{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,10,31]],"date-time":"2026-10-31T22:33:23Z","timestamp":1793486003901,"version":"4.5.0"},"reference-count":44,"publisher":"National Academy of Sciences","issue":"4","content-domain":{"domain":["www.pnas.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2012,1,24]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n                    Self-interest frequently causes individuals engaged in joint enterprises to choose actions that are counterproductive. Free-riders can invade a society of cooperators, causing a tragedy of the commons. Such social dilemmas can be overcome by positive or negative incentives. Even though an incentive-providing institution may protect a cooperative society from invasion by free-riders, it cannot always convert a society of free-riders to cooperation. In the latter case, both norms, cooperation and defection, are stable: To avoid a collapse to full defection, cooperators must be sufficiently numerous initially. A society of free-riders is then caught in a social trap, and the institution is unable to provide an escape, except at a high, possibly prohibitive cost. Here, we analyze the interplay of (\n                    <jats:italic>a<\/jats:italic>\n                    ) incentives provided by institutions and (\n                    <jats:italic>b<\/jats:italic>\n                    ) the effects of voluntary participation. We show that this combination fundamentally improves the efficiency of incentives. In particular, optional participation allows institutions punishing free-riders to overcome the social dilemma at a much lower cost, and to promote a globally stable regime of cooperation. This removes the social trap and implies that whenever a society of cooperators cannot be invaded by free-riders, it will necessarily become established in the long run, through social learning, irrespective of the initial number of cooperators. We also demonstrate that punishing provides a \u201clighter touch\u201d than rewarding, guaranteeing full cooperation at considerably lower cost.\n                  <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1115219109","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,1,9]],"date-time":"2012-01-09T20:43:26Z","timestamp":1326141806000},"page":"1165-1169","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.cm10313","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":141,"title":["The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas"],"prefix":"10.1073","volume":"109","author":[{"given":"Tatsuya","family":"Sasaki","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria;"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"\u00c5ke","family":"Br\u00e4nnstr\u00f6m","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria;"},{"name":"Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics, Ume\u00e5 University, 90187 Ume\u00e5, Sweden; and"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Ulf","family":"Dieckmann","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria;"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Karl","family":"Sigmund","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria;"},{"name":"Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"341","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,1,9]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_3_1_2","volume-title":"Understanding Institutional Diversity","author":"Ostrom 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