{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T08:04:36Z","timestamp":1789632276462,"version":"build-2803163510"},"reference-count":3,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1789603200000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":259,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["cambridge.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Behav Brain Sci"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>\n                    Seth\u2019s claim that only biological or biological-like systems can be conscious leaves open the question of what renders only\n                    <jats:italic>some<\/jats:italic>\n                    organisms conscious. We address this question by pointing to the material, ontogenetic, memory, and evaluative affordances of living organisms and arguing that evolved, minimal consciousness requires complex cognitive-affective architecture for which these biological affordances are obligatory. Conscious thinking of humans cannot be separated from minimal consciousness, and non-biological AI robots\u2019 computations do not render these operations conscious.\n                  <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s0140525x25103683","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T07:24:38Z","timestamp":1789629878000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/policypage","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Consciousness is not \u201cuniversal\u201d but depends on specifically organized biological affordances"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"49","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4549-8063","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Eva","family":"Jablonka","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas Tel Aviv University"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Simona","family":"Ginsburg","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"The Open University of Israel"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0005-1324-5589","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Zohar Z.","family":"Bronfman","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Pecan.ai"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0140525X25103683_ref1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1142\/S2705078521500168"},{"key":"S0140525X25103683_ref2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.7551\/mitpress\/11006.001.0001"},{"key":"S0140525X25103683_ref3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s12304-022-09501-y"}],"container-title":["Behavioral and Brain Sciences"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S0140525X25103683","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T07:24:39Z","timestamp":1789629879000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S0140525X25103683\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"references-count":3,"alternative-id":["S0140525X25103683"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0140525x25103683","relation":{},"ISSN":["0140-525X","1469-1825"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0140-525X","type":"print"},{"value":"1469-1825","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"assertion":[{"value":"\u00a9 The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press","name":"copyright","label":"Copyright","group":{"name":"copyright_and_licensing","label":"Copyright and Licensing"}}],"article-number":"e340"}}