{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,26]],"date-time":"2026-02-26T20:01:09Z","timestamp":1772136069993,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":55,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,18]],"date-time":"2021-05-18T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1621296000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,18]],"date-time":"2021-05-18T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1621296000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Sci Rep"],"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>It has been known that altruistic punishments solve the free rider problem in public goods games. Considering spatial structure and considering pure strategies significant advances have been made in understanding the evolution of altruistic punishments. However, these models have not considered key behavior regularities observed in experimental and field settings, where the individuals behave like conditional cooperators who are more willing to donate and are also more willing to punish free riders. Considering these behavioral regularities, without imposing a spatial structure on the population, I propose an evolutionary agent-based model in which agents behave like conditional cooperators, each agent\u2019s donation conditional on the difference between the number of donations in the past and the threshold value and the propensity value of the agent. Altruistic punishment depends on the difference between the threshold value of the focal agent and the randomly matched another agent. The simulations show that, for certain inflicted costs of punishments, generous altruistic punishments evolve and stabilize cooperation. The results show that, unlike previous models, it is not necessary to punish all free riders equally; it is necessary to do so in the case of the selfish free riders but not in the case of negative reciprocators.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1038\/s41598-021-89563-z","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,18]],"date-time":"2021-05-18T06:06:23Z","timestamp":1621317983000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators"],"prefix":"10.1038","volume":"11","author":[{"given":"Balaraju","family":"Battu","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,18]]},"reference":[{"key":"89563_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"30004","DOI":"10.1209\/0295-5075\/77\/30004","volume":"77","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2007","unstructured":"Szolnoki, A. & Szab\u00f3, G. Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner\u2019s Dilemma games. EPL Europhys. Lett. 77, 30004 (2007).","journal-title":"EPL Europhys. Lett."},{"key":"89563_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"826","DOI":"10.1038\/359826a0","volume":"359","author":"MA Nowak","year":"1992","unstructured":"Nowak, M. A. & May, R. M. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359, 826\u2013829 (1992).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"89563_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"11904","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.77.011904","volume":"77","author":"M Perc","year":"2008","unstructured":"Perc, M. & Szolnoki, A. Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner\u2019s dilemma game. Phys. Rev. E 77, 11904 (2008).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"89563_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"97","DOI":"10.1016\/j.physrep.2007.04.004","volume":"446","author":"G Szab\u00f3","year":"2007","unstructured":"Szab\u00f3, G. & Fath, G. Evolutionary games on graphs. Phys. Rep. 446, 97\u2013216 (2007).","journal-title":"Phys. Rep."},{"key":"89563_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"312","DOI":"10.1038\/nature03204","volume":"433","author":"E Lieberman","year":"2005","unstructured":"Lieberman, E., Hauert, C. & Nowak, M. A. Evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Nature 433, 312 (2005).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"89563_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"69","DOI":"10.1007\/BF02934456","volume":"66","author":"NV Joshi","year":"1987","unstructured":"Joshi, N. V. Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes. J. Genet. 66, 69\u201384 (1987).","journal-title":"J. Genet."},{"key":"89563_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1390","DOI":"10.1126\/science.7466396","volume":"211","author":"R Axelrod","year":"1981","unstructured":"Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. D. The evolution of cooperation. Science 211, 1390\u20131396 (1981).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"89563_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Kagel, J. H. & Roth, A. E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 2 (Princeton University Press, 2016).","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400883172"},{"key":"89563_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"137","DOI":"10.1038\/415137a","volume":"415","author":"E Fehr","year":"2002","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & G\u00e4chter, S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415, 137 (2002).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"89563_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"980","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.90.4.980","volume":"90","author":"E Fehr","year":"2000","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & G\u00e4chter, S. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 980\u2013994 (2000).","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"89563_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"63","DOI":"10.1016\/S1090-5138(04)00005-4","volume":"25","author":"E Fehr","year":"2004","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. Third-party punishment and social norms. Evol. Hum. Behav. 