{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,30]],"date-time":"2026-09-30T06:59:36Z","timestamp":1790751576975,"version":"4.1.0"},"reference-count":60,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2016,2,18]],"date-time":"2016-02-18T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1455753600000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2016,2,18]],"date-time":"2016-02-18T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1455753600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Sci Rep"],"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>The prevalence of cooperation among humans is puzzling because cooperators can be exploited by free riders. Peer punishment has been suggested as a solution to this puzzle, but cumulating evidence questions its robustness in sustaining cooperation. Amongst others, punishment fails when it is not powerful enough, or when it elicits counter-punishment. Existing research, however, has ignored that the distribution of punishment power can be the result of social interactions. We introduce a novel experiment in which individuals can transfer punishment power to others. We find that while decentralised peer punishment fails to overcome free riding, the voluntary transfer of punishment power enables groups to sustain cooperation. This is achieved by non-punishing cooperators empowering those who are willing to punish in the interest of the group. Our results show how voluntary power centralisation can efficiently sustain cooperation, which could explain why hierarchical power structures are widespread among animals and humans.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1038\/srep20767","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2016,2,18]],"date-time":"2016-02-18T11:16:38Z","timestamp":1455794198000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":46,"title":["Building the Leviathan \u2013 Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans"],"prefix":"10.1038","volume":"6","author":[{"given":"J\u00f6rg","family":"Gross","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Zsombor Z.","family":"M\u00e9der","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Sanae","family":"Okamoto-Barth","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Arno","family":"Riedl","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,2,18]]},"reference":[{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"35","DOI":"10.1086\/406755","volume":"46","author":"RL Trivers","year":"1971","unstructured":"Trivers, R. L. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q Rev Biol 46, 35\u201357 (1971).","journal-title":"Q Rev Biol"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR2","unstructured":"Alexander, R. D. The biology of moral systems. (Transaction Publishers, 1987)."},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"785","DOI":"10.1038\/nature02043","volume":"425","author":"E Fehr","year":"2003","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. The nature of human altruism. Nature 425, 785\u2013791 (2003).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1291","DOI":"10.1038\/nature04131","volume":"437","author":"MA Nowak","year":"2005","unstructured":"Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature 437, 1291\u20131298 (2005).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"367","DOI":"10.1016\/0167-2681(82)90011-7","volume":"3","author":"W G\u00fcth","year":"1982","unstructured":"G\u00fcth, W., Schmittberger, R. & Schwarze, B. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. J Econ Behav Organ 3, 367\u2013388 (1982).","journal-title":"J Econ Behav Organ"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"110","DOI":"10.1037\/0022-3514.51.1.110","volume":"51","author":"T Yamagishi","year":"1986","unstructured":"Yamagishi, T. The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. J Pers Soc Psychol 51, 110\u2013116 (1986).","journal-title":"J Pers Soc Psychol"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1016\/0162-3095(92)90032-Y","volume":"13","author":"R Boyd","year":"1992","unstructured":"Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethol Sociobiol 13, 171\u2013195 (1992).","journal-title":"Ethol Sociobiol"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"404","DOI":"10.2307\/1964229","volume":"86","author":"E Ostrom","year":"1992","unstructured":"Ostrom, E., Walker, J. & Gardner, R. Covenants with and without a sword: Self-governance is possible. Am Polit Sci Rev 86, 404\u2013417 (1992).","journal-title":"Am Polit Sci Rev"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"980","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.90.4.980","volume":"90","author":"E Fehr","year":"2000","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & G\u00e4chter, S. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am Econ Rev 90, 980\u2013994 (2000).","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"137","DOI":"10.1038\/415137a","volume":"415","author":"E Fehr","year":"2002","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & G\u00e4chter, S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415, 137\u2013140 (2002).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1254","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1100735","volume":"305","author":"DJ-F de Quervain","year":"2004","unstructured":"de Quervain, D. J.-F. et al. The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science 305, 1254\u20131258 (2004).