{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,13]],"date-time":"2025-05-13T22:04:26Z","timestamp":1747173866476,"version":"3.40.5"},"reference-count":21,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,21]],"date-time":"2022-02-21T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1645401600000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["cambridge.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["The Review of Symbolic Logic"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>This paper generalises an argument for probabilism due to Lindley [9]. I extend the argument to a number of non-classical logical settings whose truth-values, seen here as ideal aims for belief, are in the set <jats:inline-formula><jats:alternatives><jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" mime-subtype=\"png\" xlink:href=\"S1755020322000053_inline1.png\"\/><jats:tex-math>\n$\\{0,1\\}$\n<\/jats:tex-math><\/jats:alternatives><\/jats:inline-formula>, and where logical consequence <jats:inline-formula><jats:alternatives><jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" mime-subtype=\"png\" xlink:href=\"S1755020322000053_inline2.png\"\/><jats:tex-math>\n$\\models $\n<\/jats:tex-math><\/jats:alternatives><\/jats:inline-formula> is given the \u201cno-drop\u201d characterization. First I will show that, in each of these settings, an agent\u2019s credence can only avoid accuracy-domination if its canonical transform is a (possibly non-classical) probability function. In other words, if an agent values accuracy as the fundamental epistemic virtue, it is a necessary requirement for rationality that her credence have some probabilistic structure. Then I show that for a certain class of reasonable measures of inaccuracy, having such a probabilistic structure is sufficient to avoid accuracy-domination in these non-classical settings.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s1755020322000053","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,21]],"date-time":"2022-02-21T13:52:03Z","timestamp":1645451523000},"page":"1053-1079","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/policypage","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["TOWARDS THE INEVITABILITY OF NON-CLASSICAL PROBABILITY"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"16","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8040-6112","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"GIACOMO","family":"MOLINARI","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,21]]},"reference":[{"key":"S1755020322000053_r9","first-page":"1","article-title":"Scoring rules and the inevitability of probability","volume":"50","author":"Lindley","year":"1982","journal-title":"International Statistical Review\/Revue Internationale de Statistique"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780198732716.001.0001"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ijar.2006.04.004"},{"volume-title":"Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment","year":"1974","author":"De Finetti","key":"S1755020322000053_r2"},{"volume-title":"Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality","year":"2020","author":"Staffel","key":"S1755020322000053_r16"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/analys\/anv035"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r12","unstructured":"[12] Paris, J. B. (2001). A note on the Dutch book method. In De Cooman, G. , Fine, T. , & Seidenfeld, T. , editors, Proceedings of the Second International Symposium onImprecise Probabilities and their Applications, ISIPTA 2001. Ithaca: Shaker Publishing Company, pp. 301\u2013306."},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s10992-011-9192-4"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/S1755020312000214"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r13","unstructured":"[13] Pettigrew, R. (2011). Epistemic utility arguments for probabilism. In Zalta, E. N. , editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition. https:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/archives\/win2019\/entries\/epistemic-utility\/."},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TIT.2009.2027573"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1023\/B:SYNT.0000004904.91112.16"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-1-4020-9198-8_11"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1086\/392661"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r21","first-page":"248","volume-title":"The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy","author":"Williams","year":"2016"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r4","first-page":"137","volume-title":"Handbook of the Philosophy of Science","volume":"7","author":"Easwaran","year":"2011"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1086\/338941"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/phpr.12436"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-94-017-1652-9_11"},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r17","unstructured":"[17] Titelbaum, M. (2015). Fundamentals of Bayesian epistemology. Unpublished manuscript."},{"key":"S1755020322000053_r18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1305\/ndjfl\/1082637807"}],"container-title":["The Review of Symbolic Logic"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S1755020322000053","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,20]],"date-time":"2023-12-20T00:00:02Z","timestamp":1703030402000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S1755020322000053\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,21]]},"references-count":21,"journal-issue":{"issue":"4","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,12]]}},"alternative-id":["S1755020322000053"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s1755020322000053","relation":{},"ISSN":["1755-0203","1755-0211"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"1755-0203"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1755-0211"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2022,2,21]]},"assertion":[{"value":"\u00a9 The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Association for Symbolic Logic","name":"copyright","label":"Copyright","group":{"name":"copyright_and_licensing","label":"Copyright and Licensing"}},{"value":"This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.","name":"license","label":"License","group":{"name":"copyright_and_licensing","label":"Copyright and Licensing"}},{"value":"This content has been made available to all.","name":"free","label":"Free to read"}]}}