{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,27]],"date-time":"2026-03-27T13:01:43Z","timestamp":1774616503522,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":14,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2017,9,22]],"date-time":"2017-09-22T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1506038400000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["www.cambridge.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Camb Q Healthc Ethics"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2017,10]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract:<\/jats:title><jats:p>In this article, we engage in dialogue with Jonathan Pugh, Hannah Maslen, and Julian Savulescu about how to best interpret the potential impacts of deep brain stimulation on the self. We consider whether ordinary peoples\u2019 convictions about the true self should be interpreted in essentialist or existentialist ways. Like Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu, we argue that it is useful to understand the notion of the true self as having both essentialist and existentialist components. We also consider two ideas from existentialist philosophy\u2014Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir\u2019s ideas about \u201cbad faith\u201d and \u201cambiguity\u201d\u2014to argue that there can be value to patients in regarding themselves as having a certain amount of freedom to choose what aspects of themselves should be considered representative of their true selves. Lastly, we consider the case of an anorexia nervosa patient who shifts between conflicting mind-sets. We argue that mind-sets in which it is easier for the patient and his or her family to share values can plausibly be considered to be more representative of the patient\u2019s true self, if this promotes a well-functioning relationship between the patient and the family. However, we also argue that families are well advised to give patients room to determine what such shared values mean to them, as it can be alienating for patients if they feel that others try to impose values on them from the outside.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s0963180117000159","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2017,9,22]],"date-time":"2017-09-22T14:21:19Z","timestamp":1506090079000},"page":"658-670","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/policypage","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":8,"title":["Deep Brain Stimulation, Authenticity and Value"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"26","author":[{"given":"SVEN","family":"NYHOLM","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"ELIZABETH","family":"O\u2019NEILL","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,9,22]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref7","volume-title":"The Ethics of Ambiguity","author":"De Beauvoir","year":"1976"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/S1744552312000456"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/bjps\/axu024"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref6","volume-title":"Being and Nothingness","author":"Sartre","year":"1993"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/0146167204271182"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.4159\/9780674915855"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1353\/ppp.2007.0032"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/S0963180116000372"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref14","first-page":"1","article-title":"Value judgments and the true self","volume":"40","author":"Newman","year":"2013","journal-title":"Psychology Bulletin"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1353\/ppp.2014.0032"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1093\/oso\/9780195165241.001.0001","volume-title":"The Origin and Evolution of Cultures","author":"Boyd","year":"2005"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-5930.2011.00532.x"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref13","first-page":"140","article-title":"Neurosurgery for psychopaths? An ethical analysis","volume":"7","author":"H\u00fcbner","year":"2016","journal-title":"American Journal of Bioethics"},{"key":"S0963180117000159_ref12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.copsyc.2015.03.025"}],"container-title":["Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S0963180117000159","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,27]],"date-time":"2024-06-27T05:22:02Z","timestamp":1719465722000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S0963180117000159\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":["Further Reflections"],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2017,9,22]]},"references-count":14,"journal-issue":{"issue":"4","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2017,10]]}},"alternative-id":["S0963180117000159"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0963180117000159","relation":{},"ISSN":["0963-1801","1469-2147"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0963-1801","type":"print"},{"value":"1469-2147","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2017,9,22]]},"assertion":[{"value":"Copyright \u00a9 Cambridge University Press 2017\u00a0","name":"license","label":"License","group":{"name":"copyright_and_licensing","label":"Copyright and Licensing"}}]}}