{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T08:04:30Z","timestamp":1789632270753,"version":"build-2803163510"},"reference-count":8,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1789603200000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":259,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["cambridge.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Behav Brain Sci"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>Seth\u2019s case for biological naturalism rests on a worryingly speculative foundation: the free energy principle. Arguments for computational functionalism are likewise speculative. Yet I am optimistic that the clash can be resolved empirically. Alleged dependencies of consciousness markers on biological properties can be tested comparatively, and a pattern of failed predictions would tilt the odds towards computational functionalism.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s0140525x25103713","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T07:24:12Z","timestamp":1789629852000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/policypage","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Free energy, consciousness, and the inverse dark room problem"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"49","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-7517-4759","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jonathan","family":"Birch","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"London School of Economics and Political Science"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0140525X25103713_ref6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tics.2020.05.011"},{"key":"S0140525X25103713_ref3","volume-title":"The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory","author":"Chalmers","year":"1996"},{"key":"S0140525X25103713_ref5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2005.06.009"},{"key":"S0140525X25103713_ref1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.89.23.11357"},{"key":"S0140525X25103713_ref7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tics.2020.02.006"},{"key":"S0140525X25103713_ref4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.14748\/bmr.v25.1038"},{"key":"S0140525X25103713_ref2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/9780191966729.001.0001"},{"key":"S0140525X25103713_ref8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/icb\/icad098"}],"container-title":["Behavioral and Brain Sciences"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S0140525X25103713","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T07:24:12Z","timestamp":1789629852000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S0140525X25103713\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"references-count":8,"alternative-id":["S0140525X25103713"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0140525x25103713","relation":{},"ISSN":["0140-525X","1469-1825"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0140-525X","type":"print"},{"value":"1469-1825","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"assertion":[{"value":"\u00a9 The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press","name":"copyright","label":"Copyright","group":{"name":"copyright_and_licensing","label":"Copyright and Licensing"}}],"article-number":"e320"}}