{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,13]],"date-time":"2025-05-13T16:32:49Z","timestamp":1747153969734,"version":"3.40.5"},"reference-count":17,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,5]],"date-time":"2022-09-05T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1662336000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,5]],"date-time":"2022-09-05T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1662336000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"funder":[{"name":"University of Helsinki including Helsinki University Central Hospital"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Oper. Res. Forum"],"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>The causes of market inefficiency are many. We suggest an additional cause \u2014 buyers\u2019 random entry order. In a market where identical sellers compete for buyers of heterogeneous valuations, first come first served is the norm. Since all buyers choose the cheapest available good, a low-valuation buyer who enters the market late may find the remaining goods unaffordable, which causes markets not to clear. We therefore propose a coordination solution to the market inefficiency problem. We find that in a market where all the high-valuation buyers enter first and all the low-valuation buyers enter afterwards, the market clears effectively. Moreover, we find the inefficiency arising from buyers\u2019 entry order becomes less of a problem in larger economies and vanishes in the limit.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s43069-022-00158-4","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,5]],"date-time":"2022-09-05T12:10:45Z","timestamp":1662379845000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Market Inefficiency, Entry Order and Coordination"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"3","author":[{"given":"Klaus","family":"Kultti","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9071-7640","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Yi","family":"Zheng","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,5]]},"reference":[{"issue":"4","key":"158_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1103","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0262.2007.00783.x","volume":"75","author":"GM Angeletos","year":"2007","unstructured":"Angeletos GM, Pavan A (2007) Efficient use of information and social value of information. 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We further confirm that the order of authors listed in the manuscript has been approved by all of us.We confirm that we have given due consideration to the protection of intellectual property associated with this work and that there are no impediments to publication, including the timing of publication, with respect to intellectual property. In so doing, we confirm that we have followed the regulations of our institutions concerning intellectual property.We understand that the corresponding author is the sole contact for the editorial process (including Editorial Manager and direct communications with the office). He\/she is responsible for communicating with the other authors about progress, submissions of revisions and final approval of proofs. We confirm that we have provided a current, correct email address which is accessible by the corresponding author.","order":2,"name":"Ethics","group":{"name":"EthicsHeading","label":"Ethical Approval"}},{"value":"The authors declare no competing interests.","order":3,"name":"Ethics","group":{"name":"EthicsHeading","label":"Conflict of Interest"}}],"article-number":"50"}}