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The \u2018paradox\u2019 refers to a simple argument from the moderate claim that all truths are knowable to the extreme claim that all truths are known. It is significant because anti-realists have wanted to maintain knowability but reject omniscience. The core of the proposed solution is to concede realism about epistemic statements while maintaining anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. Transcendental epistemology supports such a view by providing for a sharp distinction between how we come to understand and apply epistemic versus non-epistemic concepts, the former through our capacity for a special kind of reflective self-knowledge Kant calls \u2018transcendental apperception\u2019. The proposal is a version of restriction strategy: it solves the paradox by restricting the anti-realist\u2019s knowability principle. Restriction strategies have been a common response to the paradox but previous versions face serious difficulties: either they result in a knowability principle too weak to do the work anti-realists want it to, or they succumb to modified forms of the paradox, or they are ad hoc. It is argued that restricting knowability to non-epistemic statements by conceding realism about epistemic statements avoids all versions of the paradox, leaves enough for the anti-realist attack on classical logic, and, with the help of transcendental epistemology, is principled in a way that remains compatible with a thoroughly anti-realist outlook.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-018-1822-8","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,6,9]],"date-time":"2018-06-09T09:47:53Z","timestamp":1528537673000},"page":"3253-3278","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["How to solve the knowability paradox with transcendental epistemology"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"198","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-4590-1307","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Andrew","family":"Stephenson","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,6,9]]},"reference":[{"key":"1822_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780198747130.001.0001","volume-title":"Manifest reality: Kant\u2019s idealism and his realism","author":"L Allais","year":"2015","unstructured":"Allais, L. 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