{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,21]],"date-time":"2025-02-21T17:54:28Z","timestamp":1740160468346,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":51,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,21]],"date-time":"2021-04-21T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1618963200000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,21]],"date-time":"2021-04-21T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1618963200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000001","name":"National Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["1718670"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["1718670"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000001","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/100006221","name":"United States - Israel Binational Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["2016734"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["2016734"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100006221","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Dyn Games Appl"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,12]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/s13235-021-00386-z","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,21]],"date-time":"2021-04-21T17:02:50Z","timestamp":1619024570000},"page":"759-784","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Privacy, Patience, and Protection"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"11","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-6332-641X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ronen","family":"Gradwohl","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Rann","family":"Smorodinsky","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,21]]},"reference":[{"key":"386_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20170627","volume":"109","author":"JM Abowd","year":"2019","unstructured":"Abowd JM, Schmutte IM (2019) An economic analysis of privacy protection and statistical accuracy as social choices. Am Econ Rev 109:171\u2013202","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"386_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"442","DOI":"10.1257\/jel.54.2.442","volume":"54","author":"A Acquisti","year":"2016","unstructured":"Acquisti A, Taylor CR, Wagman L (2016) The economics of privacy. J Econ Lit 54:442\u2013492","journal-title":"J Econ Lit"},{"key":"386_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ali SN, B\u00e9nabou R (2020) Image versus information: changing societal norms and optimal privacy. Am Econ J: Microecon 12(3):116\u2013164","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.20180052"},{"key":"386_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.10.003","volume":"119","author":"M Aramendia","year":"2020","unstructured":"Aramendia M, Wen Q (2020) Myopic perception in repeated games. Games Econ Behav 119:1\u201314","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"386_CR5","volume-title":"Repeated games with incomplete information","author":"RJ Aumann","year":"1995","unstructured":"Aumann RJ, Maschler M, Stearns RE (1995) Repeated games with incomplete information. MIT press, Cambridge"},{"key":"386_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2008.01.004","volume":"144","author":"P Battigalli","year":"2009","unstructured":"Battigalli P, Dufwenberg M (2009) Dynamic psychological games. J Econ Theory 144:1\u201335","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"386_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Becker GS (1974) A theory of social interactions. J Polit Econ 82(6):1063\u20131093","DOI":"10.1086\/260265"},{"issue":"5","key":"386_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1652","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.96.5.1652","volume":"96","author":"R Benabou","year":"2006","unstructured":"Benabou R, Tirole J (2006) Incentives and prosocial behavior. Am Econ Rev 96(5):1652\u20131678","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"386_CR9","first-page":"177","volume":"10","author":"D Bergemann","year":"2018","unstructured":"Bergemann D, H\u00f6rner J (2018) Should first-price auctions be transparent? Am Econ J: Microecon 10:177\u2013218","journal-title":"Am Econ J: Microecon"},{"issue":"5","key":"386_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"841","DOI":"10.1086\/261957","volume":"102","author":"BD Bernheim","year":"1994","unstructured":"Bernheim BD (1994) A theory of conformity. J Polit Econ 102(5):841\u2013877","journal-title":"J Polit Econ"},{"key":"386_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"168","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2005.04.007","volume":"130","author":"G Calzolari","year":"2006","unstructured":"Calzolari G, Pavan A (2006) On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting. J Econ Theory 130:168\u2013204","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"386_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chaves IN (2019) Privacy in bargaining: the case of endogenous entry. Available at SSRN 3420766","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.3420766"},{"key":"386_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chen Y, Chong S, Kash IA, Moran T, Vadhan S (2013) Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy. In: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce. ACM, pp 215\u2013232","DOI":"10.1145\/2482540.2482549"},{"key":"386_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"371","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-13129-0_30","volume-title":"Web and internet economics","author":"Y Chen","year":"2014","unstructured":"Chen Y, Sheffet O, Vadhan S (2014) Privacy games. Web and internet economics. Springer, Newyork, pp 371\u2013385"},{"key":"386_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"179","DOI":"10.2307\/1885060","volume":"102","author":"I-K