.0001","volume-title":"Ethics without principles","author":"J Dancy","year":"2004","unstructured":"Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics without principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"issue":"4","key":"2073_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"303","DOI":"10.1080\/01445340.2011.555505","volume":"32","author":"NC Dutilh","year":"2011","unstructured":"Dutilh, N. C. (2011). The different ways in which logic is (said to be) formal. History and Philosophy of Logic, 32(4), 303\u201332. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/01445340.2011.555505.","journal-title":"History and Philosophy of Logic"},{"key":"2073_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"263","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199296309.003.0011","volume-title":"New essays on tarski and philosophy","author":"J Etchemendy","year":"2008","unstructured":"Etchemendy, J. (2008). Reflections on consequence. In D. Patterson (Ed.), New essays on tarski and philosophy (pp. 263\u2013299). Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"issue":"1\u20132","key":"2073_CR9","first-page":"1","volume":"92","author":"H Field","year":"1998","unstructured":"Field, H. (1998). Epistemological nonfactualism and the a prioricity of logic. Philosophical Studies, 92(1\u20132), 1\u201324.","journal-title":"Philosophical Studies"},{"key":"2073_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"147","DOI":"10.1515\/9781614516873.147","volume-title":"Logic without borders: Essays on set theory, model theory, philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics","author":"C Franks","year":"2015","unstructured":"Franks, C. (2015). Logical nihilism. In Andr\u00e9s Villaveces, Roman Kossak, Juha Kontinen, & Asa Hirvonen (Eds.), Logic without borders: Essays on set theory, model theory, philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics (pp. 147\u2013166). Berlin: De Gruyter."},{"key":"2073_CR11","volume-title":"Foundations of logical consequence","author":"M Glanzberg","year":"2015","unstructured":"Glanzberg, M. (2015). Logical consequence and natural language. In C. R. Caret & O. T. Hjortland (Eds.), Foundations of logical consequence. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"key":"2073_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511812866","volume-title":"Philosophy of logics","author":"S Haack","year":"1978","unstructured":"Haack, S. (1978). Philosophy of logics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press."},{"key":"2073_CR13","volume-title":"Change in view","author":"G Harman","year":"1986","unstructured":"Harman, G. (1986). Change in view. Cambridge: MIT Press."},{"issue":"3","key":"2073_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"334","DOI":"10.1177\/0048393108319414","volume":"38","author":"F Hindriks","year":"2008","unstructured":"Hindriks, F. (2008). False models as explanatory engines. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 38(3), 334\u2013360.","journal-title":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences"},{"volume-title":"On preserving: Essays on preservationism and paraconsistency. Toronto Studies in Philosophy","year":"2009","key":"2073_CR15","unstructured":"Jennings, R. E., Brown, B., & Schotch, P. (Eds.). (2009). On preserving: Essays on preservationism and paraconsistency. Toronto Studies in Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press."},{"key":"2073_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"149","DOI":"10.1007\/978-94-010-0526-5_6","volume-title":"Logic, meaning and computation","author":"E Keenan","year":"2001","unstructured":"Keenan, E. (2001). Logical objects. In C. A. Anderson & M. Zel\u00ebny (Eds.), Logic, meaning and computation (pp. 149\u201380). Berlin: Springer."},{"key":"2073_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781139171472","volume-title":"Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery","author":"I Lakatos","year":"1976","unstructured":"Lakatos, I. (1976). Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."},{"key":"2073_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"43","DOI":"10.1007\/978-94-015-9731-9_2","volume-title":"Explanation: Theoretical approaches","author":"P Lipton","year":"2001","unstructured":"Lipton, P. (2001). What good is an explanation? In G. Hon & S. Rakover (Eds.), Explanation: Theoretical approaches (pp. 43\u201359). Dordrecht: Kluwer."},{"key":"2073_CR19","unstructured":"MacFarlane, J. (2004). In what sense (if any) is logic normative for thought? Central Division APA, Chicago, Symposium on the Normativity of Logic. https:\/\/johnmacfarlane.net\/work.html. Accessed 12 July 2016."},{"issue":"9","key":"2073_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"462","DOI":"10.2307\/2026276","volume":"82","author":"V McGee","year":"1985","unstructured":"McGee, V. (1985). A counter example to modus ponens. Journal of Philosophy, 82(9), 462\u2013471.","journal-title":"Journal of Philosophy"},{"issue":"2","key":"2073_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"237","DOI":"10.1007\/s11098-011-9716-3","volume":"160","author":"M Mizrahi","year":"2012","unstructured":"Mizrahi, M. (2012). Idealizations and scientific understanding. Philosophical Studies, 160(2), 237\u2013252.","journal-title":"Philosophical Studies"},{"issue":"4","key":"2073_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"647","DOI":"10.1086\/378858","volume":"70","author":"JD Norton","year":"2003","unstructured":"Norton, J. D. (2003). A material theory of induction. Philosophy of Science, 70(4), 647\u2013670.","journal-title":"Philosophy of Science"},{"issue":"5","key":"2073_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"765","DOI":"10.1086\/656542","volume":"77","author":"JD Norton","year":"2010","unstructured":"Norton, J. D. (2010). There are no universal rules for induction. Philosophy of Science, 77(5), 765\u2013777.","journal-title":"Philosophy of Science"},{"issue":"2","key":"2073_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"295","DOI":"10.1007\/s11787-007-0015-x","volume":"1","author":"G Payette","year":"2007","unstructured":"Payette, G., & Schotch, P. K. (2007). On preserving. Logica Universalis, 1(2), 295\u2013310.","journal-title":"Logica Universalis"},{"issue":"1","key":"2073_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"157","DOI":"10.1080\/00048402.2017.1342674","volume":"96","author":"G Payette","year":"2018","unstructured":"Payette, G., & Wyatt, N. (2018a). How do logics explain? