{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,1]],"date-time":"2025-11-01T21:26:27Z","timestamp":1762032387446,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":31,"publisher":"Elsevier BV","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2002,10,1]],"date-time":"2002-10-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1033430400000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.elsevier.com\/tdm\/userlicense\/1.0\/"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2002,10,1]],"date-time":"2002-10-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1033430400000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.elsevier.com\/legal\/tdmrep-license"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100003176","name":"Ministerio de Educaci\u00f3n, Cultura y Deporte","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100003176","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100004375","name":"Tel Aviv University","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100004375","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["elsevier.com","sciencedirect.com"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Games and Economic Behavior"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2002,10]]},"DOI":"10.1016\/s0899-8256(02)00009-x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2002,10,28]],"date-time":"2002-10-28T11:05:14Z","timestamp":1035803114000},"page":"46-60","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/elsevier_cm_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":10,"title":["On (un)knots and dynamics in games"],"prefix":"10.1016","volume":"41","author":[{"given":"Stefano","family":"Demichelis","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Fabrizio","family":"Germano","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"78","reference":[{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB001","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"36","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1999.0717","article-title":"Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games","volume":"29","author":"Benaim","year":"1999","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"year":"1993","series-title":"Topology and Geometry","author":"Bredon","key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB002"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB003","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"69","DOI":"10.1016\/0167-2681(85)90025-3","article-title":"Learning behavior and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria","volume":"6","author":"Crawford","year":"1985","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB004","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"192","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2000.2669","article-title":"On the indices of zeros of Nash fields","volume":"94","author":"Demichelis","year":"2000","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB005","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"537","DOI":"10.1016\/S0304-4068(00)00045-8","article-title":"Some consequences of the unknottedness of the Walras correspondence","volume":"34","author":"Demichelis","year":"2000","journal-title":"J. Math. Econ."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB006","unstructured":"Demichelis, S., Ritzberger, K., 2000. From evolutionary to strategic stability. Mimeo, CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve, and Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB007","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"84","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1999.2581","article-title":"Learning purified mixed equilibria","volume":"90","author":"Ellison","year":"2000","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB008","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"320","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1993.1021","article-title":"Learning mixed equilibria","volume":"5","author":"Fudenberg","year":"1993","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"year":"1998","series-title":"The Theory of Learning in Games","author":"Fudenberg","key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB009"},{"year":"1994","series-title":"Knots and Surfaces","author":"Gilbert","key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB010"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB011","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"56","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1997.0516","article-title":"Equivalence and invariance of the index and the degree of Nash equilibria","volume":"21","author":"Govindan","year":"1997","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB012","unstructured":"Govindan, S., Wilson, R., 1999. Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of finite games. Mimeo, University of Western Ontario and Stanford University"},{"year":"1974","series-title":"Differential Topology","author":"Guillemin","key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB013"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB014","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"548","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.18.3.548","article-title":"A bound on the proportion of pure strategy equilibria in generic games","volume":"18","author":"G\u00fcl","year":"1993","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"year":"1976","series-title":"Differential Topology","author":"Hirsch","key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB015"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB016","unstructured":"Hofbauer, J., Plank, M., 1996. Evolutionary dynamics for binary n-person games. Mimeo, University of Vienna"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB017","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"138","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1997.0636","article-title":"A note on best response dynamics","volume":"29","author":"Hopkins","year":"1999","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB018","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"368","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1993.1022","article-title":"Three problems with learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria","volume":"5","author":"Jordan","year":"1993","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB019","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"50","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1999.0736","article-title":"Adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogenous populations","volume":"31","author":"Kaniovski","year":"2000","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB020","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"330","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1995.1054","article-title":"Learning dynamics with stochastic perturbations","volume":"11","author":"Kaniovski","year":"1995","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB021","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1003","DOI":"10.2307\/1912320","article-title":"On the strategic stability of equilibria","volume":"54","author":"Kohlberg","year":"1986","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB022","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"479","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.23.2.479","article-title":"On the convergence of fictitious play","volume":"23","author":"Krishna","year":"1998","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB023","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"575","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.14.4.575","article-title":"Stable equilibria: A reformulation, Part 1","volume":"14","author":"Mertens","year":"1989","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB024","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"694","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.16.4.694","article-title":"Stable equilibria: A reformulation, Part 2","volume":"14","author":"Mertens","year":"1991","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB025","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"203","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1997.0550","article-title":"An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria","volume":"21","author":"Oechssler","year":"1997","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB026","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"698","DOI":"10.1214\/aop\/1176990853","article-title":"Nonconvergence to unstable points in urn models and stochastic approximations","volume":"18","author":"Pemantle","year":"1990","journal-title":"Ann. Probab."},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB027","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"207","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01247316","article-title":"The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint","volume":"23","author":"Ritzberger","year":"1994","journal-title":"Int. J. Game Theory"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB028","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1371","DOI":"10.2307\/2171774","article-title":"Evolutionary selection in normal-form games","volume":"63","author":"Ritzberger","year":"1995","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB029","series-title":"Game Equilibrium Models, Vol. II: Methods, Morals, and Markets","article-title":"The algebraic geometry of games and the tracing procedure","author":"Schanuel","year":"1991"},{"key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB030","series-title":"Advances in Game Theory","article-title":"Some topics in two-person games","author":"Shapley","year":"1964"},{"year":"1991","series-title":"Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria","author":"Van Damme","key":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X_BIB031"}],"container-title":["Games and Economic Behavior"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/api.elsevier.com\/content\/article\/PII:S089982560200009X?httpAccept=text\/xml","content-type":"text\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/api.elsevier.com\/content\/article\/PII:S089982560200009X?httpAccept=text\/plain","content-type":"text\/plain","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T11:54:15Z","timestamp":1760270055000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/linkinghub.elsevier.com\/retrieve\/pii\/S089982560200009X"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2002,10]]},"references-count":31,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2002,10]]}},"alternative-id":["S089982560200009X"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/s0899-8256(02)00009-x","relation":{},"ISSN":["0899-8256"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0899-8256"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2002,10]]},"assertion":[{"value":"Elsevier","name":"publisher","label":"This article is maintained by"},{"value":"On (un)knots and dynamics in games","name":"articletitle","label":"Article Title"},{"value":"Games and Economic Behavior","name":"journaltitle","label":"Journal Title"},{"value":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00009-X","name":"articlelink","label":"CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version"},{"value":"converted-article","name":"content_type","label":"Content Type"},{"value":"Copyright \u00a9 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.","name":"copyright","label":"Copyright"}]}}