Cho","year":"1987","unstructured":"Cho I-K, Kreps DM (1987) Signaling games and stable equilibria. Q J Econ 102:179\u2013221","journal-title":"Q J Econ"},{"key":"386_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Dinur I, Nissim K (2003) Revealing information while preserving privacy. In: Proceedings of the twenty-second ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems, pp 202\u2013210","DOI":"10.1145\/773153.773173"},{"key":"386_CR17","first-page":"1","volume-title":"International conference on theory and applications of models of computation","author":"C Dwork","year":"2008","unstructured":"Dwork C (2008) Differential privacy: a survey of results. International conference on theory and applications of models of computation. Springer, Newyork, pp 1\u201319"},{"key":"386_CR18","first-page":"528","volume-title":"Annual international cryptology conference","author":"C Dwork","year":"2004","unstructured":"Dwork C, Nissim K (2004) Privacy-preserving datamining on vertically partitioned databases. Annual international cryptology conference. Springer, Newyork, pp 528\u2013544"},{"key":"386_CR19","first-page":"2","volume":"1","author":"C Dwork","year":"2010","unstructured":"Dwork C, Smith A (2010) Differential privacy for statistics: what we know and what we want to learn. J Priv Confid 1:2","journal-title":"J Priv Confid"},{"key":"386_CR20","unstructured":"Friedrichsen J (2013) Signals sell: designing a product line when consumers have social image concerns. Tech. rep., Discussion paper, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research area markets and choice, research unit market behavior"},{"key":"386_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"555","DOI":"10.2307\/2298086","volume":"57","author":"D Fudenberg","year":"1990","unstructured":"Fudenberg D, Kreps DM, Maskin ES (1990) Repeated games with long-run and short-run players. Rev Econ Stud 57:555\u2013573","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"key":"386_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"221","DOI":"10.2307\/2297414","volume":"50","author":"D Fudenberg","year":"1983","unstructured":"Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1983) Sequential bargaining with incomplete information. Rev Econ Stud 50:221\u2013247","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"key":"386_CR23","first-page":"377","volume":"1","author":"D Fudenberg","year":"2006","unstructured":"Fudenberg D, Villas-Boas JM (2006) Behavior-based price discrimination and customer recognition. Handb Econ Inf Syst 1:377\u2013436","journal-title":"Handb Econ Inf Syst"},{"key":"386_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"60","DOI":"10.1016\/0899-8256(89)90005-5","volume":"1","author":"J Geanakoplos","year":"1989","unstructured":"Geanakoplos J, Pearce D, Stacchetti E (1989) Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games Econ Behav 1:60\u201379","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"386_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"334","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2013.06.013","volume":"91","author":"A Ghosh","year":"2015","unstructured":"Ghosh A, Roth A (2015) Selling privacy at auction. Games Econ Behav 91:334\u2013346","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"386_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"215","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-1765(88)90173-5","volume":"27","author":"I Gilboa","year":"1988","unstructured":"Gilboa I, Schmeidler D (1988) Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge? Econ Lett 27:215\u2013221","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"key":"386_CR27","first-page":"1019","volume":"86","author":"A Glazer","year":"1996","unstructured":"Glazer A, Konrad K (1996) A signaling explanation for charity. Am Econ Rev 86:1019\u20131028","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"386_CR28","first-page":"170","volume":"3","author":"IL Glicksberg","year":"1952","unstructured":"Glicksberg IL (1952) A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem, with application to Nash equilibrium points. Proceed Am Math Soc 3:170\u2013174","journal-title":"Proceed Am Math Soc"},{"key":"386_CR29","unstructured":"Gradwohl R, Smorodinsky R (2014) Subjective perception games and privacy. CoRR, abs\/1409.1487"},{"key":"386_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"293","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2017.04.006","volume":"104","author":"R Gradwohl","year":"2017","unstructured":"Gradwohl R, Smorodinsky R (2017) Perception games and privacy. Games Econ Behav 104:293\u2013308","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"386_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Harrington JE Jr, Zhao W (2012) Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners\u2019 Dilemma. Math Soc Sci 64(3):277\u2013289","DOI":"10.1016\/j.mathsocsci.2012.05.005"},{"key":"386_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"29","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA6917","volume":"77","author":"J H\u00f6rner","year":"2009","unstructured":"H\u00f6rner J, Vieille N (2009) Public vs. private offers in the market for lemons. Econometrica 77:29\u201369","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"386_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"91","DOI":"10.1016\/0047-2727(94)90015-9","volume":"53","author":"N Ireland","year":"1994","unstructured":"Ireland N (1994) On limiting the market for status signals. J Publ Econ 53:91\u2013110","journal-title":"J Publ Econ"},{"key":"386_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1019","DOI":"10.2307\/2951492","volume":"61","author":"E Kalai","year":"1993","unstructured":"Kalai E, Lehrer E (1993) Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 