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When individuals can choose between authorities by migrating between different communities, we find a costly bias against second-order punishment. When subjects use a majority vote instead, they vote for an authority with second-order punishment. These findings also suggest that other pressing social dilemmas could be solved by democratic voting.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1315273111","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,12,23]],"date-time":"2013-12-23T23:28:01Z","timestamp":1387841281000},"page":"752-756","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.cm10313","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":85,"title":["Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment"],"prefix":"10.1073","volume":"111","author":[{"given":"Christian","family":"Hilbe","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Evolutionary Theory Group and"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Arne","family":"Traulsen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Evolutionary Theory Group and"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Torsten","family":"R\u00f6hl","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Evolutionary Theory Group and"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Manfred","family":"Milinski","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Pl\u00f6n, Germany"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"341","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,12,23]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_3_1_2","volume-title":"The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups","author":"Olson M","year":"1971","unstructured":"M Olson The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971)."},{"key":"e_1_3_3_2_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1126\/science.162.3859.1243"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_3_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1037\/0022-3514.51.1.110"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_4_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511807763"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_5_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1098\/rspb.2008.1082"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_6_2","volume-title":"The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined","author":"Pinker S","year":"2011","unstructured":"S Pinker The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (Penguin Books, New York, 2011)."},{"key":"e_1_3_3_7_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.1115219109"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_8_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1038\/nature04201"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_9_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tree.2007.06.012"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_10_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1038\/srep00458"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_11_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1038\/415137a"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_12_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1127333"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_13_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1123633"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_14_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1038\/nature05229"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_15_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1037\/a0011381"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_16_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1038\/nature06723"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_17_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1153808"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_18_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_19_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pone.0045093"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_20_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1164744"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_21_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/S0140525X11000069"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_22_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF02393122"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_23_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1038\/nature09203"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_24_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1038\/srep00344"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_25_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1098\/rspb.2012.0937"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_26_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Zhang B Li C De Silva H Bednarik P Sigmund K (2013) The evolution of sanctioning institutions: An experimental approach to the social contract. 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