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Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Hacking (Philos Sci 34(4):311\u2013325, 1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes: (i) an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at any given time; (ii) an account of how we reduce our logical ignorance by learning logical facts and how we should update our credences in response to such evidence; and (iii) an account of when logical ignorance is irrational and when it isn\u2019t. At the end, I explain why the requirement of logical omniscience remains true of ideal agents with no computational, processing, or storage limitations.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-020-02699-9","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,5]],"date-time":"2020-06-05T01:02:31Z","timestamp":1591318951000},"page":"9991-10020","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":15,"title":["Logical ignorance and logical learning"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"198","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-0822-4300","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Richard","family":"Pettigrew","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,5]]},"reference":[{"key":"2699_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"103","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9264.2014.00366.x","volume":"114","author":"F Berto","year":"2014","unstructured":"Berto, F. (2014). 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