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Indirect reciprocity explains how social norms and reputations support cooperation: individuals cooperate with others who are considered good. Indirect reciprocity works when an institution monitors and publicly broadcasts moral reputations. Here we develop a theory of adherence to public monitoring in societies where individuals are, at first, independently responsible for evaluating the reputations of their peers. Using a mathematical model, we show that adherence to an institution of moral assessment can evolve and promote cooperation under four different social norms, including norms that previous studies found to perform poorly. We determine how an institution\u2019s size and its degree of tolerance towards anti-social behavior affect the rate of cooperation. Public monitoring serves to eliminate disagreements about reputations, which increases cooperation and payoffs, so that adherence evolves by social contagion and\u00a0remains robust against displacement.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1038\/s41467-021-23783-9","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,6,11]],"date-time":"2021-06-11T06:05:00Z","timestamp":1623391500000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":33,"title":["Adherence to public institutions that foster cooperation"],"prefix":"10.1038","volume":"12","author":[{"given":"Arunas L.","family":"Radzvilavicius","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Taylor A.","family":"Kessinger","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-2349-6304","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Joshua B.","family":"Plotkin","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,6,11]]},"reference":[{"key":"23783_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9744.1985.tb00574.x","volume":"20","author":"RD Alexander","year":"1985","unstructured":"Alexander, R. 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