{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,10,2]],"date-time":"2026-10-02T01:57:47Z","timestamp":1790906267696,"version":"4.1.0"},"reference-count":75,"publisher":"Elsevier BV","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,11,1]],"date-time":"2020-11-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1604188800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.elsevier.com\/tdm\/userlicense\/1.0\/"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,11,1]],"date-time":"2020-11-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1604188800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.elsevier.com\/legal\/tdmrep-license"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["elsevier.com","sciencedirect.com"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Journal of Theoretical Biology"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,11]]},"DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,7,26]],"date-time":"2020-07-26T17:54:52Z","timestamp":1595786092000},"page":"110423","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/elsevier_cm_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":35,"special_numbering":"C","title":["Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment"],"prefix":"10.1016","volume":"505","author":[{"given":"Marta C.","family":"Couto","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Jorge M.","family":"Pacheco","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Francisco C.","family":"Santos","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"78","reference":[{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0005","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"931","DOI":"10.1016\/S0140-6736(20)30567-5","article-title":"How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the covid-19 epidemic?","volume":"395","author":"Anderson","year":"2020","journal-title":"The Lancet"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0010","series-title":"The Evolution of Cooperation","author":"Axelrod","year":"1984"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0015","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1095","DOI":"10.2307\/1960858","article-title":"An evolutionary approach to norms","volume":"80","author":"Axelrod","year":"1986","journal-title":"Am. Political Sci. Rev."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0020","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Barrett, S., 2005. Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making. Oxford Univ. Press. doi: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/0199286094.001.0001.","DOI":"10.1093\/0199286094.001.0001"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0025","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Barrett, S., 2007. Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global public goods. Oxford Univ. Press. doi: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199211890.001.0001.","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199211890.001.0001"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0030","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"11733","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1108775108","article-title":"Avoiding disastrous climate change is possible but not inevitable","volume":"108","author":"Barrett","year":"2011","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0035","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"17372","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1208417109","article-title":"Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty","volume":"09","author":"Barrett","year":"2012","journal-title":"Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0040","series-title":"Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution","author":"Bowles","year":"2009"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0045","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"617","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1183665","article-title":"Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare","volume":"328","author":"Boyd","year":"2010","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0050","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1016\/0162-3095(92)90032-Y","article-title":"Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups","volume":"13","author":"Boyd","year":"1992","journal-title":"Ethol. Sociobiol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0055","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"227","DOI":"10.1093\/reep\/rez009","article-title":"Cooperation in the climate commons","volume":"13","author":"Carattini","year":"2019","journal-title":"Rev. Environ. Econom. Policy"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0060","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"123","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2013.10.004","article-title":"Under high stakes and uncertainty the rich should lend the poor a helping hand","volume":"341","author":"Chakra","year":"2014","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0065","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1098\/rsif.2014.0935","article-title":"First carrot, then stick: How the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation","volume":"12","author":"Chen","year":"2015","journal-title":"J.R. Soc. Interface"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0070","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"209","DOI":"10.1038\/373209a0","article-title":"Punishment in animal societies","volume":"373","author":"Clutton-Brock","year":"1995","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0075","article-title":"The competitive advantage of institutional reward","volume":"B,286","author":"Dong","year":"2019","journal-title":"Proc. Royal Soc."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0080","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"348","DOI":"10.1038\/nature06723","article-title":"Winners don\u2019t punish","volume":"452","author":"Dreber","year":"2008","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0085","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"137","DOI":"10.1038\/415137a","article-title":"Altruistic punishment in humans","volume":"415","author":"Fehr","year":"2002","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0090","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1098\/rsif.2019.0127","article-title":"Evolution of coordinated punishment to enforce cooperation from an unbiased strategy space","volume":"16","author":"Garc\u00eda","year":"2019","journal-title":"J. R. Soc. Interface"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0095","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1038\/s41598-019-52524-8","article-title":"Reward and punishment in climate change dilemmas","volume":"9","author":"G\u00f3is","year":"2019","journal-title":"Sci. Rep."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0100","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"5500","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0912214107","article-title":"Evolutionary games in the multiverse","volume":"107","author":"Gokhale","year":"2010","journal-title":"Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0105","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"321","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1461-0248.2009.01425.x","article-title":"Selective flower abortion maintains moth cooperation in a newly discovered pollination mutualism","volume":"13","author":"Goto","year":"2010","journal-title":"Ecol. Lett."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0110","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1243","DOI":"10.1126\/science.162.3859.1243","article-title":"The tragedy of the commons","volume":"162","author":"Hardin","year":"1968","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0115","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1905","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1141588","article-title":"Via freedom to coercion: The emergence of costly punishment","volume":"316","author":"Hauert","year":"2007","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0120","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pone.0066490","article-title":"The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas","volume":"8","author":"Hilbe","year":"2013","journal-title":"PLoS One"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0125","first-page":"2427","article-title":"Incentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick","volume":"B,277","author":"Hilbe","year":"2010","journal-title":"Proc. R. Soc."