{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,15]],"date-time":"2026-09-15T02:24:27Z","timestamp":1789439067853,"version":"build-2803163510"},"reference-count":66,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2012,3,30]],"date-time":"2012-03-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1333065600000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc-sa\/3.0\/"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2012,3,30]],"date-time":"2012-03-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1333065600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc-sa\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Sci Rep"],"DOI":"10.1038\/srep00344","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,3,30]],"date-time":"2012-03-30T09:15:00Z","timestamp":1333098900000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":162,"title":["Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders"],"prefix":"10.1038","volume":"2","author":[{"given":"Matja\u017e","family":"Perc","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,3,30]]},"reference":[{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR1","unstructured":"Baumol, W. J. Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1952)."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Sigmund, K. The Calculus of Selfishness (Princeton University Press, Princeton, MA, 2010).","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400832255"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ostrom, E. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990).","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511807763"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R. & Fehr, E. Moral Sentiments and Material Interests (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005).","DOI":"10.7551\/mitpress\/4771.001.0001"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"980","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.90.4.980","volume":"90","author":"E Fehr","year":"2000","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & G\u00e4chter, S. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 980\u2013994 (2000).","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"137","DOI":"10.1038\/415137a","volume":"415","author":"E Fehr","year":"2002","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & G\u00e4chter, S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415, 137\u2013140 (2002).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"753","DOI":"10.1086\/425623","volume":"164","author":"A Gardner","year":"2004","unstructured":"Gardner, A. & West, S. A. Cooperation and punishment, especially in humans. Am. Nat. 164, 753\u2013764 (2004).","journal-title":"Am. Nat."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1767","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1127333","volume":"312","author":"J Henrich","year":"2006","unstructured":"Henrich, J. & et al. Costly punishment across human societies. Science 312, 1767\u20131770 (2006).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"718","DOI":"10.1038\/nature05229","volume":"444","author":"B Rockenbach","year":"2006","unstructured":"Rockenbach, B. & Milinski, M. The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature 444, 718\u2013723 (2006).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"60","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1126398","volume":"312","author":"J Henrich","year":"2006","unstructured":"Henrich, J. Cooperation, punishment and the evolution of human institutions. Science 312, 60\u201361 (2006).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"108","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1123633","volume":"312","author":"O G\u00fcrerk","year":"2006","unstructured":"G\u00fcrerk, O., Irlenbusch, B. & Rockenbach, B. The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312, 108\u2013111 (2006).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"495","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0507229103","volume":"103","author":"H Brandt","year":"2006","unstructured":"Brandt, H., Hauert, C. & Sigmund, K. Punishing and abstaining for public goods. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 103, 495\u2013497 (2006).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1510","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1164744","volume":"322","author":"S G\u00e4chter","year":"2008","unstructured":"G\u00e4chter, S., Renner, E. & Sefton, M. The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 322, 1510 (2008).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"39","DOI":"10.1038\/457039a","volume":"457","author":"B Rockenbach","year":"2009","unstructured":"Rockenbach, B. & Milinski, M. How to treat those of ill repute. Nature 457, 39\u201340 (2009).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1243","DOI":"10.1126\/science.162.3859.1243","volume":"162","author":"G Hardin","year":"1968","unstructured":"Hardin, G. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162, 1243\u20131248 (1968).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"137","DOI":"10.1038\/nature01474","volume":"422","author":"E Fehr","year":"2003","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & Rockenbach, B. Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism. Nature 422, 137\u2013140 (2003).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3531","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0630443100","volume":"100","author":"R Boyd","year":"2003","unstructured":"Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. & Richerson, P. J. The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 100, 3531\u20133535 (2003).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"7047","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0500938102","volume":"102","author":"JH Fowler","year":"2005","unstructured":"Fowler, J. H. Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 102, 7047\u20137049 (2005).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"297","DOI":"10.1038\/452297a","volume":"452","author":"M Milinski","year":"2008","unstructured":"Milinski, M. & Rockenbach, B. Punisher pays. Nature 452, 297\u2013298 (2008).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"6982","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0712173105","volume":"105","author":"OT Eldakar","year":"2008","unstructured":"Eldakar, O. T. & Wilson, D. S. Selfishness as second-order altruism. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105, 6982\u20136986 (2008).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"499","DOI":"10.1038\/nature02978","volume":"432","author":"K Panchanathan","year":"2004","unstructured":"Panchanathan, K. & Boyd, R. Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 432, 499\u2013502 (2004).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"449","DOI":"10.1038\/432449a","volume":"432","author":"E Fehr","year":"2004","unstructured":"Fehr, E. Don't lose your reputation. Nature 432, 449\u2013450 (2004).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"E8","DOI":"10.1038\/nature04201","volume":"437","author":"JH Fowler","year":"2005","unstructured":"Fowler, J. H. Second-order free-riding problem solved? Nature 437, E8\u2013E8 (2005).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1129","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1070582","volume":"296","author":"C Hauert","year":"2002","unstructured":"Hauert, C., De Monte, S., Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods game. Science 296, 1129\u20131132 (2002).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"390","DOI":"10.1038\/nature01986","volume":"425","author":"D Semmann","year":"2003","unstructured":"Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.-J. & Milinski, M. Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game. Nature 425, 390\u2013393 (2003).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1167","DOI":"10.1098\/rspb.2008.1623","volume":"276","author":"S Mathew","year":"2009","unstructured":"Mathew, S. & Boyd, R. When does optional participation allow the evolution of cooperation? Proc. R. Soc. B 276, 1167\u20131174 (2009).","journal-title":"Proc. R. Soc. B"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1905","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1141588","volume":"316","author":"C Hauert","year":"2007","unstructured":"Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Via freedom to coercion: The emergence of costly punishment. Science 316, 1905\u20131907 (2007).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"617","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1183665","volume":"328","author":"R Boyd","year":"2010","unstructured":"Boyd, R., Gintis, H. & Bowles, S. Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare. Science 328, 617\u2013620 (2010).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"e1000758","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pcbi.1000758","volume":"6","author":"D Helbing","year":"2010","unstructured":"Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Szab\u00f3, G. Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions. PLoS Comput. Biol. 6, e1000758 (2010).","journal-title":"PLoS Comput. Biol."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"083005","DOI":"10.1088\/1367-2630\/12\/8\/083005","volume":"12","author":"D Helbing","year":"2010","unstructured":"Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Szab\u00f3, G. Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game. New J. Phys. 12, 083005 (2010).","journal-title":"New J. Phys."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1362","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1153808","volume":"319","author":"B Herrmann","year":"2008","unstructured":"Herrmann, B., Thoni, C. & Gachter, S. Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319, 1362\u20131367 (2008).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"624","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2010.06.010","volume":"265","author":"DG Rand","year":"2010","unstructured":"Rand, D. G., Armao, J. J., Nakamaru, M. & Ohtsuki, H. Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation. J. Theor. Biol. 265, 624\u2013632 (2010).","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"434","DOI":"10.1038\/ncomms1442","volume":"2","author":"DG Rand","year":"2011","unstructured":"Rand, D. G. & Nowak, M. A. The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games. Nat. Commun. 2, 434 (2011).","journal-title":"Nat. Commun."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"79","DOI":"10.1038\/nature07601","volume":"457","author":"H Ohtsuki","year":"2009","unstructured":"Ohtsuki, H., Iwasa, Y. & Nowak, M. A. Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment. Nature 457, 79\u201382 (2009).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"17448","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0905918106","volume":"106","author":"J-J Wu","year":"2009","unstructured":"Wu, J.-J., Zhang, B.-J., Zhou, Z.-X., He, Q.-Q., Zheng, X.-D., Cressman, R. & Tao, Y. Costly punishment does not always increase cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 106, 17448\u201317451 (2009).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1345","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1155333","volume":"319","author":"H Gintis","year":"2008","unstructured":"Gintis, H. Punishment and cooperation. Science 319, 1345\u20131346 (2008).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"10757","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.161155698","volume":"98","author":"K Sigmund","year":"2001","unstructured":"Sigmund, K., Hauert, C. & Nowak, M. A. Reward and punishment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 98, 10757\u201310762 (2001).