{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,10,8]],"date-time":"2026-10-08T16:38:38Z","timestamp":1791477518393,"version":"4.3.4"},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[1999,10,1]],"date-time":"1999-10-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":938736000000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Camb Q Healthc Ethics"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[1999,10]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>It is commonly taken for granted that abortion \nis necessarily impermissible if the fetus is a person with \na right to life. In her influential essay \u201cA Defense \nof Abortion,\u201d Judith Jarvis Thomson offers what I \nwill call the violinist example to show that merely \nhaving a right to life does not in and of itself give rise \nin the fetus to a right to use the mother's body. \nOn Thomson's view, if the fetus has a right to use \nthe mother's body that precludes terminating its life \nby means of an abortion, it is because the mother did something \nto give the fetus that right. Thus she concludes that the \nproposition that the fetus is a person does not imply that \nabortion is morally impermissible.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s0963180199004041","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2002,7,27]],"date-time":"2002-07-27T13:44:43Z","timestamp":1027777483000},"page":"428-435","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":7,"title":["Thomson's Violinist and Conjoined Twins"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"8","author":[{"given":"KENNETH EINAR","family":"HIMMA","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[1999,10,1]]},"container-title":["Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S0963180199004041","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,2]],"date-time":"2019-09-02T16:14:45Z","timestamp":1567440885000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S0963180199004041\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[1999,10]]},"references-count":0,"journal-issue":{"issue":"4","published-print":{"date-parts":[[1999,10]]}},"alternative-id":["S0963180199004041"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s0963180199004041","relation":{},"ISSN":["0963-1801","1469-2147"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0963-1801","type":"print"},{"value":"1469-2147","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[1999,10]]}}}