{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,10,11]],"date-time":"2026-10-11T13:54:59Z","timestamp":1791726899691,"version":"4.3.4"},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[1999,6,1]],"date-time":"1999-06-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":928195200000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/terms"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Legal Theory"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[1999,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>A wrongful life suit is an unusual civil suit brought by a child (typically a congenitally disabled child)<jats:sup>1<\/jats:sup> who seeks damages for burdens he suffers that result from his creation. Typically, the child charges that he has been born into an unwanted or miserable life.<jats:sup>2<\/jats:sup> These suits offer the prospect of financial relief for some disabled or neglected children and have some theoretical advantages over alternative causes of action.<jats:sup>3<\/jats:sup> But they have had only mixed, mostly negative, success.<jats:sup>4<\/jats:sup> They have, however, spurred considerable philosophical interest.<jats:sup>5<\/jats:sup> This attention, though, has been primarily focused on issues about the coherence of complaining about one\u2019s existence or its essential conditions. These suits also raise important, but less well-probed, philosophical questions about the morality of procreation and, more generally, about the moral significance of imposed, but not consented to, conditions that deliver both significant harms and benefits.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1017\/s1352325299052015","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2002,7,27]],"date-time":"2002-07-27T13:26:26Z","timestamp":1027776386000},"page":"117-148","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":248,"title":["WRONGFUL LIFE, PROCREATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HARM"],"prefix":"10.1017","volume":"5","author":[{"given":"Seana Valentine","family":"Shiffrin","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"56","published-online":{"date-parts":[[1999,6,1]]},"container-title":["Legal Theory"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/S1352325299052015","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,20]],"date-time":"2025-06-20T16:05:14Z","timestamp":1750435514000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/product\/identifier\/S1352325299052015\/type\/journal_article"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[1999,6]]},"references-count":0,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[1999,6]]}},"alternative-id":["S1352325299052015"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/s1352325299052015","relation":{},"ISSN":["1352-3252","1469-8048"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1352-3252","type":"print"},{"value":"1469-8048","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[1999,6]]}}}