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If collectives, being non-human, can be ascribed moral responsibility, then can we do the same for machines? Is it equally the case that machines, particularly intelligent machines, can be held morally responsible for what they choose to do? I consider the conditions required for moral responsibility, and argue that, in terms of the agency condition, artificial, non-human entities in general are excused from being responsible because, although they may choose their actions, the beliefs and desires that form the basis of their choices are predetermined by their designers, placing them in an analogous position to persons suffering covert manipulation. This creates a problem for collective responsibility, but I argue that collectives, through their supervention on human persons, represent an exception. Finally, I consider that the design of future machines may be sufficiently abstract and high-level as to fall below some threshold of influence, allowing machines enough freedom for us to hold them responsible.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s43681-023-00285-6","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,4,18]],"date-time":"2023-04-18T10:03:25Z","timestamp":1681812205000},"page":"485-498","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":11,"title":["Intelligent machines, collectives, and moral responsibility"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"4","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8965-9431","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Simon","family":"Courtenage","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,4,18]]},"reference":[{"issue":"11","key":"285_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"2769","DOI":"10.1007\/s11098-016-0809-x","volume":"174","author":"M Baddorf","year":"2017","unstructured":"Baddorf, M.: Phenomenal consciousness, collective mentality, and collective moral responsibility. 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