{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,6,1]],"date-time":"2026-06-01T22:52:06Z","timestamp":1780354326097,"version":"3.54.1"},"reference-count":37,"publisher":"AIP Publishing","issue":"7","funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001809","name":"National Natural Science Foundation of China","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["61903077"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["61903077"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001809","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"name":"Shanghai Sailing Program","award":["19YF1402500"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["19YF1402500"]}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100004329","name":"Slovenian Research Agency","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","award":["P1-0403"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["P1-0403"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100004329","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100004329","name":"Slovenian Research Agency","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","award":["J1-9112"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["J1-9112"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100004329","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]},{"name":"The Science and Technology Commission of Shanghai Municipality","award":["2JC1401400"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["2JC1401400"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["pubs.aip.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,1]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>Studies to date on the role of social exclusion in public cooperation have mainly focused on the peer or pool sanctioning types of excluding free-riders from the share of common goods. However, the exclusive behaviors are not necessarily performed by individuals or local organizations but may rather be implemented by a centralized enforcement institution at a global scale. Besides, previous modeling methods of either peer or pool exclusion often presuppose some particular forms of feedback between the individual or collective efforts and the efficiency of social exclusion and, therefore, cannot comprehensively evaluate their effects on the evolution of cooperation in the social dilemma situations. Here, we construct a general model of global exclusion by considering the successful construction of the centralized exclusive institution as an arbitrary non-decreasing and smooth function of the collective efforts made by the global excluders and then theoretically analyze its potential impacts in the replicator dynamics of the public goods game. Interestingly, we have shown that, despite the presence of both the first- and second-order free-riding problems, global exclusion can indeed lead to the emergence or even stabilization of public cooperation without the support of any other evolutionary mechanism. In addition, we have also observed rich dynamical behaviors, such as the occurrence of a global or local family of neutrally stable closed orbits revolving around a nonlinear center or the existence of stable heteroclinic cycles between defectors, cooperators as well as global excluders, which give rise to a classification of up to 21 different phases.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1063\/5.0099697","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,28]],"date-time":"2022-07-28T12:01:01Z","timestamp":1659009661000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1063\/aip-crossmark-policy-page","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":30,"title":["Replicator dynamics of public goods games with global exclusion"],"prefix":"10.1063","volume":"32","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-8134-0917","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Xiaofeng","family":"Wang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Automation, School of Information Science & Technology, Donghua University 1 , Shanghai 201620, China"},{"name":"Engineering Research Center of Digitized Textile & Apparel Technology, Donghua University, Ministry of Education 2 , Shanghai 201620, China"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-3087-541X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Matja\u017e","family":"Perc","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor 3 , Koro\u0161ka cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia"},{"name":"Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University 4 , Taichung 404332, Taiwan"},{"name":"Alma Mater Europaea 5 , Slovenska ulica 17, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia"},{"name":"Complexity Science Hub Vienna 6 , Josefst\u00e4dterstra\u00dfe 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"317","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,28]]},"reference":[{"key":"2024031600271173800_c1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"145","DOI":"10.1016\/0025-5564(78)90077-9","article-title":"Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics","volume":"40","year":"1978","journal-title":"Math. 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