{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,22]],"date-time":"2022-09-22T01:30:33Z","timestamp":1663810233966},"reference-count":34,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"6","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,28]],"date-time":"2019-09-28T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1569628800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,28]],"date-time":"2019-09-28T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1569628800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Synthese"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,6]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-019-02389-1","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,28]],"date-time":"2019-09-28T18:15:55Z","timestamp":1569694555000},"page":"5067-5088","update-policy":"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["The value of truth and the normativity of evidence"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"198","author":[{"given":"Tommaso","family":"Piazza","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,28]]},"reference":[{"key":"2389_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"257","DOI":"10.2307\/2214077","volume":"2","author":"W Alston","year":"1987","unstructured":"Alston, W. (1987). The deontological conception of epistemic justification. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 257\u2013299.","journal-title":"Philosophical Perspectives"},{"key":"2389_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"427","DOI":"10.1111\/phib.12140","volume":"59","author":"S Berker","year":"2018","unstructured":"Berker, S. (2018). A combinatorial argument against practical reasons for belief. Analytic Philosophy, 59, 427\u2013470.","journal-title":"Analytic Philosophy"},{"issue":"449","key":"2389_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"942","DOI":"10.1093\/mind\/fzw017","volume":"125","author":"J Bermudez","year":"2016","unstructured":"Bermudez, J. (2016). Review of believing against the evidence, by Miriam Schleifer McCormick. Mind, 125(449), 942\u2013945.","journal-title":"Mind"},{"key":"2389_CR4","volume-title":"Epistemic rationality and epistemic normativity","author":"P Bondy","year":"2018","unstructured":"Bondy, P. (2018). Epistemic rationality and epistemic normativity. New York: Routledge."},{"key":"2389_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-019-02163-3","author":"P Bondy","year":"2019","unstructured":"Bondy, P. (2019). The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief. Synthese. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s11229-019-02163-3.","journal-title":"Synthese"},{"issue":"3","key":"2389_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"667","DOI":"10.2307\/2653823","volume":"60","author":"R Feldman","year":"2000","unstructured":"Feldman, R. (2000). The ethics of belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60(3), 667\u2013695.","journal-title":"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research"},{"issue":"8","key":"2389_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"2221","DOI":"10.1007\/s11098-018-1123-6","volume":"176","author":"S Goldberg","year":"2019","unstructured":"Goldberg, S. (2019). Against epistemic partiality in friendship. Philosophical Studies, 176(8), 2221\u20132242.","journal-title":"Philosophical Studies"},{"key":"2389_CR8","volume-title":"The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy","author":"W James","year":"1897","unstructured":"James, W. (1897). The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press."},{"key":"2389_CR9","first-page":"63","volume-title":"Philosophy of psychology: Debates on psychological explanation","author":"M Johnston","year":"1995","unstructured":"Johnston, M. (1995). Self-deception and the nature of mind. In C. Macdonald (Ed.), Philosophy of psychology: Debates on psychological explanation (pp. 63\u201391). New York: Blackwell."},{"issue":"3","key":"2389_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"329","DOI":"10.1080\/05568640409485146","volume":"33","author":"S Keller","year":"2004","unstructured":"Keller, S. (2004). Friendship and belief. Philosophical Papers, 33(3), 329\u2013351.","journal-title":"Philosophical Papers"},{"issue":"2","key":"2389_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"163","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1020212716425","volume":"110","author":"T Kelly","year":"2002","unstructured":"Kelly, T. (2002). The rationality of belief and some other propositional attitudes. Philosophical Studies, 110(2), 163\u2013196.","journal-title":"Philosophical Studies"},{"key":"2389_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511498909","volume-title":"The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding","author":"J Kvanvig","year":"2003","unstructured":"Kvanvig, J. (2003). The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."},{"issue":"2","key":"2389_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"391","DOI":"10.1017\/S0012217311000333","volume":"50","author":"D Matheson","year":"2011","unstructured":"Matheson, D. (2011). How to be an epistemic value pluralist. Dialogue, 50(2), 391\u2013405.","journal-title":"Dialogue"},{"key":"2389_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.4324\/9781315882390","volume-title":"Evidentialism and epistemic justification","author":"K McCain","year":"2014","unstructured":"McCain, K. (2014). Evidentialism and epistemic justification. London: Routledge."},{"key":"2389_CR15","volume-title":"Believing against the evidence. Agency and the ethics of belief","author":"MS McCormick","year":"2015","unstructured":"McCormick, M. S. (2015). Believing against the evidence. Agency and the ethics of belief. London: Routledge."},{"key":"2389_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"8","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0114.2011.01413.x","volume":"93","author":"C McHugh","year":"2012","unstructured":"McHugh, C. (2012). The truth norm of belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93, 8\u201330.","journal-title":"Pacific Philosophical Quarterly"},{"issue":"4","key":"2389_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1117","DOI":"10.1111\/ejop.12032","volume":"23","author":"C McHugh","year":"2013","unstructured":"McHugh, C. (2013). The illusion of exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy, 23(4), 1117\u20131136.","journal-title":"European Journal of Philosophy"},{"issue":"2","key":"2389_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"312","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1933-1592.2010.00380.x","volume":"81","author":"PJ Nickel","year":"2010","unstructured":"Nickel, P. J. (2010). Voluntary belief on a reasonable basis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(2), 312\u2013334.","journal-title":"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research"},{"key":"2389_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:osobl\/9780199572809.001.0001","volume-title":"On what matters","author":"D Parfit","year":"2011","unstructured":"Parfit, D. (2011). On what matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"key":"2389_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1080\/00048402.2018.1563798","author":"R Pettigrew","year":"2019","unstructured":"Pettigrew, R. (2019). Veritism, epistemic risk, and the swamping problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/00048402.2018.1563798.","journal-title":"Australasian Journal of Philosophy."