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We incorporate heterogeneity in the population by studying games on graphs, in which the variability in connectivity ranges from single-scale graphs, for which heterogeneity is small and associated degree distributions exhibit a Gaussian tale, to scale-free graphs, for which heterogeneity is large with degree distributions exhibiting a power-law behavior. We study the evolution of cooperation, modeled in terms of the most popular dilemmas of cooperation. We show that, for all dilemmas, increasing heterogeneity favors the emergence of cooperation, such that long-term cooperative behavior easily resists short-term noncooperative behavior. Moreover, we show how cooperation depends on the intricate ties between individuals in scale-free populations.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0508201103","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2006,2,17]],"date-time":"2006-02-17T01:43:49Z","timestamp":1140140629000},"page":"3490-3494","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.cm10313","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":871,"title":["Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations"],"prefix":"10.1073","volume":"103","author":[{"given":"F. C.","family":"Santos","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"*Institut de Recherches Interdisciplinaires et de D\u00e9veloppements en Intelligence Artificielle, CP 194\/6, Universit\u00e9 Libre de Bruxelles, Avenue Franklin Roosevelt 50, 1050 Brussels, Belgium;"}]},{"given":"J. M.","family":"Pacheco","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Centro de F\u00edsica Te\u00f3rica e Computacional and Departamento de F\u00edsica da Faculdade de Ci\u00eancias, Universidade de Lisboa, P-1649-003 Lisbon, Portugal; and"}]},{"given":"Tom","family":"Lenaerts","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"*Institut de Recherches Interdisciplinaires et de D\u00e9veloppements en Intelligence Artificielle, CP 194\/6, Universit\u00e9 Libre de Bruxelles, Avenue Franklin Roosevelt 50, 1050 Brussels, Belgium;"},{"name":"Department of Computer Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium"}]}],"member":"341","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2006,2,16]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_3_1_2","volume-title":"Games of Life","author":"Sigmund K.","year":"1993","unstructured":"K. Sigmund Games of Life (Oxford Univ. 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