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We apply different notions of stability: <jats:italic>myopic team-wise stability<\/jats:italic>, which extends to our setup the concept of pair-wise stability, <jats:italic>coalitional stability<\/jats:italic>, where agents are perfectly rational and able to coordinate, and <jats:italic>stochastic stability<\/jats:italic>, where agents are myopic and errors occur with vanishing probability. We find that, in many cases, coalitional stability in no way refines myopic team-wise stability, while stochastically stable states are feasible states that maximize the overall number of activities performed by teams.\n<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s13235-022-00438-y","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,5]],"date-time":"2022-03-05T13:02:43Z","timestamp":1646485363000},"page":"1101-1129","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"12","author":[{"given":"Leonardo","family":"Boncinelli","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-2648-4272","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Alessio","family":"Muscillo","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Paolo","family":"Pin","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,5]]},"reference":[{"issue":"1","key":"438_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.3982\/TE2177","volume":"16","author":"L Baumann","year":"2021","unstructured":"Baumann L (2021) A model of weighted network formation. 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