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The novelty of our model is that it develops the dichotomy between wind energy, which is viewed as a cheap but volatile asset versus purchased energy, which is interpreted as an expensive but reliable asset. A further element of novelty is that the proposed model describes opportunities for time and space arbitrage, and can be used as a benchmark to quantify the reduction of aggregate wind energy volatility through joint bidding. By reformulating the coalitional game as a standard deviation game, we provide insights into how aggregate producers, viewed as a coalition, can mitigate the volatility of their collective wind energy production. Furthermore, we design a profit allocation mechanism for this standard deviation game. We prove that this allocation belongs to the strong\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:tex-math>$$\\epsilon ^*$$<\/jats:tex-math>\n                        <mml:math xmlns:mml=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <mml:msup>\n                            <mml:mi>\u03f5<\/mml:mi>\n                            <mml:mo>\u2217<\/mml:mo>\n                          <\/mml:msup>\n                        <\/mml:math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    -core and investigate the conditions under which\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:tex-math>$$\\epsilon ^*$$<\/jats:tex-math>\n                        <mml:math xmlns:mml=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <mml:msup>\n                            <mml:mi>\u03f5<\/mml:mi>\n                            <mml:mo>\u2217<\/mml:mo>\n                          <\/mml:msup>\n                        <\/mml:math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    is null, which implies that the allocation is in the core. We further prove the robustness of this allocation mechanism under the assumption of homogeneity. The paper concludes with numerical analyses to corroborate the theoretical\u00a0results.\n                  <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s13235-025-00634-6","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,22]],"date-time":"2025-03-22T23:38:45Z","timestamp":1742686725000},"page":"884-918","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Coalition of Wind Power Producers with Shared Storage and Arbitrage Opportunities"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"16","author":[{"given":"Azin","family":"Khaleghi","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Dario","family":"Bauso","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Raffaele","family":"Pesenti","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,22]]},"reference":[{"key":"634_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Baeyens E, Bitar E, Khargonekar PP, Poolla K (2011) Wind energy aggregation: a coalitional game approach. 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