{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,11]],"date-time":"2026-03-11T15:34:04Z","timestamp":1773243244863,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":15,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,4,13]],"date-time":"2024-04-13T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1712966400000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,4,13]],"date-time":"2024-04-13T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1712966400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Sci Rep"],"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>Pure self-management model, pure aggregation business model and Self-support\u2009+\u2009aggregation model are three commonly used business modes on ride-hailing platforms. We use an analytical model to study these three business models and give the optimal business model decision of the platform. The research shows that the heterogeneity ratio of drivers, the cost of the platform under the Self-support model, the franchise fee received by the platform under the aggregation model and the dissatisfaction of the original users on the platform play a key role in the selection of the platform\u2019s business model. When the difference between the franchise fee under the aggregation mode and the platform cost under the Self-support mode fails to generate positive feedback on the platform profit, the platform should choose the pure Self-support mode. When riders are more sensitive to the heterogeneity of service quality of the platform and user stickiness can be ensured, the platform should choose the pure aggregation business model. When user stickiness can be guaranteed and the cost of the platform under the self-run model is controllable, the platform should choose the Self-support\u2009+\u2009aggregation business model.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1038\/s41598-024-58984-x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,4,13]],"date-time":"2024-04-13T00:01:34Z","timestamp":1712966494000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["The platform business model selection of online ride-hailing giants based on the aggregation model"],"prefix":"10.1038","volume":"14","author":[{"given":"Xueyu","family":"Zhu","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Min","family":"Guo","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Jinhong","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,4,13]]},"reference":[{"key":"58984_CR1","unstructured":"Ministry of Transport: The online car-hailing supervision information interaction system received a total of 574 million orders in October, up 3.6% from the previous month. https:\/\/news.cnstock.com\/news,bwkx-202211-4978684.htm"},{"key":"58984_CR2","unstructured":"Guangming Daily: protecting the rights and interests of drivers is also an important part of the healthy development of online ride-hailing. 2022.02.26. https:\/\/baijiahao.baidu.com\/s?id=1725828252606130184&wfr=spider&for=pc"},{"issue":"4","key":"58984_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"990","DOI":"10.1162\/154247603322493212","volume":"1","author":"JC Rochet","year":"2003","unstructured":"Rochet, J. C. & Tirole, J. Platform competition in two-sided markets. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 1(4), 990\u20131029 (2003).","journal-title":"J. Eur. Econ. Assoc."},{"key":"58984_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"106093","DOI":"10.1016\/j.knosys.2020.106093","volume":"204","author":"X Wei","year":"2020","unstructured":"Wei, X. et al. Optimal buisiness model for the monopolistic ride-hailing platform: Pooling, premier or hybrid?. Knowl Based Syst. 204, 106093 (2020).","journal-title":"Knowl Based Syst."},{"key":"58984_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","unstructured":"Benjaafar, S., Bernhard, H. & Courcoubetis, C. Drivers, riders and service providers: The impact of the sharing economy on mobility (2020). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2139\/ssrn.3035478","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.3035478"},{"key":"58984_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tre.2017.02.003","volume":"101","author":"LC Kung","year":"2017","unstructured":"Kung, L. C. & Zhong, G. Y. The optimal pricing strategy for two-sided platform delivery in the sharing economy. Transp. Res. E 101, 1\u201312 (2017).","journal-title":"Transp. Res. E"},{"issue":"4","key":"58984_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"423","DOI":"10.1007\/s12232-010-0110-9","volume":"57","author":"C Aloui","year":"2010","unstructured":"Aloui, C. & Jebsi, K. Optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform with a one-sided congestion effect. Int. Rev. Econ. 57(4), 423\u2013439 (2010).","journal-title":"Int. Rev. Econ."},{"issue":"1","key":"58984_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"89","DOI":"10.1111\/jems.12306","volume":"28","author":"KA Bryan","year":"2019","unstructured":"Bryan, K. A. & Gans, J. S. A theory of multihoming in rideshare competition. J. Econ. Manag. Strategy 28(1), 89\u201396 (2019).","journal-title":"J. Econ. Manag. Strategy"},{"issue":"7","key":"58984_CR9","first-page":"167","volume":"28","author":"Lu Ke","year":"2019","unstructured":"Ke, Lu., Jing, Z. & Xiaowei, L. Pricing research of ride-hailing platform: From the view of inter-group network externality. Oper. Res. Manag. Sci. 28(7), 167\u2013178 (2019).","journal-title":"Oper. Res. Manag. Sci."},{"issue":"14","key":"58984_CR10","first-page":"236","volume":"58","author":"H Li","year":"2022","unstructured":"Li, H. & Xiao, Q. Research on pricing strategy of online car-hailing market under aggregation mode. Comput. Eng. Appl. 58(14), 236\u2013244 (2022).","journal-title":"Comput. Eng. Appl."},{"key":"58984_CR11","first-page":"133","volume":"3","author":"H Li","year":"2021","unstructured":"Li, H., Xiao, Q. & Chen, W. Research on competitive strategy of ride-hailing platform under aggregation mode. J. Chongqing Univ. Technol. 3, 133\u2013142 (2021).","journal-title":"J. Chongqing Univ. 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