25, 63\u201387 (2004).","journal-title":"Evol. Hum. Behav."},{"key":"89563_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"961","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1193649","volume":"330","author":"D Rustagi","year":"2010","unstructured":"Rustagi, D., Engel, S. & Kosfeld, M. Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management. Science 330, 961\u2013965 (2010).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"89563_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"159","DOI":"10.1257\/jep.14.3.159","volume":"14","author":"E Fehr","year":"2000","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & G\u00e4chter, S. Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. J. Econ. Perspect. 14, 159\u2013181 (2000).","journal-title":"J. Econ. Perspect."},{"key":"89563_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1254","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1100735","volume":"305","author":"DJF De Quervain","year":"2004","unstructured":"De Quervain, D. J. F., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V. & Schellhammer, M. The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science 305, 1254 (2004).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"89563_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"11023","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1105456108","volume":"108","author":"D Baldassarri","year":"2011","unstructured":"Baldassarri, D. & Grossman, G. Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 108, 11023\u201311027 (2011).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci."},{"key":"89563_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"27292","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.2007230117","volume":"117","author":"KP Andersson","year":"2020","unstructured":"Andersson, K. P., Chang, K. & Molina-Garz\u00f3n, A. Voluntary leadership and the emergence of institutions for self-governance. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 117, 27292\u201327299 (2020).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci."},{"key":"89563_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"36101","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.83.036101","volume":"83","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2011","unstructured":"Szolnoki, A., Szab\u00f3, G. & Perc, M. Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool punishment. Phys. Rev. E 83, 36101 (2011).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"89563_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3716","DOI":"10.1098\/rspb.2012.0937","volume":"279","author":"A Traulsen","year":"2012","unstructured":"Traulsen, A., R\u00f6hl, T. & Milinski, M. An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons. Proc. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 279, 3716\u20133721 (2012).","journal-title":"Proc. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci."},{"key":"89563_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"764","DOI":"10.1007\/s13235-019-00339-7","volume":"10","author":"Q Wang","year":"2020","unstructured":"Wang, Q., Liu, L. & Chen, X. Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment. Dyn. Games Appl. 10, 764\u2013782 (2020).","journal-title":"Dyn. Games Appl."},{"key":"89563_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"83005","DOI":"10.1088\/1367-2630\/12\/8\/083005","volume":"12","author":"D Helbing","year":"2010","unstructured":"Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Szab\u00f3, G. Punish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game. New J. Phys. 12, 83005 (2010).","journal-title":"New J. Phys."},{"key":"89563_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"e1000758","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pcbi.1000758","volume":"6","author":"D Helbing","year":"2010","unstructured":"Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Szab\u00f3, G. Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions. PLoS Comput. Biol. 6, e1000758 (2010).","journal-title":"PLoS Comput. Biol."},{"key":"89563_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"57104","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.81.057104","volume":"81","author":"D Helbing","year":"2010","unstructured":"Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Szab\u00f3, G. Defector-accelerated cooperativeness and punishment in public goods games with mutations. Phys. Rev. E 81, 57104 (2010).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"89563_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"213","DOI":"10.1038\/nature06940","volume":"454","author":"FC Santos","year":"2008","unstructured":"Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D. & Pacheco, J. M. Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games. Nature 454, 213 (2008).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"89563_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"12819","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.92.012819","volume":"92","author":"X Chen","year":"2015","unstructured":"Chen, X., Szolnoki, A. & Perc, M. Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game. Phys. Rev. E 92, 12819 (2015).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"89563_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"83016","DOI":"10.1088\/1367-2630\/16\/8\/083016","volume":"16","author":"X Chen","year":"2014","unstructured":"Chen, X., Szolnoki, A. & Perc, M. Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment. New J. Phys. 16, 83016 (2014).","journal-title":"New J. Phys."},{"key":"89563_CR26","first-page":"83016","volume":"77","author":"FC Santos","year":"2008","unstructured":"Santos, F. C. et al. Punish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game. Phys. Rev. E 77, 83016 (2008).