{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T08:04:37Z","timestamp":1789632277776,"version":"build-2803163510"},"reference-count":5,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1789603200000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":259,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["cambridge.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Behav Brain Sci"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>Seth argues in favour of strongly substrate-dependent biological naturalism. I suggest we need more reason to believe the substrates in question are consciousness-specific. Instead, the case for mortal computational biological naturalism is more promising. A self-evidencing framing helps elucidate what the consciousness-specific functional characteristics of mortal computation might be, leaving conscious AI waiting in the wings.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s0140525x25103592","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T07:24:40Z","timestamp":1789629880000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/policypage","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Self-evidencing and consciousness-specific mortal computation"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"49","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3906-3060","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jakob","family":"Hohwy","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Monash University"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0140525X25103592_ref1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3390\/e26060518"},{"key":"S0140525X25103592_ref3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.7551\/mitpress\/15901.001.0001"},{"key":"S0140525X25103592_ref2","unstructured":"Hinton, G. (2022). The forward-forward algorithm: Some preliminary investigations. arXiv preprint arXiv:2212.13345."},{"key":"S0140525X25103592_ref4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.31219\/osf.io\/epqkg"},{"key":"S0140525X25103592_ref5","unstructured":"Whyte, C. , Corcoran, A. , Robinson, J. , Smith, R. , Moran, R. , Parr, T. , Friston, K. , Seth, A. , & Hohwy, J. (In press). On the minimal theory of consciousness implicit in active inference. Physics of Life Reviews."}],"container-title":["Behavioral and Brain Sciences"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S0140525X25103592","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T07:24:43Z","timestamp":1789629883000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S0140525X25103592\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"references-count":5,"alternative-id":["S0140525X25103592"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0140525x25103592","relation":{},"ISSN":["0140-525X","1469-1825"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0140-525X","type":"print"},{"value":"1469-1825","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"assertion":[{"value":"\u00a9 The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press","name":"copyright","label":"Copyright","group":{"name":"copyright_and_licensing","label":"Copyright and Licensing"}}],"article-number":"e339"}}