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However, punishment is costly, and thus rational individuals are unwilling to take the punishing action, resulting in the second-order free-rider problem. Recent experimental study evidences that individuals prefer conditional punishment, and their punishing decision depends on other members\u2019 punishing decisions. In this work, we thus propose a theoretical model for conditional punishment and investigate how such conditional punishment influences cooperation in the public goods game. Considering conditional punishers only take the punishing action when the number of unconditional punishers exceeds a threshold number, we demonstrate that such conditional punishment induces the effect of a double-edged sword on the evolution of cooperation both in well-mixed and structured populations. Specifically, when it is relatively easy for conditional punishers to engage in the punishment activity corresponding to a low threshold value, cooperation can be promoted in comparison with the case without conditional punishment. Whereas when it is relatively difficult for conditional punishers to engage in the punishment activity corresponding to a high threshold value, cooperation is inhibited in comparison with the case without conditional punishment. Moreover, we verify that such double-edged sword effect exists in a wide range of model parameters and can be still observed in other different punishment regimes.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1038\/s41598-017-18727-7","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,1,5]],"date-time":"2018-01-05T15:36:23Z","timestamp":1515166583000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":30,"title":["Conditional punishment is a double-edged sword in promoting cooperation"],"prefix":"10.1038","volume":"8","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-6725-8263","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Feng","family":"Huang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Xiaojie","family":"Chen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-5600-8157","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Long","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,1,11]]},"reference":[{"key":"18727_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511807763","volume-title":"Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action","author":"E Ostrom","year":"1990","unstructured":"Ostrom, E. 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