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We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate separating and pooling equilibria in games with two and three discrete bid levels and compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria to find the optimal bid levels for these cases.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10058-023-00337-7","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,7,29]],"date-time":"2023-07-29T09:01:39Z","timestamp":1690621299000},"page":"125-150","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese\u2013English auction"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"28","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-8457-4479","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ricardo","family":"Gon\u00e7alves","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Indrajit","family":"Ray","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,7,29]]},"reference":[{"issue":"5","key":"337_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1452","DOI":"10.1257\/0002828043052330","volume":"94","author":"LM Ausubel","year":"2004","unstructured":"Ausubel LM (2004) An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. 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