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In this paper, we use a four-by-four strategic-form representation of the beer-quiche game to demonstrate five Nash equilibria of three different kinds, including pooling and hybrid equilibria. Our results show how receiver response strategies can maintain bluffing signals within communication systems. Critically, we identify a novel pooling equilibrium in which all senders use a single signal, effectively concealing positive information about themselves. This provides a plausible explanation for the strategic concealment of quality. Our findings suggest that signals conveying concealed information can exist in a wide range of interactive situations with asymmetric information, contributing to a broader understanding of signalling beyond traditional costly signalling models.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s13235-025-00643-5","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,15]],"date-time":"2025-05-15T04:24:08Z","timestamp":1747283048000},"page":"935-957","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Signals Concealing Positive Information Can Coexist in the General Beer-and-Quiche Type Games"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"16","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8281-4419","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Shan","family":"Sun","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9892-8568","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Igor V.","family":"Erovenko","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-6600-2939","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jan","family":"Rycht\u00e1\u0159","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3012-8104","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Dewey","family":"Taylor","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,15]]},"reference":[{"issue":"4","key":"643_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"706","DOI":"10.1016\/S0003-3472(05)80382-3","volume":"39","author":"ES Adams","year":"1990","unstructured":"Adams ES, Caldwell RL (1990) Deceptive communication in asymmetric fights of the stomatopod crustacean Gonodactylus bredini. 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