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Forum"],"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>Airport slot allocation is a significant procedure with a number of benefits that emerge for the airport itself but for the airlines as well. Market-based approaches have gained interest to address slot allocation since the airlines are essentially bidders that compete for the slots. Market-based approaches have significant benefits over other methods including efficiency. In this paper, the slot allocation of airports is addressed using the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) auction model. The auction is implemented to impose a constraint to the allocation process by allowing acquisition of one slot per airline. Moreover, we provide a coalitional game theoretic algorithm to solve the VCG model. Results show the best possible slot allocation, and further research is essential to describe the multiple slots\u2019 acquisition and whether this takes place due to unwanted behavior of the airline in its bidding process. Furthermore in the results, different values are noticed which essentially is attributed to the different models of solving the slot allocation problem.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s43069-025-00509-x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,8,6]],"date-time":"2025-08-06T13:45:29Z","timestamp":1754487929000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Allocation of Airport Flight Slots Using a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auction with Game Theory"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"6","author":[{"given":"Vassilios","family":"Kappatos","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Evangelos D.","family":"Spyrou","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,8,6]]},"reference":[{"doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lee H, Jung J, Lee DJ (2024) An auction-based airport slot reallocation scheme considering the grandfather rights of airlines. 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