{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,10]],"date-time":"2026-04-10T16:42:42Z","timestamp":1775839362530,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":34,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,7,2]],"date-time":"2020-07-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1593648000000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["cambridge.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["The Review of Symbolic Logic"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,9]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>Is knowledge definable as justified true belief (\u201cJTB\u201d)? We argue that one can legitimately answer positively or negatively, depending on whether or not one\u2019s true belief is justified by what we call <jats:italic>adequate<\/jats:italic> reasons. To facilitate our argument we introduce a simple propositional logic of <jats:italic>reason-based belief<\/jats:italic>, and give an axiomatic characterization of the notion of adequacy for reasons. We show that this logic is sufficiently flexible to accommodate various useful features, including quantification over reasons. We use our framework to contrast two notions of JTB: one internalist, the other externalist. We argue that Gettier cases essentially challenge the internalist notion but not the externalist one. Our approach commits us to a form of infallibilism about knowledge, but it also leaves us with a puzzle, namely whether knowledge involves the possession of only adequate reasons, or leaves room for some inadequate reasons. We favor the latter position, which reflects a milder and more realistic version of infallibilism.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s1755020319000522","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,7,2]],"date-time":"2020-07-02T08:56:03Z","timestamp":1593680163000},"page":"687-727","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/policypage","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION, AND ADEQUATE REASONS"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"14","author":[{"given":"PAUL","family":"\u00c9GR\u00c9","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"PAUL","family":"MARTY","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"BRYAN","family":"RENNE","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,7,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"S1755020319000522_r32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-662-02962-6"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/S1755020308090060"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.apal.2013.07.005"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1080\/00048407112341001"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2024037"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/phpr.12117"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2025679"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r34","volume-title":"Knowledge and its limits","author":"Williamson","year":"2000"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2024435"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r12","volume-title":"Methods Models for Belief and Knowledge","author":"Dutant","year":"2015"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r27","first-page":"113","article-title":"How do you know?","volume":"11","author":"Sosa","year":"1974","journal-title":"American Philosophical Quarterly"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r18","first-page":"1","volume-title":"Justification and Knowledge","author":"Goldman","year":"1979"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/analys\/24.2.46"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s11225-011-9347-x"},{"key":"S1755020319000522_r11","unstructured":"[11] Dutant, J . 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