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0130","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"25","DOI":"10.1038\/srep00458","article-title":"Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite","volume":"2","author":"Hilbe","year":"2012","journal-title":"Sci. Rep."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0135","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"6946","DOI":"10.1038\/s41598-019-43102-z","article-title":"Computation and simulation of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations","volume":"9","author":"Hindersin","year":"2019","journal-title":"Sci. Rep."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0140","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"117","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2013.05.007","article-title":"Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous","volume":"333","author":"Iwasa","year":"2013","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0145","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"van Kampen, N.G., 2007. Stochastic processes in physics and chemistry. (3rd ed.). North-Holland. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/B978-0-444-52965-7.X5000-4.","DOI":"10.1016\/B978-044452965-7\/50006-4"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0150","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Karlin, S., & Taylor, H. M. (1975). A first course in stochastic processes. (2nd ed.). Academic Press Inc, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/C2009-1-28569-8.","DOI":"10.1016\/B978-0-08-057041-9.50005-2"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0155","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"111","DOI":"10.1017\/S1355770X12000460","article-title":"Social-ecological systems as complex adaptive systems: modeling and policy implications","volume":"18","author":"Levin","year":"2013","journal-title":"Environ. Dev. Econ."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0160","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"328","DOI":"10.1007\/s11284-006-0162-1","article-title":"Learning to live in a global commons: socioeconomic challenges for a sustainable environment","volume":"21","author":"Levin","year":"2006","journal-title":"Ecol. Res."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0165","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"807","DOI":"10.1007\/s10584-011-0319-y","article-title":"Cooperative interaction of rich and poor can be catalyzed by intermediate climate targets","volume":"109","author":"Milinski","year":"2011","journal-title":"Climatic Change"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0170","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2291","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0709546105","article-title":"The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change","volume":"USA,105","author":"Milinski","year":"2008","journal-title":"Proc. Natl Acad. Sci."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0175","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2008.09.004","article-title":"Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment","volume":"257","author":"Nakamaru","year":"2009","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0180","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"534","DOI":"10.2197\/ipsjjip.24.534","article-title":"Study of the Evolution of Cooperation Based on an Alternative Notion of Punishment Sanction with Jealousy","volume":"24","author":"Ohdaira","year":"2016","journal-title":"J. Inform. Process."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0185","series-title":"Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action","author":"Ostrom","year":"1990"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0190","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"550","DOI":"10.1016\/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.004","article-title":"Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change","volume":"20","author":"Ostrom","year":"2010","journal-title":"Global Environ. Change"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0195","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"243","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2016.11.012","article-title":"Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game","volume":"419","author":"Oya","year":"2017","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0200","article-title":"Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N-person stag-hunt dilemmas","volume":"B,276","author":"Pacheco","year":"2008","journal-title":"Proc. R. Soc."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0205","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pcbi.1004101","article-title":"Co-evolutionary dynamics of collective action with signaling for a quorum","volume":"11","author":"Pacheco","year":"2015","journal-title":"PLoS Comput. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0210","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"93","DOI":"10.1126\/science.309.5731.93","article-title":"How did cooperative behavior evolve?","volume":"309","author":"Pennisi","year":"2005","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0215","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"344","DOI":"10.1038\/srep00344","article-title":"Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders","volume":"2","author":"Perc","year":"2012","journal-title":"Sci. Rep."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0220","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.physrep.2017.05.004","article-title":"Statistical physics of human cooperation","volume":"687","author":"Perc","year":"2017","journal-title":"Phys. Rep."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0225","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1088\/1367-2630\/14\/4\/043013","article-title":"Self-organization of punishment in structured populations","volume":"14","author":"Perc","year":"2012","journal-title":"New J. Phys."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0230","series-title":"Future Digital Democracy","first-page":"38","article-title":"Knowledge management for democratic governance of socio-technical systems","author":"Pitt","year":"2018"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0235","first-page":"39","article-title":"Axiomatization of socio-economic principles for self-organizing institutions: Concepts, experiments and challenges","volume":"7","author":"Pitt","year":"2012","journal-title":"ACM T Auton. Adap. Sys."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0240","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"413","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tics.2013.06.003","article-title":"Human cooperation","volume":"17","author":"Rand","year":"2013","journal-title":"Trends Cogn. Sci."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0245","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"10421","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1015648108","article-title":"Risk of collective failure provides an escape from the tragedy of the commons","volume":"08","author":"Santos","year":"2011","journal-title":"Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0250","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1140004","DOI":"10.1142\/S0218202511400045","article-title":"Evolutionary dynamics of climate change under collective-risk dilemmas","volume":"22","author":"Santos","year":"2012","journal-title":"Math. Models Methods Appl. Sci."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0255","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1165","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1115219109","article-title":"The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas","volume":"109","author":"Sasaki","year":"2012","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0260","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"20122498","DOI":"10.1098\/rspb.2012.2498","article-title":"The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion","volume":"280","author":"Sasaki","year":"2013","journal-title":"Proc. R. Soc. B"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0265","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Sasaki, T., Uchida, S., 2014. Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Biology Letters,10, 20130903\u201320130903. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1098\/rsbl.2013.0903.","DOI":"10.1098\/rsbl.2013.0903"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0270","volume":"volume 16","author":"Scheffer","year":"2009"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0275","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"36","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2014.04.019","article-title":"Sanctions as honest signals - The evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions","volume":"356","author":"Schoenmakers","year":"2014","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0280","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pone.0059894","article-title":"Strict or graduated punishment? effect of punishment strictness on the evolution of cooperation in continuous public goods games","volume":"8","author":"Shimao","year":"2013","journal-title":"PLoS One"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0285","series-title":"The Calculus of Selfishness","author":"Sigmund","year":"2010"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0290","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"861","DOI":"10.1038\/nature09203","article-title":"Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons","volume":"466","author":"Sigmund","year":"2010","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0295","article-title":"Social dynamics","author":"Skyrms","year":"2014","journal-title":"Oxford University Press"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0300","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"3153","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0409523102","article-title":"Strategic interactions in multi-institutional epidemics of antibiotic resistance","volume":"02","author":"Smith","year":"2005","journal-title":"Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0305","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"581","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2009.07.010","article-title":"Evolution of cooperation under n-person snowdrift games","volume":"260","author":"Souza","year":"2009","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0310","first-page":"1","article-title":"Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games","author":"Szolnoki","year":"2011","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0315","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.83.036101","article-title":"Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool punishment","volume":"83","author":"Szolnoki","year":"2011","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0320","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"11825","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1102493108","article-title":"Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game","volume":"08","author":"Tavoni","year":"2011","journal-title":"Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0325","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1057","DOI":"10.1038\/nclimate2375","article-title":"Managing the climate commons at the nexus of ecology, behaviour and economics","volume":"4","author":"Tavoni","year":"2014","journal-title":"Nat. Clim. Change"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0330","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"152","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2011.07.003","article-title":"The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management","volume":"299","author":"Tavoni","year":"2012","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0335","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1621","DOI":"10.1016\/j.bulm.2004.03.004","article-title":"Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations","volume":"66","author":"Taylor","year":"2004","journal-title":"Bull. Math. Biol."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0340","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.74.011909","article-title":"Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation","volume":"74","author":"Traulsen","year":"2006","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0345","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"3716","DOI":"10.1098\/rspb.2012.0937","article-title":"An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons","volume":"279","author":"Traulsen","year":"2012","journal-title":"Proc. R. Soc. B"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0350","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevLett.108.158104","article-title":"Emergence of fairness in repeated group interactions","volume":"108","author":"Van Segbroeck","year":"2012","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. Lett."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0355","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"797","DOI":"10.1038\/nclimate1927","article-title":"A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons","volume":"3","author":"Vasconcelos","year":"2013","journal-title":"Nat. Clim. Change"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0360","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2212","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1323479111","article-title":"Climate policies under wealth inequality","volume":"111","author":"Vasconcelos","year":"2014","journal-title":"Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0365","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.80.016101","article-title":"Emergence of social cooperation in threshold public goods games with collective risk","volume":"80","author":"Wang","year":"2009","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0370","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.physrep.2016.10.006","article-title":"Statistical physics of vaccination","volume":"664","author":"Wang","year":"2016","journal-title":"Phys. Rep."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423_b0375","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"110","DOI":"10.1037\/0022-3514.51.1.110","article-title":"The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good","volume":"51","author":"Yamagishi","year":"1986","journal-title":"J. Personality Social Psychol."}],"container-title":["Journal of Theoretical Biology"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/api.elsevier.com\/content\/article\/PII:S0022519320302782?httpAccept=text\/xml","content-type":"text\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/api.elsevier.com\/content\/article\/PII:S0022519320302782?httpAccept=text\/plain","content-type":"text\/plain","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,20]],"date-time":"2025-09-20T16:29:39Z","timestamp":1758385779000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/linkinghub.elsevier.com\/retrieve\/pii\/S0022519320302782"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020,11]]},"references-count":75,"alternative-id":["S0022519320302782"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423","relation":{},"ISSN":["0022-5193"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0022-5193","type":"print"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020,11]]},"assertion":[{"value":"Elsevier","name":"publisher","label":"This article is maintained by"},{"value":"Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment","name":"articletitle","label":"Article Title"},{"value":"Journal of Theoretical Biology","name":"journaltitle","label":"Journal Title"},{"value":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110423","name":"articlelink","label":"CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version"},{"value":"article","name":"content_type","label":"Content Type"},{"value":"\u00a9 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd.","name":"copyright","label":"Copyright"}],"article-number":"110423"}}