{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T08:04:34Z","timestamp":1789632274120,"version":"build-2803163510"},"reference-count":5,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1789603200000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":259,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["cambridge.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Behav Brain Sci"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>Digital computation may not be sufficient for consciousness, but this does not warrant biological naturalism. Rejecting coarse-grained Turing-computational functionalism and adopting a broader computationalism with no built-in syntax\/semantics distinction, undermines the motivation for biological naturalism. Substrate-dependent processes of the kind found in living things may be necessary for the emergence of consciousness, but these are functional requirements, not intrinsic properties.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s0140525x25103737","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T07:24:16Z","timestamp":1789629856000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/policypage","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Birds do it, we do it, even embodied machines could do it. Why consciousness is not intrinsically biological."],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"49","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-3064-5948","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Simon","family":"Bowes","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Sussex"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0140525X25103737_ref5","first-page":"133","article-title":"Virtual machines and consciousness","volume":"10","author":"Sloman","year":"2003","journal-title":"Journal of Consciousness Studies"},{"key":"S0140525X25103737_ref3","volume-title":"Consciousness explained","author":"Dennett","year":"1991"},{"key":"S0140525X25103737_ref1","volume-title":"Computer models on mind: computational approaches in theoretical psychology","author":"Boden","year":"1988"},{"key":"S0140525X25103737_ref2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-031-36930-8"},{"key":"S0140525X25103737_ref4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/S0140525X00005756"}],"container-title":["Behavioral and Brain Sciences"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S0140525X25103737","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,17]],"date-time":"2026-09-17T07:24:17Z","timestamp":1789629857000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S0140525X25103737\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"references-count":5,"alternative-id":["S0140525X25103737"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0140525x25103737","relation":{},"ISSN":["0140-525X","1469-1825"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0140-525X","type":"print"},{"value":"1469-1825","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"assertion":[{"value":"\u00a9 The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press","name":"copyright","label":"Copyright","group":{"name":"copyright_and_licensing","label":"Copyright and Licensing"}}],"article-number":"e324"}}