{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,21]],"date-time":"2025-11-21T05:49:35Z","timestamp":1763704175352},"reference-count":29,"publisher":"Elsevier BV","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2004,4,1]],"date-time":"2004-04-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1080777600000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.elsevier.com\/tdm\/userlicense\/1.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["European Journal of Operational Research"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2004,4]]},"DOI":"10.1016\/s0377-2217(02)00678-1","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2003,1,30]],"date-time":"2003-01-30T15:52:50Z","timestamp":1043941970000},"page":"251-270","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":61,"title":["Pricing combinatorial auctions"],"prefix":"10.1016","volume":"154","author":[{"given":"Mu","family":"Xia","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Gary J.","family":"Koehler","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Andrew B.","family":"Whinston","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"78","reference":[{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Andersson, A., Tenhunen, M., Ygge, F., 2000. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination. In: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Multi-agent Systems (ICMAS), Boston, MA","DOI":"10.1109\/ICMAS.2000.858429"},{"issue":"9","key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1203","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.47.9.1203.9781","article-title":"Optimal investment in knowledge within a firm using a market mechanism","volume":"47","author":"Ba","year":"2001","journal-title":"Management Science"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB3","unstructured":"Bikhchandani, S., Ostroy, J., 2001. The package assignment model. Working Paper, UCLA"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bikhchandani, S., de Vries, S., Schummer, J., Vohra, R., 2001. Linear programming and Vickrey auctions. Working Paper","DOI":"10.1007\/978-1-4684-9277-4_6"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"17","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01726210","article-title":"Multipart pricing of public goods","volume":"11","author":"Clarke","year":"1971","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB6","unstructured":"DeMartini, C., Kwasnica, A., Ledyard, J., Porter, D., 1999. A new and improved design for multi-object iterative auctions. Working Paper, California Institute of Technology"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB7","unstructured":"Fan, M., Stallaert, J., Whinston, A.B., 2000. Decentralized mechanism design for supply chain organizations using an auction market. Working Paper, CREC, UT Austin, forthcoming in Information Systems Research"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB8","unstructured":"Fujishima, Y., Leyton-Brown, K., Shoham, Y., 1999. Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: optimal and approximate approaches. In: Proceedings of the IJCAI\u201999, Stockholm, pp. 548\u2013553"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB9","series-title":"Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness","author":"Garey","year":"1979"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Gonen, R., Lehmann, D., 2000. Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics. In: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC\u201900), Minneapolis, MN","DOI":"10.1145\/352871.352873"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"617","DOI":"10.2307\/1914085","article-title":"Incentives in teams","volume":"41","author":"Groves","year":"1973","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"657","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.39.6.657","article-title":"Solving airline crew scheduling problems by branch and cut","volume":"39","author":"Hoffman","year":"1993","journal-title":"Management Science"},{"issue":"3","key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"461","DOI":"10.1086\/261158","article-title":"Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions","volume":"91","author":"Leonard","year":"1983","journal-title":"Journal of Political Economy"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB14","unstructured":"Leyton-Brown, K., Tennenholtz, M., Shoham, Y., 2000. An algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial auctions. In: Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Austin, TX"},{"issue":"4","key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB15","first-page":"274","article-title":"A bibliographical survey on some well-known non-standard knapsack problems","volume":"36","author":"Lin","year":"1998","journal-title":"INFOR"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB16","unstructured":"MacKie-Mason, J., Varian, H., 1994. Generalized Vickrey auctions. Technical Report. Department of Economics, University of Michigan"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB17","series-title":"Microeconomic Theory","author":"Mas-Collel","year":"1995"},{"issue":"3","key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"303","DOI":"10.2307\/2296361","article-title":"Resource allocation in a non-convex economy","volume":"39","author":"Moore","year":"1972","journal-title":"Review of Economic Studies"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB19","series-title":"Integer and Combinatorial Optimization","author":"Nemhauser","year":"1988"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB20","unstructured":"O\u2019Neill, R., Sotkiewicz, P., Hobbs, B., Rothkopf, M., Stewart Jr., W., 2001. Equilibrium prices in markets with non-convexities. Working Paper"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB21","unstructured":"Parkes, D., 2001. An iterative generalized Vickrey auction: strategy-proofness without complete revelation. AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents"},{"issue":"8","key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1131","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.44.8.1131","article-title":"Computationally manageable combinational auctions","volume":"44","author":"Rothkopf","year":"1998","journal-title":"Management Science"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB23","unstructured":"Sandholm, T., 1999. An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. In: Proceedings of the IJCAI\u201999, Stockholm, pp. 542\u2013547"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB24","unstructured":"Sandholm, T., Suri, S., Gilpin A., Levine, D., 2001. CABOB: A fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions. In: Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), Seattle, Washington, USA"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB25","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"45","DOI":"10.1002\/nav.3800090106","article-title":"Complements and substitutes in the optimal assignment problem","volume":"9","author":"Shapley","year":"1962","journal-title":"Naval Research Logistics Quarterly"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"8","DOI":"10.2307\/2977633","article-title":"Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders","author":"Vickrey","year":"1961","journal-title":"Journal of Finance"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB27","unstructured":"Wurman, P., Wellman, M., 1999. Equilibrium prices in bundle auctions. Working Paper. Department of Computer Science, The University of Michigan"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB28","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Wurman, P., Wellman, M., 2000. AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction. Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC\u201900), Minneapolis, pp. 21\u201329","DOI":"10.1145\/352871.352874"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0377-2217(02)00678-1_BIB29","unstructured":"Xia, M., Stallaert, J., Whinston, A.B., 2001. Solving combinatorial double auctions. CREC Working Paper, University of Texas at Austin"}],"container-title":["European Journal of Operational Research"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/api.elsevier.com\/content\/article\/PII:S0377221702006781?httpAccept=text\/xml","content-type":"text\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/api.elsevier.com\/content\/article\/PII:S0377221702006781?httpAccept=text\/plain","content-type":"text\/plain","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2020,3,12]],"date-time":"2020-03-12T06:59:30Z","timestamp":1583996370000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/linkinghub.elsevier.com\/retrieve\/pii\/S0377221702006781"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2004,4]]},"references-count":29,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2004,4]]}},"alternative-id":["S0377221702006781"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/s0377-2217(02)00678-1","relation":{},"ISSN":["0377-2217"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0377-2217","type":"print"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2004,4]]}}}