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Despite the importance of attaining behavioral consistency for successful collective action, the theoretical mechanisms behind this process remain largely elusive. Here, we address this issue by studying the evolutionary dynamics of individual cooperativity levels in multiround threshold public goods games. By using adaptive dynamics, we explore how individual behavior responses are shaped by incentives, with and without reward or punishment. We demonstrate that rewarding consistent cooperators can lead to the emergence of two distinct populations: volunteers who consistently cooperate and free-riders who consistently defect. In contrast, punishing consistent defectors does not lead to similar evolutionary branching. 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