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"893","DOI":"10.1257\/000282803322157142","volume":"93","author":"J Andreoni","year":"2003","unstructured":"Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W. & Vesterlund, L. The carrot or the stick: Rewards, punishments and cooperation. Am. Econ. Rev. 93, 893\u2013902 (2003).","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"2427","DOI":"10.1098\/rspb.2010.0065","volume":"277","author":"C Hilbe","year":"2010","unstructured":"Hilbe, C. & Sigmund, K. Incentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick. Proc. R. Soc. B 277, 2427\u20132433 (2010).","journal-title":"Proc. R. Soc. B"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"38003","DOI":"10.1209\/0295-5075\/92\/38003","volume":"92","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2010","unstructured":"Szolnoki, A. & Perc, M. Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game. EPL 92, 38003 (2010).","journal-title":"EPL"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR41","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"593","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tree.2007.06.012","volume":"22","author":"K Sigmund","year":"2007","unstructured":"Sigmund, K. Punish or perish? retailation and collaboration among humans. Trends Ecol. Evol. 22, 593\u2013600 (2007).","journal-title":"Trends Ecol. Evol."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR42","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"424","DOI":"10.1038\/415424a","volume":"415","author":"M Milinski","year":"2002","unstructured":"Milinski, M., Semmann, D. & Krambeck, H.-J. Reputation helps to solve the \u2018tragedy of the commons\u2019. Nature 415, 424\u2013426 (2002).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR43","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"248","DOI":"10.1007\/s00265-004-0782-9","volume":"56","author":"D Semmann","year":"2004","unstructured":"Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.-J. & Milinski, M. Strategic investment in reputation. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 56, 248\u2013252 (2004).","journal-title":"Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR44","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"348","DOI":"10.1038\/nature06723","volume":"452","author":"A Dreber","year":"2008","unstructured":"Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D. & Nowak, M. A. Winners don't punish. Nature 452, 348\u2013351 (2008).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR45","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1272","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1177418","volume":"325","author":"DG Rand","year":"2009","unstructured":"Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Fudenberg, D. & Nowak, M. A. Positive interactions promote public cooperation. Science 325, 1272\u20131275 (2009).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR46","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"861","DOI":"10.1038\/nature09203","volume":"446","author":"K Sigmund","year":"2010","unstructured":"Sigmund, K., Silva, H. D., Traulsen, A. & Hauert, C. Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons. Nature 446, 861\u2013863 (2010).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR47","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"110","DOI":"10.1037\/0022-3514.51.1.110","volume":"51","author":"T Yamagishi","year":"1986","unstructured":"Yamagishi, T. The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 51, 110\u2013116 (1986).","journal-title":"J. Pers. Soc. Psychol."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR48","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"056109","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.80.056109","volume":"80","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2009","unstructured":"Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Szab\u00f3, G. Topology-independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games. Phys. Rev. E 80, 056109 (2009).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR49","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"68003","DOI":"10.1209\/0295-5075\/95\/68003","volume":"95","author":"J G\u00f3mez-Garde\u00f1es","year":"2011","unstructured":"G\u00f3mez-Garde\u00f1es, J., Vilone, D. & S\u00e1nchez, A. Disentangling social and group heterogeneities: Public goods games on complex networks. EPL 95, 68003 (2011).","journal-title":"EPL"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR50","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"047102","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.84.047102","volume":"84","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2011","unstructured":"Szolnoki, A. & Perc, M. Group-size effects on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game. Phys. Rev. E 84, 047102 (2011).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR51","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"046106","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.84.046106","volume":"84","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2011","unstructured":"Szolnoki, A., Szab\u00f3, G. & Czak\u00f3, L. Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games. Phys. Rev. E 84, 046106 (2011).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR52","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"016113","DOI":"10.1063\/1.3535579","volume":"21","author":"J G\u00f3mez-Garde\u00f1es","year":"2011","unstructured":"G\u00f3mez-Garde\u00f1es, J., Romance, M., Criado, R., Vilone, D. & S\u00e1nchez, A. Evolutionary games defined at the network mesoscale: The public goods game. Chaos 21, 016113 (2011).","journal-title":"Chaos"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR53","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1099","DOI":"10.1098\/rspb.2003.2336","volume":"270","author":"H Brandt","year":"2003","unstructured":"Brandt, H., Hauert, C. & Sigmund, K. Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 270, 1099\u20131104 (2003).","journal-title":"Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR54","first-page":"853","volume":"7","author":"M Nakamaru","year":"2005","unstructured":"Nakamaru, M. & Iwasa, Y. Evolution of altruism by costly punishment in lattice-structured population: score-dependent viability versus score-dependent fertility. Evol. Ecol. Res. 7, 853\u2013870 (2005).","journal-title":"Evol. Ecol. Res."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR55","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"297","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2008.09.025","volume":"256","author":"T Sekiguchi","year":"2009","unstructured":"Sekiguchi, T. & Nakamaru, M. Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games. J. Theor. Biol. 256, 297\u2013304 (2009).","journal-title":"J. Theor. Biol."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR56","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"057104","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.81.057104","volume":"81","author":"D Helbing","year":"2010","unstructured":"Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Szab\u00f3, G. Defector-accelerated cooperativeness and punishment in public goods games with mutations. Phys. Rev. E 81, 057104 (2010).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR57","unstructured":"Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New York, 1984)."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR58","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Skyrms, B. Evolution of the Social Contract (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1996).","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511806308"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR59","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H. Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004).","DOI":"10.1093\/0199262055.001.0001"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR60","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"826","DOI":"10.1038\/359826a0","volume":"359","author":"MA Nowak","year":"1992","unstructured":"Nowak, M. A. & May, R. M. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359, 826\u2013829 (1992).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR61","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"4877","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.91.11.4877","volume":"91","author":"MA Nowak","year":"1994","unstructured":"Nowak, M. A., Bonhoeffer, S. & May, R. M. Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 91, 4877\u20134881 (1994).","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR62","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"643","DOI":"10.1038\/nature02360","volume":"428","author":"C Hauert","year":"2004","unstructured":"Hauert, C. & Doebeli, M. Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game. Nature 428, 643\u2013646 (2004).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR63","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"97","DOI":"10.1016\/j.physrep.2007.04.004","volume":"446","author":"G Szab\u00f3","year":"2007","unstructured":"Szab\u00f3, G. & F\u00e1th, G. Evolutionary games on graphs. Phys. Rep. 446, 97\u2013216 (2007).","journal-title":"Phys. Rep."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR64","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"591","DOI":"10.1103\/RevModPhys.81.591","volume":"81","author":"C Castellano","year":"2009","unstructured":"Castellano, C., Fortunato, S. & Loreto, V. Statistical physics of social dynamics. Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 591\u2013646 (2009).","journal-title":"Rev. Mod. Phys."},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR65","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"036101","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.83.036101","volume":"83","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2011","unstructured":"Szolnoki, A., Szab\u00f3, G. & Perc, M. Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool punishment. Phys. Rev. E 83, 036101 (2011).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"},{"key":"BFsrep00344_CR66","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"69","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.58.69","volume":"58","author":"G Szab\u00f3","year":"1998","unstructured":"Szab\u00f3, G. & T\u0151ke, C. Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice. Phys. Rev. E 58, 69\u201373 (1998).","journal-title":"Phys. Rev. E"}],"container-title":["Scientific Reports"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/srep00344","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/srep00344.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/srep00344.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,6]],"date-time":"2023-01-06T04:35:13Z","timestamp":1672979713000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/srep00344"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2012,3,30]]},"references-count":66,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,12,21]]}},"alternative-id":["BFsrep00344"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1038\/srep00344","relation":{},"ISSN":["2045-2322"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2045-2322","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2012,3,30]]},"assertion":[{"value":"21 February 2012","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"22 February 2012","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"30 March 2012","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"The author declares no competing financial interests.","order":1,"name":"Ethics","group":{"name":"EthicsHeading","label":"Competing interests"}}],"article-number":"344"}}