{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,30]],"date-time":"2022-03-30T01:24:21Z","timestamp":1648603461357},"reference-count":7,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2016,4,1]],"date-time":"2016-04-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1459468800000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["The Review of Symbolic Logic"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>In (Anglberger<jats:italic>et al.<\/jats:italic>, 2015, Section 4.1), a deontic logic is proposed which explicates the idea that a formula<jats:italic>\u03c6<\/jats:italic>is obligatory if and only if it is (semantically speaking) the weakest permission. We give a sound and strongly complete, Hilbert style axiomatization for this logic. As a corollary, it is compact, contradicting earlier claims from Anglberger<jats:italic>et al.<\/jats:italic>(2015). In addition, we prove that our axiomatization is equivalent to Anglberger et al.\u2019s infinitary proof system, and show that our results are robust w.r.t. certain changes in the underlying semantics.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s1755020316000034","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2016,4,1]],"date-time":"2016-04-01T08:55:00Z","timestamp":1459500900000},"page":"370-379","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["OBLIGATION AS WEAKEST PERMISSION: A STRONGLY COMPLETE AXIOMATIZATION"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"9","author":[{"given":"FREDERIK","family":"VAN DE PUTTE","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,4,1]]},"reference":[{"key":"S1755020316000034_ref4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0890-5401(91)90026-X"},{"key":"S1755020316000034_ref5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-31570-1_10"},{"key":"S1755020316000034_ref7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Van De Putte Frederik . That will do: Logics for deontic necessity and sufficiency. Under review, 2016.","DOI":"10.1007\/s10670-016-9829-3"},{"key":"S1755020316000034_ref1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Anglberger Albert J. J. , Gratzl Norbert , & Roy Olivier . (2015). Obligation, free choice, and the logic of weakest permissions, this Review, 8(4), 807\u2013827.","DOI":"10.1017\/S1755020315000209"},{"key":"S1755020316000034_ref6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"657","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-06025-5_24","volume-title":"Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Outstanding Contributions to Logic","volume":"5","author":"Roy","year":"2014"},{"key":"S1755020316000034_ref3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-1-4613-0609-2_21"},{"key":"S1755020316000034_ref2","first-page":"7","volume-title":"Studies in Logic","volume":"8","author":"Dong","year":"2015"}],"container-title":["The Review of Symbolic Logic"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S1755020316000034","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,6]],"date-time":"2019-09-06T05:11:18Z","timestamp":1567746678000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S1755020316000034\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2016,4,1]]},"references-count":7,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,6]]}},"alternative-id":["S1755020316000034"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s1755020316000034","relation":{},"ISSN":["1755-0203","1755-0211"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1755-0203","type":"print"},{"value":"1755-0211","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2016,4,1]]}}}