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Our main results show that (a) the Gale\u2013Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play \u201csafer\u201d strategies under the Gale\u2013Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for enrollment planning and the possible protection risk averse agents seek.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-012-9329-5","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,6,20]],"date-time":"2012-06-20T07:56:26Z","timestamp":1340178986000},"page":"1-22","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":52,"title":["Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"16","author":[{"given":"Flip","family":"Klijn","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Joana","family":"Pais","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Marc","family":"Vorsatz","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,14]]},"reference":[{"issue":"3","key":"9329_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"729","DOI":"10.1257\/000282803322157061","volume":"93","author":"A. 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