{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,30]],"date-time":"2026-07-30T15:55:45Z","timestamp":1785426945089,"version":"3.56.0"},"reference-count":75,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,30]],"date-time":"2026-01-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1769731200000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":29,"URL":"http:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100002347","name":"Bundesministerium f\u00fcr Forschung, Technologie und Raumfahrt","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["01UG2202A"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["01UG2202A"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100002347","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Polit. life sci."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>Ever since the advent of recombinant DNA technology in the early 1970s concerns have been expressed about the misuse potential of this and subsequent biotechnology breakthroughs. This article focuses on the securitization of gain-of-function (GOF) virology research in the United States, utilizing an updated theoretical framework that distinguishes between \u201criskification\u201d and \u201cthreatification.\u201d The paper examines three distinct cases, two historical, one ongoing. It argues that early attempts to govern GOF research primarily employed a riskification approach, characterized by self-governance by the scientific community. However, the controversy over the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a shift toward threatification, bringing in high-level political actors like the U.S. President and Congress, resulting in the adoption of more restrictive, legally-enforced oversight measures. The article concludes that the application of this theoretical distinction provides a better understanding of how the governance of dual-use research has evolved in the United States.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/pls.2025.10018","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,30]],"date-time":"2026-01-30T07:46:50Z","timestamp":1769759210000},"page":"141-158","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Gain-of-function virology as dual-use research of concern: Variations of securitization in the United States"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"45","author":[{"given":"Alexander","family":"Kelle","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"id":[{"id":"https:\/\/ror.org\/04bjdr366","id-type":"ROR","asserted-by":"publisher"}],"name":"Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at University of Hamburg"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Malcolm","family":"Dando","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"id":[{"id":"https:\/\/ror.org\/00vs8d940","id-type":"ROR","asserted-by":"publisher"}],"name":"University of Bradford"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,30]]},"reference":[{"key":"S073093842510018X_r70","volume-title":"Globalization, biosecurity, and the future of the life sciences","year":"2006"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1038\/d41586-025-00457-w"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r77","unstructured":"Zimmer, C. (2024, December 12). \u2018Second tree of life\u2019 could wreak havoc, scientists warn. The New York Times. https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2024\/12\/12\/science\/mirror-life-microbes-research.html"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r21","unstructured":"Ebright, R. H. (2024, June 18) Written testimony [Testimony before the Record to the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight for the Hearing \u201cOrigin of COVID-19; An Examination of Available Evidence\u201d]."},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1128\/msphere.00289-25"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3316\/QRJ0902027"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r32","unstructured":"Global Biodefense Staff (2025, May 6). How the Trump administration\u2019s ban on gain-of-function research undermines pandemic preparedness. https:\/\/globalbiodefense.com\/2025\/05\/06\/the-cost-of-caution-how-the-trump-administrations-ban-on-gain-of-function-research-undermines-pandemic-preparedness\/"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r74","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/0967010611418714"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1126\/science.ads9158"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1213362"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r46","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1038\/d41586-025-01411-6"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r43","unstructured":"Lurie, N. (2014). Charge to NSABB, National Institutes of Health. https:\/\/osp.od.nih.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2_Lurie-Charge_to_NSABB.pdf"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r56","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.51593\/20220035"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r45","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1089\/apb.2024.0048"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r41","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/pls.2023.13"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r10","volume-title":"Security: A new framework for analysis","author":"Buzan","year":"1998"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r64","unstructured":"U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2013, February 21). A framework for guiding U.S. Department of Health and Human Services funding decisions about research proposals with the potential for generating highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses that are transmissible among mammals by respiratory droplets. https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20201221180529\/http:\/\/www.phe.gov\/s3\/dualuse\/Documents\/funding-hpai-h5n1.pdf"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r68","unstructured":"U.S. National Institutes of Health. (2025, June 18). Implementation update: Terminating or suspending dangerous gain-of-function research in accordance with Executive Order on Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research (Notice Number NOT-OD25\u2013127). https:\/\/grants.nih.gov\/grants\/guide\/notice-files\/NOT-OD-25-127.html"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r73","unstructured":"U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). (2016). Recommendations for the Evaluation and Oversight of Proposed Gain-of-Function Research. https:\/\/osp.od.nih.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/06\/NSABB_Final_Report_Recommendations_Evaluation_Oversight_Proposed_Gain_of_Function_Research.pdf"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1128\/mBio.01730-14"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r27","unstructured":"Garry, R. F. (2024, June 18). Written testimony [Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight for the Hearing \u201cOrigin of COVID-19; An Examination of Available Evidence\u201d]."},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r55","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.112220499"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.crm.2023.100492"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r47","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/1354066111425258"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1080\/713604665"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r71","unstructured":"U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). (2007). Proposed framework for the oversight of dual-use life sciences research: Strategies for minimizing the potential misuse of research information. https:\/\/osp.od.nih.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/Proposed-Oversight-Framework-for-Dual-Use-Research.pdf"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/0305829811419444"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r69","volume-title":"Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism","year":"2004"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/1354066105052960"},{"key":"S073093842510018X_r40","unstructured":"Kopp, E . (2025, August 28). 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