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(1), 157\u2013167. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/00048402.2017.1342674.","journal-title":"Australasian Journal of Philosophy"},{"key":"2073_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Payette, G., & Wyatt, N. (2018b). Logical particularism. In N. Kellen, N. J. L. L. Pedersen & J. Wyatt (Eds.), Pluralisms: Truth and logic (pp. 277\u2013299). Palgrave Macmillan.","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-98346-2_12"},{"key":"2073_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511801174","volume-title":"An introduction to non-classical logic: From if to is","author":"G Priest","year":"2008","unstructured":"Priest, G. (2008). An introduction to non-classical logic: From if to is. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press."},{"key":"2073_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"211","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781139626279.016","volume-title":"The metaphysics of logic, chapter 12","author":"G Priest","year":"2014","unstructured":"Priest, G. (2014). Revising logic. In P. Rush (Ed.), The metaphysics of logic, chapter 12 (pp. 211\u201323). Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press."},{"key":"2073_CR29","volume-title":"Paraconsistent logic: Essays on the inconsistent","author":"G Priest","year":"1989","unstructured":"Priest, G., Routley, R., & Norman, J. (1989). Paraconsistent logic: Essays on the inconsistent. Munich: Philosophia Verlag."},{"key":"2073_CR30","unstructured":"Russell, G. (2015). Could there be no logic? Presented at Society for Exact Philosophy Meeting; Hamilton, Ontario."},{"key":"2073_CR31","first-page":"1","volume-title":"Logic, methodology, and the philosophy of science: Proceedings of the fifteenth international congress","author":"G Russell","year":"2017","unstructured":"Russell, G. (2017). An introduction to logical nihilism. In H. Leitgeb, I. Niiniluoto, P. Sepp\u00e4l\u00e4, & E. Sober (Eds.), Logic, methodology, and the philosophy of science: Proceedings of the fifteenth international congress (pp. 1\u201310?). London, UK: College Publications."},{"key":"2073_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199696529.001.0001","volume-title":"Varieties of logic","author":"S Shapiro","year":"2014","unstructured":"Shapiro, S. (2014). Varieties of logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"key":"2073_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1093\/aristotelian\/83.1.1","volume":"83","author":"T Smiley","year":"1982","unstructured":"Smiley, T. (1982). the presidential address: The schematic fallacy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 83, 1\u201317.","journal-title":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society"},{"key":"2073_CR34","volume-title":"Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy","author":"T Smiley","year":"1998","unstructured":"Smiley, T. (1998). Consequence, conceptions of. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. London: Routledge."},{"key":"2073_CR35","volume-title":"The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, spring edition","author":"F Steinberger","year":"2017","unstructured":"Steinberger, F. (2017). The normative status of logic. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, spring edition. Palo Alto: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University."},{"issue":"1","key":"2073_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"137","DOI":"10.1007\/s11225-008-9095-8","volume":"88","author":"G Wheeler","year":"2008","unstructured":"Wheeler, G. (2008). Applied logic without psychologism. Studia Logica, 88(1), 137\u2013156. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s11225-008-9095-8.","journal-title":"Studia Logica"},{"key":"2073_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"79","DOI":"10.1016\/j.shpsa.2015.03.005","volume":"52","author":"AI Woody","year":"2015","unstructured":"Woody, A. I. (2015). Re-orienting discussions of scientific explanation: A functional perspective. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 52, 79\u201387.","journal-title":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A"},{"key":"2073_CR38","first-page":"25","volume":"241","author":"N Wyatt","year":"2018","unstructured":"Wyatt, N., & Payette, G. (2018). Logical pluralism and logical form. Logique & Analyse, 241, 25\u201342.","journal-title":"Logique & Analyse"},{"issue":"6","key":"2073_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1001","DOI":"10.1007\/s10992-012-9228-4","volume":"41","author":"S Yalcin","year":"2012","unstructured":"Yalcin, S. (2012). A counterexample to modus tollens. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41(6), 1001\u20131024. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s10992-012-9228-4.","journal-title":"Journal of Philosophical Logic"}],"container-title":["Synthese"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s11229-018-02073-w.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s11229-018-02073-w\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s11229-018-02073-w.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,30]],"date-time":"2021-08-30T12:29:12Z","timestamp":1630326552000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s11229-018-02073-w"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,1,22]]},"references-count":39,"journal-issue":{"issue":"S20","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,8]]}},"alternative-id":["2073"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s11229-018-02073-w","relation":{},"ISSN":["0039-7857","1573-0964"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0039-7857"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1573-0964"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,1,22]]},"assertion":[{"value":"24 May 2018","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"20 December 2018","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"22 January 2019","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}