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Others argue that they are the same things (One Object\u00a0View). This last view is often understood as the claim that appearances and things in\u00a0themselves are numerically identical (Numerical Identity). However, Walker (2010) and\u00a0Stang (2014) show that Numerical Identity clashes against Kant\u2019s claim that we lack\u00a0knowledge of things in themselves (Noumenal Ignorance). I propose a weaker version\u00a0of the One Object View that is not couched in terms of Numerical Identity and,\u00a0consequently, avoids the problem raised by Walker and Stang. My case is based on a\u00a0sustained analogy with perceptual experience that aims at showing that appearances\u00a0and things in themselves are the same things in the following sense: the very same\u00a0things can be presented under the mode of sensory intuition or (possibly) under the\u00a0mode of intellectual intuition. Those things presented under the mode of sensory\u00a0intuition are appearances; presented under the (possible) mode of intellectual intuition\u00a0are things in themselves. This way of construing appearances and things in\u00a0themselves preserves the core insight of the One Object View. At the same time, as it\u00a0does not entail any isomorphism between appearances and things in themselves, it\u00a0does not clash against Noumenal Ignorance.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s11229-023-04159-6","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,4,25]],"date-time":"2023-04-25T15:28:05Z","timestamp":1682436485000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Sameness beyond numerical identity. A defence of the One Object View of Kant\u00b4s transcendental idealism"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"201","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-8467-9457","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Mattia","family":"Riccardi","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,4,25]]},"reference":[{"key":"4159_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"655","DOI":"10.1080\/0960878042000279314","volume":"12","author":"L Allais","year":"2004","unstructured":"Allais, L. (2004). Kant\u2019s one world: Interpreting \u201ctranscendental idealism\u201d. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 12, 655\u2013684.","journal-title":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy"},{"key":"4159_CR3","volume-title":"Kant\u2019s transcendental idealism","author":"H Allison","year":"1983","unstructured":"Allison, H. (1983). Kant\u2019s transcendental idealism. 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