{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,2,9]],"date-time":"2024-02-09T17:03:40Z","timestamp":1707498220704},"reference-count":90,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,5,8]],"date-time":"2018-05-08T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1525737600000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["The Review of Symbolic Logic"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>Recently, several epistemologists have defended an attractive principle of epistemic rationality, which we shall call<jats:italic>Ur-Prior Conditionalization<\/jats:italic>. In this essay, I ask whether we can justify this principle by appealing to the epistemic goal of accuracy. I argue that any such accuracy-based argument will be in tension with<jats:italic>Evidence Externalism<\/jats:italic>, i.e., the view that agent\u2019s evidence may entail nontrivial propositions about the external world. This is because any such argument will crucially require the assumption that, independently of all empirical evidence, it is rational for an agent to be certain that her evidence will always include truths, and that she will always have perfect introspective access to her own evidence. This assumption is incompatible with<jats:italic>Evidence Externalism<\/jats:italic>. I go on to suggest that even if we don\u2019t accept<jats:italic>Evidence Externalism<\/jats:italic>, the prospects for any accuracy-based justification for<jats:italic>Ur-Prior Conditionalization<\/jats:italic>are bleak.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s1755020318000035","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,5,8]],"date-time":"2018-05-08T04:56:30Z","timestamp":1525755390000},"page":"62-96","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":6,"title":["ACCURACY AND UR-PRIOR CONDITIONALIZATION"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"12","author":[{"given":"NILANJAN","family":"DAS","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,5,8]]},"reference":[{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref48","volume-title":"Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge","author":"McDowell","year":"2011"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref46","first-page":"455","article-title":"Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge","volume":"68","author":"McDowell","year":"1982","journal-title":"Proceedings of the British Academy"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref36","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0149.2004.0356c.x"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1086\/392661"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-1-4020-9198-8_11"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref29","first-page":"111","volume-title":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology","volume":"1","author":"Halpern","year":"2004"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref40","first-page":"1","article-title":"The dogmatism puzzle","volume":"92","author":"Lasonen-Aarnio","year":"2013","journal-title":"Australasian Journal of Philosophy"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref51","first-page":"444","article-title":"Ur-priors, conditionalization, and ur-prior conditionalization","volume":"3","author":"Meacham","year":"2016","journal-title":"Ergo"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5840\/jphil2016113825"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199287512.003.0006"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref23","volume-title":"Thinking How to Live","author":"Gibbard","year":"2003"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/analys\/60.2.143"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1215\/00318108-2366479"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref59","first-page":"121","article-title":"No exception for belief","volume":"91","author":"Rinard","year":"2015","journal-title":"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/0198237545.001.0001"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780198732594.001.0001"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199550623.001.0001"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780199264933.003.0005"},{"key":"S1755020318000035_ref8","unstructured":"Briggs R. 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