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"235","DOI":"10.1023\/B:EXEC.0000040559.08652.51","volume":"7","author":"JM Walker","year":"2004","unstructured":"Walker, J. M. & Halloran, M. A. Rewards and sanctions and the provision of public goods in one-shot settings. Exp Econ 7, 235\u2013247 (2004).","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2017","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x","volume":"73","author":"A Falk","year":"2005","unstructured":"Falk, A., Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. Driving forces behind informal sanctions. Econometrica 73, 2017\u20132030 (2005).","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"32","DOI":"10.2307\/2786982","volume":"51","author":"T Yamagishi","year":"1988","unstructured":"Yamagishi, T. Seriousness of social dilemmas and the provision of a sanctioning system. Soc Psychol Quart 51, 32\u201342 (1988).","journal-title":"Soc Psychol Quart"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1510","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1164744","volume":"322","author":"S G\u00e4chter","year":"2008","unstructured":"G\u00e4chter, S., Renner, E. & Sefton, M. The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 322, 1510 (2008).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"366","DOI":"10.1257\/000282803321455359","volume":"93","author":"D Masclet","year":"2003","unstructured":"Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S. & Villeval, M. C. Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. Am Econ Rev 93, 366\u2013380 (2003).","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"107","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-005-0869-9","volume":"8","author":"M Casari","year":"2005","unstructured":"Casari, M. On the design of peer punishment experiments. Exp Econ 8, 107\u2013115 (2005).","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR18","first-page":"871","volume":"275","author":"M Egas","year":"2008","unstructured":"Egas, M. & Riedl, A. The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation. P Roy Soc B-Biol Sci 275, 871\u2013878 (2008).","journal-title":"P Roy Soc B-Biol Sci"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"358","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-007-9171-3","volume":"11","author":"N Nikiforakis","year":"2008","unstructured":"Nikiforakis, N. & Normann, H.-T. A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. Exp Econ 11, 358\u2013369 (2008).","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"79","DOI":"10.1038\/nature07601","volume":"457","author":"H Ohtsuki","year":"2009","unstructured":"Ohtsuki, H., Iwasa, Y. & Nowak, M. A. Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment. Nature 457, 79\u201382 (2009).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"348","DOI":"10.1038\/nature06723","volume":"452","author":"A Dreber","year":"2008","unstructured":"Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D. & Nowak, M. A. Winners don\u2019t punish. Nature 452, 348\u2013351 (2008).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1362","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1153808","volume":"319","author":"B Herrmann","year":"2008","unstructured":"Herrmann, B., Th\u00f6ni, C. & G\u00e4chter, S. Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319, 1362\u20131367 (2008).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR23","first-page":"541","volume":"254","author":"MA Janssen","year":"2008","unstructured":"Janssen, M. A. & Bushman, C. Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible. P Natl Acad Sci USA 254, 541\u2013545 (2008).","journal-title":"P Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"91","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008","volume":"92","author":"N Nikiforakis","year":"2008","unstructured":"Nikiforakis, N. Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves? J Public Econ 92, 91\u2013112 (2008).","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR25","first-page":"791","volume":"364","author":"S G\u00e4chter","year":"2009","unstructured":"G\u00e4chter, S. & Herrmann, B. Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment. P Roy Soc B-Biol Sci 364, 791\u2013806 (2009).","journal-title":"P Roy Soc B-Biol Sci"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR26","first-page":"624","volume":"265","author":"DG Rand","year":"2010","unstructured":"Rand, D. G., Armao, J. J., IV, Nakamaru, M. & Ohtsuki, H. Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation. P Natl Acad Sci USA 265, 624\u2013632 (2010).","journal-title":"P Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR27","first-page":"1","volume":"2","author":"MA Nowak","year":"2011","unstructured":"Nowak, M. A. & Rand, D. G. The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games. Nat Comms 2, 1\u20137 (2011).","journal-title":"Nat Comms"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"24","DOI":"10.1017\/S0140525X11001221","volume":"35","author":"A Dreber","year":"2012","unstructured":"Dreber, A. & Rand, D. G. Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments. Behav Brain Sci 35, 24 (2012).","journal-title":"Behav Brain Sci"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"137","DOI":"10.1038\/nature01474","volume":"422","author":"E Fehr","year":"2003","unstructured":"Fehr, E. & Rockenbach, B. Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism. Nature 422, 137\u2013140 (2003).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"613","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1183532","volume":"328","author":"MA Janssen","year":"2010","unstructured":"Janssen, M. A., Holahan, R., Lee, A. & Ostrom, E. Lab experiments for the study of social-ecological systems. Science 328, 613\u2013617 (2010).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"e64677","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pone.0064677","volume":"8","author":"L-L Jiang","year":"2013","unstructured":"Jiang, L.