{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,18]],"date-time":"2026-01-18T03:28:03Z","timestamp":1768706883462,"version":"3.49.0"},"reference-count":25,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,14]],"date-time":"2025-03-14T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1741910400000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":1839,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,3,1]],"date-time":"2020-03-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1583020800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"}],"funder":[{"name":"Funda\u00e7\u00e3o para a Ci\u00eancia e a Tecnologia","award":["PTDC\/IIM-ECO\/4546\/2014"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["PTDC\/IIM-ECO\/4546\/2014"]}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100004837","name":"Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovaci\u00f3n","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","award":["SEJ2007-67135"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["SEJ2007-67135"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100004837","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Exp. econ."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents\u2019 behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-019-09606-1","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,1]],"date-time":"2019-04-01T07:21:00Z","timestamp":1554103260000},"page":"212-239","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":11,"title":["Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"23","author":[{"given":"Joana","family":"Pais","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"\u00c1gnes","family":"Pint\u00e9r","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8150-5120","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"R\u00f3bert F.","family":"Veszteg","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,14]]},"reference":[{"key":"9606_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ackerman, H., Goldberg, P.W., Mirrokni, V., R\u00f6glin, H., & V\u00f6cking, B. (2008). Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets. In Proc. 9th ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC08) Chicago, pp. 256\u2013263.","DOI":"10.1145\/1386790.1386831"},{"key":"9606_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1021","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-012-0352-8","volume":"42","author":"P Bir\u00f3","year":"2013","unstructured":"Bir\u00f3, P., & Norman, G. (2013). Analysis of stochastic matching markets. International Journal of Game Theory, 42, 1021\u20131040.","journal-title":"International Journal of Game Theory"},{"issue":"67","key":"9606_CR3","first-page":"1","volume":"3","author":"J Boudreau","year":"2008","unstructured":"Boudreau, J. (2008). Preference structure and random paths to stability in matching markets. Economics Bulletin, 3(67), 1\u201312.","journal-title":"Economics Bulletin"},{"issue":"3","key":"9606_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"587","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9779.2010.01465.x","volume":"12","author":"J Boudreau","year":"2010","unstructured":"Boudreau, J., & Knoblauch, V. (2010). Marriage matching and intercorrelation of preferences. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12(3), 587\u2013602.","journal-title":"Journal of Public Economic Theory"},{"key":"9606_CR5","unstructured":"Celik, O., & Knoblauch, V. (2007). Marriage matching with correlated preferences. Economics working papers, p 200716."},{"key":"9606_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"567","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2017.10.013","volume":"145","author":"M Comola","year":"2018","unstructured":"Comola, M., & Fafchamps, M. (2018). An experimental study on decentralized networked markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 145, 567\u2013591.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization"},{"key":"9606_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2015.05.002","volume":"92","author":"E Diamantoudi","year":"2015","unstructured":"Diamantoudi, E., Xue, L., & Miyagawa, E. (2015). Decentralized matching: The role of commitment. Games and Economic Behavior, 92, 1\u201317.","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"9606_CR8","volume-title":"An experimental study of decentralized matching","author":"F Echenique","year":"2013","unstructured":"Echenique, F., & Yariv, L. (2013). An experimental study of decentralized matching. New York: Mimeo, Caltech SS."},{"key":"9606_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"449","DOI":"10.3982\/QE496","volume":"7","author":"F Echenique","year":"2016","unstructured":"Echenique, F., Wilson, A. J., & Yariv, L. (2016). Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study. Quantitative Economics, 7, 449\u2013482.","journal-title":"Quantitative Economics"},{"key":"9606_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"524","DOI":"10.1177\/1059712309341220","volume":"17","author":"K Eriksson","year":"2009","unstructured":"Eriksson, K., & Strimling, P. (2009). Partner search heuristics in the lab: Stability of matchings under various preference structures. Adaptive Behavior, 17, 524\u2013536.","journal-title":"Adaptive Behavior"},{"key":"9606_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-006-9159-4","volume":"2","author":"U Fischbacher","year":"2007","unstructured":"Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree\u2014Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments\u2014Experimenter\u2019s manual. Experimental Economics, 2, 171\u2013178.","journal-title":"Experimental Economics"},{"key":"9606_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"9","DOI":"10.1080\/00029890.1962.11989827","volume":"LXIV","author":"D Gale","year":"1962","unstructured":"Gale, D., & Shapley, L. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly, LXIV, 9\u201315.","journal-title":"American Mathematical Monthly"},{"key":"9606_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-009-0218-x","volume":"40","author":"G Haeringer","year":"2011","unstructured":"Haeringer, G., & Wooders, M. (2011). Decentralized job matching. International Journal of Game Theory, 40, 1\u201328.","journal-title":"International Journal of Game Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"9606_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"284","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econlet.2006.07.002","volume":"94","author":"E Haruvy","year":"2007","unstructured":"Haruvy, E., & \u00dcnver, U. (2007). Equilibrium selection and the role of information in repeated matching markets. Economics Letters, 94(2), 284\u2013289.","journal-title":"Economics Letters"},{"key":"9606_CR15","first-page":"263","volume-title":"WINE","author":"M Hoffman","year":"2013","unstructured":"Hoffman, M., Moeller, D., & Patuir, R. (2013). Jealousy graphs: Structure and complexity of decentralized stable matching. In Y. Chen & N. Immorlica (Eds.), WINE (pp. 263\u2013276). Berlin: Springer."},{"key":"9606_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"201","DOI":"10.1162\/003355300554719","volume":"115","author":"J Kagel","year":"2000","unstructured":"Kagel, J., & Roth, A. E. (2000). The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by natural experiments. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 201\u2013235.","journal-title":"Quarterly Journal of Economics"},{"key":"9606_CR17","unstructured":"Knuth, D. E. (1976). Marriages stable et leurs relations avec d\u2019autres problemes combinatoires. Les Presses de l\u2019Universit\u00e9 de Montr\u00e9al."},{"key":"9606_CR18","unstructured":"Molis, E., & Veszteg, R. F. (2010). Experimental results on the roommate problem. CORE Discussion Paper 2010011."},{"key":"9606_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1086\/298366","volume":"13","author":"H Nalbantian","year":"1995","unstructured":"Nalbantian, H., & Schotter, A. (1995). Matching and efficiency in the baseball free-agent system: An experimental examination. Journal of Labor Economics, 13, 1\u20133.","journal-title":"Journal of Labor Economics"},{"key":"9606_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Niederle, M., & Yariv, L. (2009). Decentralized matching with aligned preferences. mimeo.","DOI":"10.3386\/w14840"},{"key":"9606_CR21","first-page":"199","volume":"2","author":"M Niederle","year":"2009","unstructured":"Niederle, M., & Roth, A. E. (2009). Market culture: How rules governing exploding offers affect market performance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2, 199\u2013219.","journal-title":"American Economic Journal: Microeconomics"},{"key":"9606_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"632","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2007.12.005","volume":"64","author":"J Pais","year":"2008","unstructured":"Pais, J. (2008). Incentives in decentralized random matching markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 64, 632\u2013649.","journal-title":"Games and Economic Behavior"},{"key":"9606_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"959","DOI":"10.1257\/002205105775362014","volume":"43","author":"R Rogerson","year":"2005","unstructured":"Rogerson, R., Shimer, R., & Wright, R. (2005). Search-theoretic models of the labor market: A survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 959\u2013988.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Literature"},{"key":"9606_CR24","first-page":"415","volume":"81","author":"AE Roth","year":"1991","unstructured":"Roth, A. E. (1991). A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. American Economic Review, 81, 415\u2013440.","journal-title":"American Economic Review"},{"key":"9606_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1475","DOI":"10.2307\/2938326","volume":"58","author":"AE Roth","year":"1990","unstructured":"Roth, A. E., & Vande Vate, J. H. (1990). Random paths to stability in two-sided matching. Econometrica, 58, 1475\u20131480.","journal-title":"Econometrica"}],"container-title":["Experimental Economics"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s10683-019-09606-1.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s10683-019-09606-1\/fulltext.html","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/s10683-019-09606-1.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"},{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S1386415720011631","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,2]],"date-time":"2025-09-02T07:07:07Z","timestamp":1756796827000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S1386415720011631\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020,3]]},"references-count":25,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,3]]}},"alternative-id":["S1386415720011631"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s10683-019-09606-1","relation":{},"ISSN":["1386-4157","1573-6938"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1386-4157","type":"print"},{"value":"1573-6938","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020,3]]},"assertion":[{"value":"14 April 2017","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"28 February 2019","order":2,"name":"revised","label":"Revised","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"5 March 2019","order":3,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"1 April 2019","order":4,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}]}}