},{"key":"2389_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"19","DOI":"10.1017\/S1358246109000046","volume":"64","author":"D Pritchard","year":"2009","unstructured":"Pritchard, D. (2009). Knowledge, understanding, and epistemic value. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 64, 19\u201343.","journal-title":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement"},{"key":"2389_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199586264.001.0001","volume-title":"The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations","author":"D Pritchard","year":"2010","unstructured":"Pritchard, D. (2010). Knowledge and understanding. In D. Pritchard, A. Millar, & A. Haddock (Eds.), The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"key":"2389_CR23","volume-title":"Reasons for belief","author":"D Pritchard","year":"2011","unstructured":"Pritchard, D. (2011). What is the swamping problem? In A. Reisner & A. Steglich-Peterson (Eds.), Reasons for belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."},{"key":"2389_CR24","volume-title":"The ethics of belief","author":"D Pritchard","year":"2014","unstructured":"Pritchard, D. (2014). Truth as the fundamental epistemic good. In J. Matheson & R. Vico (Eds.), The ethics of belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"issue":"2","key":"2389_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"257","DOI":"10.1007\/s11098-008-9222-4","volume":"145","author":"A Reisner","year":"2009","unstructured":"Reisner, A. (2009). The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem. Philosophical Studies, 145(2), 257\u2013272.","journal-title":"Philosophical Studies"},{"key":"2389_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/nous.12253","author":"S Rinard","year":"2018","unstructured":"Rinard, S. (2018). Believing for practical reasons. Nous. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/nous.12253.","journal-title":"Nous."},{"issue":"225","key":"2389_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"481","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9213.2006.454.x","volume":"56","author":"N Shah","year":"2006","unstructured":"Shah, N. (2006). A new argument for evidentialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56(225), 481\u2013498.","journal-title":"The Philosophical Quarterly"},{"issue":"2","key":"2389_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"343","DOI":"10.1080\/00048402.2015.1068348","volume":"94","author":"N Sharadin","year":"2016","unstructured":"Sharadin, N. (2016). Nothing but the evidential considerations? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(2), 343\u2013361.","journal-title":"Australasian Journal of Philosophy"},{"issue":"506","key":"2389_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"381","DOI":"10.1093\/mind\/fzw070","volume":"127","author":"K Sylvan","year":"2018","unstructured":"Sylvan, K. (2018). Veritism unswamped. Mind, 127(506), 381\u2013435.","journal-title":"Mind"},{"key":"2389_CR30","volume-title":"Seemings and justification. New essays on dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism","year":"2013","unstructured":"Tucker, C. (Ed.). (2013). Seemings and justification. New essays on dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press."},{"issue":"265","key":"2389_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"805","DOI":"10.1093\/pq\/pqw026","volume":"66","author":"J Way","year":"2016","unstructured":"Way, J. (2016). Two arguments for evidentialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(265), 805\u2013818.","journal-title":"The Philosophical Quarterly"},{"key":"2389_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511621253","volume-title":"Problems of the self. Philosophical papers 1956\u20131972","author":"B Williams","year":"1973","unstructured":"Williams, B. (1973). Deciding to believe. In B. Williams (Ed.), Problems of the self. Philosophical papers 1956\u20131972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press."},{"key":"2389_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"173","DOI":"10.5840\/wcp20200053","volume":"5","author":"L Zagzebski","year":"2000","unstructured":"Zagzebski, L. (2000). From reliabilism to virtue epistemology. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, 5, 173\u2013179.","journal-title":"The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy"},{"key":"2389_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"12","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-9973.00257","volume":"34","author":"L Zagzebski","year":"2003","unstructured":"Zagzebski, L. (2003). The search for the source of the epistemic good. Metaphilosophy, 34, 12\u201328.","journal-title":"Metaphilosophy"}],"container-title":["Synthese"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s11229-019-02389-1.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s11229-019-02389-1\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s11229-019-02389-1.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2021,6,3]],"date-time":"2021-06-03T11:20:47Z","timestamp":1622719247000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s11229-019-02389-1"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,28]]},"references-count":34,"journal-issue":{"issue":"6","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,6]]}},"alternative-id":["2389"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s11229-019-02389-1","relation":{},"ISSN":["0039-7857","1573-0964"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0039-7857","type":"print"},{"value":"1573-0964","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,28]]},"assertion":[{"value":"23 June 2019","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"3 September 2019","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"28 September 2019","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}