61:1019\u20131045","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"386_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"341","DOI":"10.3982\/TE1566","volume":"10","author":"A Kaya","year":"2015","unstructured":"Kaya A, Liu Q (2015) Transparency and price formation. Theor Econ 10:341\u2013383","journal-title":"Theor Econ"},{"issue":"9","key":"386_CR36","first-page":"e0184525","volume":"12","author":"M Madden","year":"2014","unstructured":"Madden M, Rainie L, Zickuhr K, Duggan M, Smith A (2014) Public perceptions of privacy and security in the post-snowden era. Pew Res Center 12(9):e0184525","journal-title":"Pew Res Center"},{"key":"386_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Mailath GJ, Samuelson L (2006) Repeated games and reputations: long-run relationships. Oxford University Press, Oxford","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780195300796.001.0001"},{"key":"386_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"321","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-014-0431-0","volume":"44","author":"C Maor","year":"2015","unstructured":"Maor C, Solan E (2015) Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors. Int J Game Theory 44:321\u2013346","journal-title":"Int J Game Theory"},{"key":"386_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511794216","volume-title":"Game Theory","author":"M Maschler","year":"2013","unstructured":"Maschler M, Solan E, Zamir S (2013) Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"386_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"McSherry F, Talwar K (2007) Mechanism design via differential privacy. In: Foundations of computer science, 2007. FOCS\u201907. 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, pp 94\u2013103","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2007.66"},{"key":"386_CR41","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Nissim K, Orlandi C, Smorodinsky R (2012a) Privacy-aware mechanism design. In: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, pp 774\u2013789","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229073"},{"key":"386_CR42","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Nissim K, Smorodinsky R, Tennenholtz M (2012b) Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy. In: Proceedings of the 3rd innovations in theoretical computer science conference. ACM, pp 203\u2013213","DOI":"10.1145\/2090236.2090254"},{"key":"386_CR43","volume-title":"A course in game theory","author":"MJ Osborne","year":"1994","unstructured":"Osborne MJ, Rubinstein A (1994) A course in game theory. MIT press, Cambridge"},{"key":"386_CR44","first-page":"405","volume":"71","author":"RA Posner","year":"1981","unstructured":"Posner RA (1981) The economics of privacy. Am Econ Rev 71:405\u2013409","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"386_CR45","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"862","DOI":"10.1257\/0002828054201297","volume":"95","author":"A Prat","year":"2005","unstructured":"Prat A (2005) The wrong kind of transparency. Am Econ Rev 95:862\u2013877","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"386_CR46","unstructured":"Rainie L, Kiesler S, Kang R, Madden M, Duggan M, Brown S, Dabbish L (2013) Anonymity, privacy, and security online. Pew Research Center, Washington, DC. Available at https:\/\/www.pewinternet.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/9\/media\/Files\/Reports\/2013\/PIP_AnonymityOnline_090513.pdf. Accessed 18 Apr 2021"},{"key":"386_CR47","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"27","DOI":"10.1515\/bejte-2012-0003","volume":"13","author":"L Rayo","year":"2013","unstructured":"Rayo L (2013) Monopolistic signal provisionn++. BE J Theor Econ 13:27\u201358","journal-title":"BE J Theor Econ"},{"key":"386_CR48","volume-title":"Real analysis","author":"HL Royden","year":"1988","unstructured":"Royden HL, Fitzpatrick P (1988) Real analysis. Macmillan, New York"},{"key":"386_CR49","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Rubinstein A (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica J Econ Soc. 97\u2013109","DOI":"10.2307\/1912531"},{"key":"386_CR50","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"8125","DOI":"10.1007\/978-0-387-30440-3_481","volume-title":"Encyclopedia of complexity and systems science","author":"J Sobel","year":"2009","unstructured":"Sobel J (2009) Signaling games. Encyclopedia of complexity and systems science. Springer, Newyork, pp 8125\u20138139"},{"key":"386_CR51","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"631","DOI":"10.2307\/1593765","volume":"35","author":"CR Taylor","year":"2004","unstructured":"Taylor CR (2004) Consumer privacy and the market for customer information. RAND J Econ 35:631\u2013650","journal-title":"RAND J Econ"}],"container-title":["Dynamic Games and Applications"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s13235-021-00386-z.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s13235-021-00386-z\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s13235-021-00386-z.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2021,10,24]],"date-time":"2021-10-24T13:30:25Z","timestamp":1635082225000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/s13235-021-00386-z"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,21]]},"references-count":51,"journal-issue":{"issue":"4","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,12]]}},"alternative-id":["386"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s13235-021-00386-z","relation":{},"ISSN":["2153-0785","2153-0793"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"2153-0785"},{"type":"electronic","value":"2153-0793"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,21]]},"assertion":[{"value":"30 March 2021","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"21 April 2021","order":2,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}