{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,10,29]],"date-time":"2026-10-29T23:13:07Z","timestamp":1793315587726,"version":"4.5.0"},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[1999,6,1]],"date-time":"1999-06-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":928195200000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Behav Brain Sci"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[1999,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>Although the study of visual perception has made more progress \nin the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there \nremain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to \ncognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both \nsides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, \nperceptual learning, and other areas of vision science) and \ndefends the position that an important part of visual perception, \ncorresponding to what some people have called early vision, is \nprohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge, and \nutilities in determining the function it computes \u2013 in other \nwords, it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex \nand involves top-down interactions that are internal to the early \nvision system. Its function is to provide a structured representation \nof the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into \nmemory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to \nother systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also \naddresses certain conceptual and methodological issues raised by this \nclaim, such as whether signal detection theory and event-related \npotentials can be used to assess cognitive penetration of \nvision.<\/jats:p><jats:p>A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing, \nincluding, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a \npre-perceptual attention-allocation stage and a post-perceptual \nevaluation, selection, and inference stage, which accesses long-term \nmemory. These two stages provide the primary ways in which cognition \ncan affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses \narguments from computer vision and psychology showing that vision \nis \u201cintelligent\u201d and involves elements of \u201cproblem \nsolving.\u201d The cases of apparently intelligent interpretation \nsometimes cited in support of this claim do not show cognitive \npenetration; rather, they show that certain natural constraints on \ninterpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical \nproperties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. \nThe paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and \n\u201chints\u201d are alleged to affect what is seen. In each case \nit is concluded that the evidence is more readily assimilated to the \nview that when cognitive effects are found, they have a locus outside \nearly vision, in such processes as the allocation of focal attention \nand the identification of the stimulus.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s0140525x99002022","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2002,7,27]],"date-time":"2002-07-27T13:42:27Z","timestamp":1027777347000},"page":"341-365","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":744,"title":["Is vision continuous with cognition?: The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"22","author":[{"given":"Zenon","family":"Pylyshyn","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[1999,6,1]]},"container-title":["Behavioral and Brain Sciences"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S0140525X99002022","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,11]],"date-time":"2019-04-11T06:22:14Z","timestamp":1554963734000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S0140525X99002022\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[1999,6]]},"references-count":0,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-print":{"date-parts":[[1999,6]]}},"alternative-id":["S0140525X99002022"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0140525x99002022","relation":{},"ISSN":["0140-525X","1469-1825"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0140-525X","type":"print"},{"value":"1469-1825","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[1999,6]]}}}