-L., Perc, M. & Szolnoki, A. If Cooperation Is Likely Punish Mildly: Insights from Economic Experiments Based on the Snowdrift Game. PLoS ONE 8, e64677 (2013).","journal-title":"PLoS ONE"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"561","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-015-0884-5","volume":"45","author":"D Engelmann","year":"2014","unstructured":"Engelmann, D. & Nikiforakis, N. In the long-run we are all dead: On the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments. Soc Choice Welfare, 45, 561\u2013577 (2014).","journal-title":"Soc Choice Welfare"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"3531","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0630443100","volume":"100","author":"R Boyd","year":"2003","unstructured":"Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. & Richerson, P. J. The evolution of altruistic punishment. P Natl Acad Sci USA 100, 3531\u20133535 (2003).","journal-title":"P Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"499","DOI":"10.1038\/nature02978","volume":"432","author":"K Panchanathan","year":"2004","unstructured":"Panchanathan, K. & Boyd, R. Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 432, 499\u2013502 (2004).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"E8","DOI":"10.1038\/nature04201","volume":"437","author":"JH Fowler","year":"2005","unstructured":"Fowler, J. H. Second-order free-riding problem solved? Nature 437, E8\u2013E8 (2005).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"826","DOI":"10.1037\/a0011381","volume":"95","author":"T Kiyonari","year":"2008","unstructured":"Kiyonari, T. & Barclay, P. Cooperation in social dilemmas: Free riding may be thwarted by second-order reward rather than by punishment. J Pers Soc Psychol 95, 826\u2013842 (2008).","journal-title":"J Pers Soc Psychol"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1701","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1178883","volume":"326","author":"A Ule","year":"2009","unstructured":"Ule, A., Schram, A., Riedl, A. & Cason, T. Indirect punishment and generosity toward strangers. Science 326, 1701\u20131704 (2009).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR38","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"344","DOI":"10.1038\/srep00344","volume":"2","author":"M Perc","year":"2012","unstructured":"Perc, M. Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders. Sci Rep 2, 344\u2013344 (2012).","journal-title":"Sci Rep"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ostrom, E. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. (Cambridge University Press, 1990).","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511807763"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"217","DOI":"10.1016\/S0167-2681(02)00098-7","volume":"51","author":"M Casari","year":"2003","unstructured":"Casari, M. & Plott, C. R. Decentralized management of common property resources: Experiments with a centuries-old institution. J Econ Behav Organ 51, 217\u2013247 (2003).","journal-title":"J Econ Behav Organ"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR41","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"108","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1123633","volume":"312","author":"B Rockenbach","year":"2006","unstructured":"Rockenbach, B., Guererk, O. & Irlenbusch, B. The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312, 108\u2013111 (2006).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR42","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"671","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x","volume":"45","author":"M Sefton","year":"2007","unstructured":"Sefton, M., Shupp, R. & Walker, J. M. The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision of public goods. Econ Inq 45, 671\u2013690 (2007).","journal-title":"Econ Inq"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR43","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1335","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.99.4.1335","volume":"99","author":"M Kosfeld","year":"2009","unstructured":"Kosfeld, M., Okada, A. & Riedl, A. Institution formation in public goods games. Am Econ Rev 99, 1335\u20131355 (2009).","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR44","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"617","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1183665","volume":"328","author":"R Boyd","year":"2010","unstructured":"Boyd, R., Gintis, H. & Bowles, S. Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare. Science 328, 617\u2013620 (2010).","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR45","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"861","DOI":"10.1038\/nature09203","volume":"466","author":"K Sigmund","year":"2010","unstructured":"Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A. & Hauert, C. Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons. Nature 466, 861\u2013863 (2010).","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR46","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"11023","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1105456108","volume":"108","author":"D Baldassarri","year":"2011","unstructured":"Baldassarri, D. & Grossman, G. Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans. P Natl Acad Sci USA 108, 11023\u201311027 (2011).","journal-title":"P Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR47","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1036","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003","volume":"96","author":"J Andreoni","year":"2012","unstructured":"Andreoni, J. & Gee, L. K. Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision. J Public Econ 96, 1036\u20131046 (2012).","journal-title":"J Public Econ"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR48","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1017\/S0140525X11000069","volume":"35","author":"FF Guala","year":"2012","unstructured":"Guala, F. F. Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behav Brain Sci 35, 1\u201315 (2012).","journal-title":"Behav Brain Sci"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR49","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"285","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-013-9375-7","volume":"17","author":"B Zhang","year":"2014","unstructured":"Zhang, B., Li, C., De Silva, H., Bednarik, P. & Sigmund, K. The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract. Exp Econ 17, 285\u2013303 (2014).","journal-title":"Exp Econ"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR50","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"291","DOI":"10.1017\/S0031819100067152","volume":"29","author":"A Flew","year":"1954","unstructured":"Flew, A. The justification of punishment. Philosophy 29, 291\u2013307 (1954).","journal-title":"Philosophy"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR51","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"036101","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.83.036101","volume":"83","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2011","unstructured":"Szolnoki, A., Szab\u00f3, G. & Perc, M. Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool punishment. Phys Rev E 83, 036101\u201310 (2011).","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR52","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Andreoni, J. & Gee, L. K. The Hired Gun Mechanism. Working Paper (2011). 10.3386\/w17032","DOI":"10.3386\/w17032"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR53","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"752","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1315273111","volume":"111","author":"C Hilbe","year":"2014","unstructured":"Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A. & Rohl, T. Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment. P Natl Acad Sci USA 111, 752\u2013756 (2014).","journal-title":"P Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR54","first-page":"3716","volume":"279","author":"A Traulsen","year":"2012","unstructured":"Traulsen, A., R\u00f6hl, T. & Milinski, M. An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons. P Roy Soc B-Biol Sci 279, 3716\u20133721 (2012).","journal-title":"P Roy Soc B-Biol Sci"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR55","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1088\/1367-2630\/16\/8\/083016","volume":"16","author":"X Chen","year":"2014","unstructured":"Chen, X., Szolnoki, A. & Perc, M. Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment. New J Phys 16, 1\u201315 (2014). 10.1088\/1367-2630\/16\/8\/083016","journal-title":"New J Phys"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR56","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1088\/1367-2630\/14\/4\/043013","volume":"14","author":"M Perc","year":"2012","unstructured":"Perc, M. & Szolnoki, A. Self-organization of punishment in structured populations. New J Phys 14, 1\u201313 (2012).","journal-title":"New J Phys"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR57","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"257","DOI":"10.1016\/0162-3095(95)00050-U","volume":"16","author":"L Ellis","year":"1995","unstructured":"Ellis, L. Dominance and reproductive success among nonhuman animals: A cross-species comparison. Ethol Sociobiol 16, 257\u2013333 (1995).","journal-title":"Ethol Sociobiol"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR58","unstructured":"de Waal, F. In Primate societies (eds Smuts, B. B. et al. ) Ch. 34, 421\u2013429 (University of Chicago Press, 1987)."},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR59","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"167","DOI":"10.1016\/0010-0277(90)90022-C","volume":"37","author":"DL Cheney","year":"1990","unstructured":"Cheney, D. L. & Seyfarth, R. M. The representation of social relations by monkeys. Cognition 37, 167\u2013196 (1990).","journal-title":"Cognition"},{"key":"BFsrep20767_CR60","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"209","DOI":"10.1038\/373209a0","volume":"373","author":"TH Clutton-Brock","year":"1995","unstructured":"Clutton-Brock, T. H. & Parker, G. A. Punishment in animal societies. Nature 373, 209\u2013216 (1995).","journal-title":"Nature"}],"container-title":["Scientific Reports"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/srep20767","content-type":"text\/html","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/srep20767.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/srep20767.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,4]],"date-time":"2023-01-04T13:08:54Z","timestamp":1672837734000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/srep20767"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2016,2,18]]},"references-count":60,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,8,26]]}},"alternative-id":["BFsrep20767"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1038\/srep20767","relation":{},"ISSN":["2045-2322"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2045-2322","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2016,2,18]]},"assertion":[{"value":"22 June 2015","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"7 January 2016","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"18 February 2016","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"The authors declare no competing financial interests.","order":1,"name":"Ethics","group":{"name":"EthicsHeading","label":"Competing interests"}}],"article-number":"20767"}}