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"89563_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"43013","DOI":"10.1088\/1367-2630\/14\/4\/043013","volume":"14","author":"M Perc","year":"2012","unstructured":"Perc, M. & Szolnoki, A. Self-organization of punishment in structured populations. New J. Phys. 14, 43013 (2012).","journal-title":"New J. Phys."},{"key":"89563_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"34","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2013.02.008","volume":"325","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2013","unstructured":"Szolnoki, A. & Perc, M. Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation. J. Theor. Biol. 325, 34\u201341 (2013).","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"89563_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"20150100","DOI":"10.1098\/rstb.2015.0100","volume":"371","author":"M Milinski","year":"2016","unstructured":"Milinski, M. Reputation, a universal currency for human social interactions. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 371, 20150100 (2016).","journal-title":"Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci."},{"key":"89563_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"499","DOI":"10.1038\/nature02978","volume":"432","author":"K Panchanathan","year":"2004","unstructured":"Panchanathan, K. & Boyd, R. Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 432, 499\u2013502 (2004).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"89563_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3531","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0630443100","volume":"100","author":"R Boyd","year":"2003","unstructured":"Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. & Richerson, P. J. The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 100, 3531\u20133535 (2003).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci."},{"key":"89563_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"407","DOI":"10.1006\/jtbi.2003.3104","volume":"220","author":"H Gintis","year":"2003","unstructured":"Gintis, H. The hitchhiker\u2019s guide to altruism: Gene-culture coevolution, and the internalization of norms. J. Theor. Biol. 220, 407\u2013418 (2003).","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"89563_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"541","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2008.06.017","volume":"254","author":"MA Janssen","year":"2008","unstructured":"Janssen, M. A. & Bushman, C. Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible. J. Theor. Biol. 254, 541\u2013545 (2008).","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"89563_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"7047","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0500938102","volume":"102","author":"JH Fowler","year":"2005","unstructured":"Fowler, J. H. Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 102, 7047\u20137049 (2005).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci."},{"key":"89563_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"23","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-9442.00182","volume":"102","author":"C Keser","year":"2000","unstructured":"Keser, C. & Van Winden, F. Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods. Scand. J. Econ. 102, 23\u201339 (2000).","journal-title":"Scand. J. Econ."},{"key":"89563_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"397","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-1765(01)00394-9","volume":"71","author":"U Fischbacher","year":"2001","unstructured":"Fischbacher, U., G\u00e4chter, S. & Fehr, E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Econ. Lett. 71, 397\u2013404 (2001).","journal-title":"Econ. Lett."},{"key":"89563_CR37","unstructured":"G\u00e4chter, S. Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications. (No. 2006-03). CeDEx Discussion Paper Series (2006)."},{"key":"89563_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"541","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.100.1.541","volume":"100","author":"U Fischbacher","year":"2010","unstructured":"Fischbacher, U. & Gachter, S. Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public goods experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 100, 541\u2013556 (2010).","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"89563_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"13","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2009.11.013","volume":"263","author":"S Uchida","year":"2010","unstructured":"Uchida, S. & Sigmund, K. The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 263, 13\u201319 (2010).","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"89563_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"267","DOI":"10.1086\/417658","volume":"67","author":"M Mesterton-Gibbons","year":"1992","unstructured":"Mesterton-Gibbons, M. & Dugatkin, L. A. Cooperation among unrelated individuals: Evolutionary factors. Q. Rev. Biol. 67, 267\u2013281 (1992).","journal-title":"Q. Rev. Biol."},{"key":"89563_CR41","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"785","DOI":"10.1038\/nature02043","volume":"425","author":"E Fehr","year":"2003","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. The nature of human altruism. Nature 425, 785\u2013791 (2003).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"89563_CR42","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400838837","volume-title":"A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution","author":"S Bowles","year":"2011","unstructured":"Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution (Princeton University Press, 2011)."},{"key":"89563_CR43","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"191567","DOI":"10.1098\/rsos.191567","volume":"7","author":"B Battu","year":"2020","unstructured":"Battu, B. & Srinivasan, N. Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games. R. Soc. Open Sci. 7, 191567 (2020).","journal-title":"R. Soc. Open Sci."},{"key":"89563_CR44","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"4524","DOI":"10.1038\/s41598-018-22593-2","volume":"8","author":"B Battu","year":"2018","unstructured":"Battu, B., Pammi, V. S. C. & Srinivasan, N. Evolution of cooperation with heterogeneous conditional cooperators. Sci. Rep. 8, 4524 (2018).","journal-title":"Sci. Rep."},{"key":"89563_CR45","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"441","DOI":"10.1038\/35106555","volume":"414","author":"RL Riolo","year":"2001","unstructured":"Riolo, R. L., Cohen, M. D. & Axelrod, R. Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity. Nature 414, 441\u2013443 (2001).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"89563_CR46","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"793","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1093411","volume":"303","author":"MA Nowak","year":"2004","unstructured":"Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Evolutionary dynamics of biological games. Science 303, 793\u2013799 (2004).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"89563_CR47","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"573","DOI":"10.1038\/31225","volume":"393","author":"MA Nowak","year":"1998","unstructured":"Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 393, 573 (1998).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"89563_CR48","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"250","DOI":"10.1038\/355250a0","volume":"355","author":"MA Nowak","year":"1992","unstructured":"Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Tit for tat in heterogenous populations. Nature 355, 250 (1992).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"89563_CR49","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1605","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1152110","volume":"320","author":"S Bowles","year":"2008","unstructured":"Bowles, S. Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine\" the moral sentiments\": Evidence from economic experiments. Science 320, 1605\u20131609 (2008).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"89563_CR50","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"424","DOI":"10.1038\/415424a","volume":"415","author":"M Milinski","year":"2002","unstructured":"Milinski, M., Semmann, D. & Krambeck, H.-J. Reputation helps solve the \u2018tragedy of the commons\u2019. Nature 415, 424\u2013426 (2002).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"89563_CR51","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"2127","DOI":"10.1142\/S0218202519500428","volume":"29","author":"L Liu","year":"2019","unstructured":"Liu, L., Chen, X. & Szolnoki, A. Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators. Math. Model. Methods Appl. Sci. 29, 2127\u20132149 (2019).","journal-title":"Math. Model. Methods Appl. Sci."},{"key":"89563_CR52","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"464","DOI":"10.2307\/2234133","volume":"100","author":"J Andreoni","year":"1990","unstructured":"Andreoni, J. Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving. Econ. J. 100, 464\u2013477 (1990).","journal-title":"Econ. J."},{"key":"89563_CR53","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1129","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1070582","volume":"296","author":"C Hauert","year":"2002","unstructured":"Hauert, C., De Monte, S., Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. Volunteering as red queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games. Science 296, 1129\u20131132 (2002).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"89563_CR54","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"650","DOI":"10.1038\/s41562-017-0191-5","volume":"1","author":"S G\u00e4chter","year":"2017","unstructured":"G\u00e4chter, S., K\u00f6lle, F. & Quercia, S. Reciprocity and the tragedies of maintaining and providing the commons. Nat. Hum. Behav. 1, 650\u2013656 (2017).","journal-title":"Nat. Hum. Behav."},{"key":"89563_CR55","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400835522","volume-title":"Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life","author":"JH Miller","year":"2009","unstructured":"Miller, J. H. & Page, S. E. Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life (Princeton University Press, 2009)."}],"container-title":["Scientific Reports"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/s41598-021-89563-z.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/s41598-021-89563-z","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/s41598-021-89563-z.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2022,12,3]],"date-time":"2022-12-03T03:13:20Z","timestamp":1670037200000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/s41598-021-89563-z"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,18]]},"references-count":55,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,12]]}},"alternative-id":["89563"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1038\/s41598-021-89563-z","relation":{"has-preprint":[{"id-type":"doi","id":"10.21203\/rs.3.rs-224808\/v1","asserted-by":"object"}]},"ISSN":["2045-2322"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2045-2322","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2021,5,18]]},"assertion":[{"value":"9 February 2021","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"28 April 2021","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"18 May 2021","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"The author declares no competing interests.","order":1,"name":"Ethics","group":{"name":"EthicsHeading","label":"Competing interests"}}],"article-number":"10502"}}