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His Duplication Argument claims that personites have persons as duplicates in other metaphysically possible worlds. Since duplicates share all intrinsic descriptive properties, they must share normative ones, including moral status. I challenge this by accepting Johnston\u2019s duplication claim but rejecting its moral conclusion. Perdurantists can respond by adopting Moral Contingentism: the view that pure moral laws are not\n                    <jats:italic>metaphysically necessary<\/jats:italic>\n                    but only\n                    <jats:italic>normatively necessary<\/jats:italic>\n                    , hence metaphysically contingent. These perdurantists can maintain metaphysically possible worlds where personites have person-duplicates, while holding these worlds normatively impossible (i.e.,\n                    <jats:italic>countermoral<\/jats:italic>\n                    ). Countermoral worlds\u2014differing in their pure moral laws and thus how they ground moral status\u2014cannot confer moral status on personites through duplication in normatively possible worlds, including the actual one.\n                  <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-026-05725-4","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,21]],"date-time":"2026-07-21T09:19:16Z","timestamp":1784625556000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Moral contingentism, personites and countermoral worlds"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"208","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0002-5648-4457","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Tommaso","family":"Soriani","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,21]]},"reference":[{"key":"5725_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bader, R. 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