{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,28]],"date-time":"2025-09-28T06:48:07Z","timestamp":1759042087574},"reference-count":24,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2015,6,26]],"date-time":"2015-06-26T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1435276800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Dyn Games Appl"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2017,3]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s13235-015-0164-0","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2015,6,25]],"date-time":"2015-06-25T07:49:15Z","timestamp":1435218555000},"page":"76-92","update-policy":"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":9,"title":["On the Evolution of Continuous Types Under Replicator and Gradient Dynamics: Two Examples"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"7","author":[{"given":"Jean Paul","family":"Rabanal","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2015,6,26]]},"reference":[{"key":"164_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"344","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2014.07.001","volume":"153","author":"M-W Cheung","year":"2014","unstructured":"Cheung M-W (2014) Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space. J Econ Theory 153:344\u2013375","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"164_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"83","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2004.09.003","volume":"53","author":"JC Ely","year":"2005","unstructured":"Ely JC, Sandholm W (2005) Evolution in Bayesian games I: theory. Games Econ Behav 53:83\u2013109","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"164_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"691","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jmateco.2010.08.006","volume":"46","author":"D Friedman","year":"2010","unstructured":"Friedman D, Ostrov DN (2010) Gradient dynamics in population games: some basic results. J Math Econ 46:691\u2013707","journal-title":"J Math Econ"},{"key":"164_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"743","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2012.07.004","volume":"148","author":"D Friedman","year":"2013","unstructured":"Friedman D, Ostrov DN (2013) Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games. J Econ Theory 148:743\u2013777","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"164_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"813","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2008.10.006","volume":"66","author":"D Friedman","year":"2009","unstructured":"Friedman D, Singh N (2009) Equilibrium vengeance. Games Econ Behav 66:813\u2013829","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"164_CR6","volume-title":"Explaining process and change, approaches to evolutionary economics","author":"W G\u00fcth","year":"1992","unstructured":"G\u00fcth W, Yaari M (1992) An evolutionary approach to explaining reciprocal behavior. In: Witt U (ed) Explaining process and change, approaches to evolutionary economics. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor"},{"issue":"2","key":"164_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"251","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-006-0121-7","volume":"32","author":"A Heifetz","year":"2007","unstructured":"Heifetz A, Shannon C, Spiegel Y (2007) The dynamic evolution of preferences. Econ Theory 32(2):251\u2013286","journal-title":"Econ Theory"},{"key":"164_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"558","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1996.0133","volume":"71","author":"J Hofbauer","year":"1996","unstructured":"Hofbauer J, Weibull J (1996) Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies. J Econ Theory 71:558\u2013573","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"164_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"406","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2008.03.006","volume":"65","author":"J Hofbauer","year":"2009","unstructured":"Hofbauer J, Oechssler J, Riedel F (2009) Brown\u2013von Neumann\u2013Nash dynamics: the continuous strategy case. Games Econ Behav 65:406\u2013429","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"164_CR10","volume-title":"A first course in the numerical analysis of differential equations","author":"A Iserles","year":"1996","unstructured":"Iserles A (1996) A first course in the numerical analysis of differential equations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"164_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"394","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jedc.2014.06.001","volume":"48","author":"M Kopel","year":"2014","unstructured":"Kopel M, Lamantia F, Szidarovszky F (2014) Evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms. J Econ Dyn Control 48:394\u2013409","journal-title":"J Econ Dyn Control"},{"issue":"3","key":"164_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"982","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econmod.2012.02.008","volume":"29","author":"M Kopel","year":"2012","unstructured":"Kopel M, Brand B (2012) Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives. Econ Model 29(3):982\u2013989","journal-title":"Econ Model"},{"issue":"1","key":"164_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"47","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-1765(01)00400-1","volume":"72","author":"M K\u00f6nigstein","year":"2001","unstructured":"K\u00f6nigstein M, M\u00fcller W (2001) Why firms should care for customers. Econ Lett 72(1):47\u201352","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"key":"164_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","unstructured":"Lahkar R, Riedel F (2015) The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets. Games Econ Behav. doi: 10.1016\/j.geb.2015.03.009","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2015.03.009"},{"key":"164_CR15","unstructured":"LeVeque RJ (2005) Numerical methods for conservation laws 2nd edn. Lectures in Mathematics ETH Zurich, Birkhauser Verlag, Basel"},{"key":"164_CR16","unstructured":"Lohman S, Oechssler J, Warneryd K (2001). Evolution and the social dilemma. Unpublished manuscript"},{"key":"164_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"141","DOI":"10.1007\/PL00004092","volume":"17","author":"J Oechssler","year":"2001","unstructured":"Oechssler J, Riedel F (2001) Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ Theory 17:141\u2013162","journal-title":"Econ Theory"},{"key":"164_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"223","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2001.2950","volume":"107","author":"J Oechssler","year":"2002","unstructured":"Oechssler J, Riedel F (2002) On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models. J Econ Theory 107:223\u2013252","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"164_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"231","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2000.2668","volume":"97","author":"R Ok","year":"2001","unstructured":"Ok R, Vega-Redondo F (2001) On the evolution of individualistic preferences: an incomplete information scenario. J Econ Theory 97:231\u2013254","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"164_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"179","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2014.04.008","volume":"152","author":"S Perkins","year":"2014","unstructured":"Perkins S, Leslie DS (2014) Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets. J Econ Theory 152:179\u2013213","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"164_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"448","DOI":"10.1007\/s13235-013-0096-5","volume":"4","author":"JP Rabanal","year":"2014","unstructured":"Rabanal JP, Friedman D (2014) Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples. Dyn Games Appl 4:448\u2013467","journal-title":"Dyn Games Appl"},{"issue":"6","key":"164_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1371","DOI":"10.2307\/2171774","volume":"63","author":"K Ritzberger","year":"1995","unstructured":"Ritzberger K, Weibull JW (1995) Evolutionary selection in normal-form games. Econometrica 63(6):1371\u20131399","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"164_CR23","volume-title":"Population games and evolutionary dynamics","author":"W Sandholm","year":"2010","unstructured":"Sandholm W (2010) Population games and evolutionary dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"164_CR24","volume-title":"Evolutionary game theory","author":"W Weibull","year":"1997","unstructured":"Weibull W (1997) Evolutionary game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge"}],"container-title":["Dynamic Games and Applications"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s13235-015-0164-0.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s13235-015-0164-0\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s13235-015-0164-0","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s13235-015-0164-0.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,6,2]],"date-time":"2019-06-02T15:14:49Z","timestamp":1559488489000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s13235-015-0164-0"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2015,6,26]]},"references-count":24,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2017,3]]}},"alternative-id":["164"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s13235-015-0164-0","relation":{},"ISSN":["2153-0785","2153-0793"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2153-0785","type":"print"},{"value":"2153-0793","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2015,6,26]]}}}