{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,31]],"date-time":"2022-03-31T02:24:11Z","timestamp":1648693451693},"reference-count":22,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2012,4,10]],"date-time":"2012-04-10T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1334016000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["J Syst Sci Complex"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2012,6]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s11424-012-9301-7","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,4,10]],"date-time":"2012-04-10T00:03:03Z","timestamp":1334016183000},"page":"549-555","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"25","author":[{"given":"Yaqiong","family":"Wu","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Yong","family":"Zhao","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Chaoyuan","family":"Yue","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Xianglin","family":"Wu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,4,10]]},"reference":[{"key":"9301_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"227","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-6419.00083","volume":"13","author":"P. Klemperer","year":"1999","unstructured":"P. Klemperer, Auction theory: A guide to the literature, Journal of Economic Surveys, 1999, 13: 227\u2013286.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Surveys"},{"key":"9301_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"373","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-1765(95)00766-0","volume":"50","author":"Y. K. Che","year":"1996","unstructured":"Y. K. Che and I. Gale, Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints, Economics Letters, 1996, 50: 373\u2013379.","journal-title":"Economics Letters"},{"key":"9301_CR3","first-page":"97","volume":"6","author":"Y. K. Che","year":"1996","unstructured":"Y. K. Che and I. Gale, Financial constraints in auctions: Effects and antidotes, Advances in Applied Microeconomics, 1996, 6: 97\u2013120.","journal-title":"Advances in Applied Microeconomics"},{"key":"9301_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-937X.00033","volume":"65","author":"Y. K. Che","year":"1998","unstructured":"Y. K. Che and I. Gale, Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders, The Review of Economic Studies, 1998, 65: 1\u201321.","journal-title":"The Review of Economic Studies"},{"key":"9301_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"374","DOI":"10.1016\/S0022-0531(03)00033-4","volume":"110","author":"H. Fang","year":"2003","unstructured":"H. Fang and S. O. Parreiras, On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders: An example, Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 110: 374\u2013392.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Theory"},{"key":"9301_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"43","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2005.02.008","volume":"55","author":"M. Frutos","year":"2006","unstructured":"M. Frutos and L. Pechlivano, Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty, Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 55: 43\u201371.","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"9301_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"267","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1430-9134.1995.00267.x","volume":"4","author":"P. C. Cramton","year":"1995","unstructured":"P. C. Cramton, Money out of thin air: The nationwide narrow band PCS auction, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1995, 4: 267\u2013343.","journal-title":"Journal of Economics and Management Strategy"},{"key":"9301_CR8","first-page":"53","volume":"102","author":"D. Genesove","year":"1993","unstructured":"D. Genesove, Adverse selection in the wholesale used car market, The Journal of Political Economy, 1993, 102: 53\u201375.","journal-title":"The Journal of Political Economy"},{"key":"9301_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tcs.2007.10.040","volume":"393","author":"T. M. Bu","year":"2008","unstructured":"T. M. Bu, Q. Qi, and A. W. Sun, Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints, Theoretical Computer Science, 2008, 393: 1\u201313.","journal-title":"Theoretical Computer Science"},{"key":"9301_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"585","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2002.10.003","volume":"54","author":"A. Rapoport","year":"2004","unstructured":"A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss, Mixed-strategy play in single-stage first-price all-pay auctions with symmetric players, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2004, 54: 585\u2013607.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization"},{"key":"9301_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"435","DOI":"10.1007\/s001990000153","volume":"19","author":"I. Cho","year":"2002","unstructured":"I. Cho, K. Jewel, and R. Vohra, A simple model of coalitional bidding, Economic Theory, 2002, 19: 435\u2013457.","journal-title":"Economic Theory"},{"key":"9301_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"215","DOI":"10.1006\/game.2001.0896","volume":"39","author":"H. Fang","year":"2002","unstructured":"H. Fang and S. O. Parreiras, Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case, Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 39: 215\u2013236.","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"9301_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"667","DOI":"10.1016\/S0014-2921(00)00057-X","volume":"44","author":"E. Maskin","year":"2000","unstructured":"E. Maskin, Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers, European Economic Review, 2000, 44: 667\u2013681.","journal-title":"European Economic Review"},{"key":"9301_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"129","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2000.2715","volume":"100","author":"C. Z. Zheng","year":"2001","unstructured":"C. Z. Zheng, High bids and broke winners, Journal of Economic Theory, 2001, 100: 129\u2013171.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Theory"},{"key":"9301_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"928","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2008.10.001","volume":"66","author":"C. Pitchik","year":"2009","unstructured":"C. Pitchik, Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information, Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, 66: 928\u2013949.","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"9301_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"363","DOI":"10.2307\/2555662","volume":"19","author":"C. Pitchik","year":"1988","unstructured":"C. Pitchik and A. Schotter, Perfect equilibria in budget constrained sequential auctions: An experimental study, Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, 19: 363\u2013388.","journal-title":"Rand Journal of Economics"},{"key":"9301_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"155","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-937X.00164","volume":"68","author":"J. Benoit","year":"2001","unstructured":"J. Benoit and V. Krishna, Multiple object auctions with budget constrained bidders, The Review of Economic Studies, 2001, 68: 155\u2013179.","journal-title":"The Review of Economic Studies"},{"key":"9301_CR18","unstructured":"T. Harford, Sequential Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders, M. Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1998."},{"key":"9301_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"935","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.26.9.935","volume":"26","author":"T. R. Palfrey","year":"1980","unstructured":"T. R. Palfrey, Multiple-object, discriminatory auctions with bidding constraints: A game-theoretic analysis, Management Science, 1980, 26: 935\u2013945.","journal-title":"Management Science"},{"key":"9301_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"947","DOI":"10.1016\/S0014-2921(98)00107-X","volume":"43","author":"Y. K. Che","year":"1999","unstructured":"Y. K. Che and I. Gale, Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 \u00d7 2 case, European Economic Review, 1999, 43: 947\u2013957.","journal-title":"European Economic Review"},{"key":"9301_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"198","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1999.2639","volume":"92","author":"Y. K. Che","year":"2000","unstructured":"Y. K. Che and I. Gale, The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer, Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, 92: 198\u2013233.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Theory"},{"key":"9301_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"8","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x","volume":"16","author":"W. Vickrey","year":"1961","unstructured":"W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auction, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance, 1961, 16: 8\u201337.","journal-title":"Journal of Finance"}],"container-title":["Journal of Systems Science and Complexity"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s11424-012-9301-7.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s11424-012-9301-7\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s11424-012-9301-7","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,6,1]],"date-time":"2019-06-01T10:54:04Z","timestamp":1559386444000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s11424-012-9301-7"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2012,4,10]]},"references-count":22,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2012,6]]}},"alternative-id":["9301"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s11424-012-9301-7","relation":{},"ISSN":["1009-6124","1559-7067"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1009-6124","type":"print"},{"value":"1559-7067","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2012,4,10]]}}}