{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,29]],"date-time":"2026-07-29T11:24:48Z","timestamp":1785324288702,"version":"3.55.0"},"reference-count":20,"publisher":"Elsevier BV","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,1]],"date-time":"2018-10-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1538352000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.elsevier.com\/tdm\/userlicense\/1.0\/"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,1]],"date-time":"2018-10-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1538352000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.elsevier.com\/legal\/tdmrep-license"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100007601","name":"European Union Horizon 2020","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["690817"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["690817"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100007601","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100000038","name":"NSERC","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100000038","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["elsevier.com","sciencedirect.com"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Journal of Theoretical Biology"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,10]]},"DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,7,7]],"date-time":"2018-07-07T20:06:14Z","timestamp":1530993974000},"page":"232-248","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/elsevier_cm_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":31,"special_numbering":"C","title":["Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games"],"prefix":"10.1016","volume":"455","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-0971-1231","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Vlastimil","family":"K\u0159ivan","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Theodore E.","family":"Galanthay","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Ross","family":"Cressman","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"78","reference":[{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0001","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"409","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00300543","article-title":"Patch choice under perceptual constraints: a cause for departures from an ideal free distribution","volume":"19","author":"Abrahams","year":"1986","journal-title":"Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0002","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"935","DOI":"10.1007\/s00285-012-0573-2","article-title":"Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games","volume":"67","author":"Argasinski","year":"2013","journal-title":"J. Math. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0003","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"33","DOI":"10.1007\/s12064-017-0257-y","article-title":"Interaction rates, vital rates, background fitness and replicator dynamics: how to embed evolutionary game structure into realistic population dynamics","volume":"137","author":"Argasinski","year":"2018","journal-title":"Theory Biosci."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0004","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"198","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ecocom.2017.04.002","article-title":"Evolutionary stability under limited population growth: eco-evolutionary feedbacks and replicator dynamics","volume":"34","author":"Argasinski","year":"2018","journal-title":"Ecol. Complexity"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0005","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"279","DOI":"10.1006\/tpbi.2000.1491","article-title":"A mechanistic model for partial preferences","volume":"58","author":"Berec","year":"2000","journal-title":"Theor. Popul. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0006","series-title":"Allee Effects","author":"Courchamp","year":"2008"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0007","series-title":"The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory: A Dynamic Approach","author":"Cressman","year":"1992"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0008","series-title":"Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive form Games","author":"Cressman","year":"2003"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0009","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2016.11.029","article-title":"Evolutionary stability for matrix games under time constraints","volume":"415","author":"Garay","year":"2017","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0010","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"469","DOI":"10.1006\/anbe.1994.1064","article-title":"Perceptual constraints on optimal foraging: a reason for departures from the ideal free distribution?","volume":"47","author":"Gray","year":"1994","journal-title":"Anim. Behav."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0011","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"178","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2013.10.013","article-title":"Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection","volume":"343","author":"Hauser","year":"2014","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0012","series-title":"Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics","author":"Hofbauer","year":"1998"},{"issue":"20141794","key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0013","article-title":"The hawk\u2013dove game in a sexually reproducing species explains a colourful polymorphism of an endangered bird","volume":"281","author":"Kokko","year":"2014","journal-title":"Proc. R. Soc. B"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0014","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"199","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2017.01.010","article-title":"Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: two player matrix games","volume":"416","author":"K\u0159ivan","year":"2017","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0015","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"15","DOI":"10.1038\/246015a0","article-title":"The logic of animal conflict","volume":"246","author":"Maynard Smith","year":"1973","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0016","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"20130544","DOI":"10.1098\/rsif.2013.0544","article-title":"Towards a richer evolutionary game theory","volume":"10","author":"McNamara","year":"2013","journal-title":"J. R. Soc. Interface"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0017","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"469","DOI":"10.1006\/jtbi.1998.0889","article-title":"What pair formation can do to the battle of the sexes: towards more realistic game dynamics","volume":"197","author":"Mylius","year":"1999","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0018","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"243","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tpb.2005.06.009","article-title":"Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates","volume":"69","author":"Taylor","year":"2006","journal-title":"Theor. Popul. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0019","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"145","DOI":"10.1016\/0025-5564(78)90077-9","article-title":"Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics","volume":"40","author":"Taylor","year":"1978","journal-title":"Math. Biosci."},{"issue":"35902","key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003_bib0020","article-title":"Opting out against defection leads to stable coexistence with cooperation","volume":"6","author":"Zhang","year":"2016","journal-title":"Sci. Rep."}],"container-title":["Journal of Theoretical Biology"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/api.elsevier.com\/content\/article\/PII:S0022519318303163?httpAccept=text\/xml","content-type":"text\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/api.elsevier.com\/content\/article\/PII:S0022519318303163?httpAccept=text\/plain","content-type":"text\/plain","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,20]],"date-time":"2025-09-20T16:25:03Z","timestamp":1758385503000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/linkinghub.elsevier.com\/retrieve\/pii\/S0022519318303163"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2018,10]]},"references-count":20,"alternative-id":["S0022519318303163"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003","relation":{},"ISSN":["0022-5193"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0022-5193","type":"print"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2018,10]]},"assertion":[{"value":"Elsevier","name":"publisher","label":"This article is maintained by"},{"value":"Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games","name":"articletitle","label":"Article Title"},{"value":"Journal of Theoretical Biology","name":"journaltitle","label":"Journal Title"},{"value":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.jtbi.2018.07.003","name":"articlelink","label":"CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version"},{"value":"article","name":"content_type","label":"Content Type"},{"value":"\u00a9 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.","name":"copyright","label":"Copyright"}]}}