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These views are intuitively appealing, but they also face a powerful objection: in scenarios that involve disagreements over their own correctness, conciliatory views appear to self-defeat and, thereby, issue inconsistent recommendations. This paper provides a response to this objection. Drawing on the work from defeasible logics paradigm and abstract argumentation, it develops a formal model of conciliatory reasoning and explores its behavior in the troubling scenarios. The model suggests that the recommendations that conciliatory views issue in such scenarios are perfectly reasonable\u2014even if outwardly they may look odd.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s1755020321000502","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,12,2]],"date-time":"2021-12-02T09:24:01Z","timestamp":1638437041000},"page":"740-787","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/policypage","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["CONCILIATORY REASONING, SELF-DEFEAT, AND ABSTRACT 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Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Association for Symbolic Logic","name":"copyright","label":"Copyright","group":{"name":"copyright_and_licensing","label":"Copyright and Licensing"}},{"value":"This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.","name":"license","label":"License","group":{"name":"copyright_and_licensing","label":"Copyright and Licensing"}},{"value":"This content has been made available to all.","name":"free","label":"Free to read"}]}}